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AUTHOR: 


WHEELER,  CHARLES 
KIRKLAND 


TITLE: 


CRITIQUE  OF  PURE 

KANT 

PLACE: 

BOSTON 

DA  TE : 

1911 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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Wheeler,  (Jharles  Kirkland. 

Critique  of  pure  Kant ;  or,  A  real  realism  vs.  a  fictitious 
idealism;  in  a  word,  the  bubble  and  monstrosity  of  the 
Kantian  raetaphysic,  by  Charles  Kirkland  Wheeler  ... 
Boston,  Tlie  Arakelyan  press,  1911. 

298  p.    front.  Cport.)     20^*=".        $1.50 


1  1.  jCant,  Irnmanuel.  1724-1804.  Kritik  der  reinen  vernunft. 

0  11-30799 

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HLMEDBY:    RESEARCH  PUBLICATIONS.  INC  WOODBRIDGE.  CT 


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if   \ 


i\ 


CONTENTS 


PREFACE 7 

CHAPTER  I 
A  Foreword  on  Historic  and  Current  Metaphysic  in 

General   ^' 

CHAPTER  II 
Kant  No  Exception ^^ 

CHAPTER  III 
Kant^s  Scorn  of  the  Possibility  of  Knowledge  of  Objec- 

tive  Truth  Absolute 39 

CHAPTER  IV 
Kant's  Charge  of  the  Consciousness  with  Being  a  Mon- 
umental Falsifier  If  Not  a  Downright  Liar 45 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Vanity  and  Farce  of  Academic  Explanations  of 
How  What  is  Within  the  Mind  is  Yet  Perceived  as 
Without  It  57 

CHAPTER  VI 
Primary  Demonstration  of  an  External  World  Absolute       65 

CHAPTER  VII 
Second   and   Physical   Demonstration   of   an   External 

World  Absolute  75 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Demonstration  of  the  Perception  of  the  External  Physi- 
cal World  Absolute  and  Incidental  Third  One  of 
Its  Existence  ^ 

CHAPTER  IX 
Demonstration  of   Space   and  Time  as  External  and 

Absolute   ^°^ 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Bewilderment  and  Error  of  Kanf  s  A  Priori  Intui- 
tion—His  Total   Bewilderment   and   Error   at   a 
Climax ^^^ 


'V 


'^**.i.; 


I 


ll' 


\ 


CHAPTER  XI 
EflFects  or  Impressions  of  the  External  World  Absolute 
on  the  Mind  a  Fiction  —  Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fic- 
tion —  For  What  Is  Mind?  IS9 

CHAPTER  XII 
Demonstration  That  What  Only  in  External  Perception 
We  Perceive  Is  the  External  World  Absolute  and 
That  All  Illusion  Springs  Only  of  Not  Perceivmg 
It  Exhaustively,  Mechanically  loi 

CHAPTER  XIII 
Persistence  of  Perception  by  the  Mind  vs.  Persistence 

of  Impression  on  It ^93 

CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Sensibility  No  Passive  Faculty  of  the  Mind,  Neither 
Any  Faculty  of  the  Mind  at  All  as  is  Neither  Mem- 
ory any  Faculty  of  It 201 

CHAPTER  XV 
Demonstration  of  Kant's  Categoricals  or  the  Sort  of 

Nothing  the  Origin  He  Assumed  for  Them 209 

CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Primordial  Mental  the  Intrinsic  Nature  of  the  Ex- 
ternal World  Absolute 217 

CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Mind  of  Kant's  Exploitation  a  Sheer  Abstraction  — 

a  Phantom  of  a  Riotous  Fancy 231 

CHAPTER  XVIII 
The  Academic  Legend  of  Mind  Knowing  Only  Mind 

Only  Academic  Nonsense  237 

CHAPTER  XIX 
Original  Versus  A  Priori  Intuition 249 

CHAPTER  XX 
Summary  in  Brief  and  Large  Conclusions  in  Philosophy 

and  Criticism  Arrived  At 207 

PART  II 
CHAPTER  XXI 
The  Critique  of  the   Practical  Reason  or  Kant  Once 
Judge  on  the  Bench  NOW  Down  Within  the  Bar 

as  Prosecuting  Attorney  285 

Appendix  A 291 


i    'I 


I 


^ 


CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  KANT 


OR 


A  Real  Realism  vs.  A  Fictitious  Idealism 


IN  A  WORD 


The  Bubble  and  Monstrosity 

OF  THE 

Kantian  Metaphysic 


BY 


CHARLES  KIRKLAND  WHEELER 


•{J. 


"iVb,  what  we  desire  is  Truth,  Truth  only, 
even  if  it  be  something  most  frightful  and 
most  ugly.  Never  ask  if  a  truth  be  profita- 
ble, or  if  it  be  a  calamity''— Nietzsche. 


BOSTON 

368  Congress  Street 
1911 


MUi- 


Oi 


''vv't/A^s^-tA 


(^/>   2.^^^ 


Copyright,  191 1 
By  Charles  K.  Wheeler. 


I  - 


6 

i£ 


/  am  God  in  Nature;  I  am  a  weed  by  the  wall. 

—  Emerson, 


DEDICATED 

To  the  Propagation  of  the  Hundredth  Century 
Philosophy,  or  the  Doctrine  of  our  Oneness  with  the 
ONE  — oneness  of  ourselves  individually  as  a  part, 
and  of  ourselves  and  all  things  collectively  as  a  form 
or  aspect  of  the  ONE,  with  the  ONE;  and  Doctrine  of 
the  Oneness  of  source  of  consciousness  and  the  physical 


They  reckon  ill  who  leave  me  out. 

If  me  they  Hy  I  am  the  wings, 
I  am  the  doubter  and  the  doubt; 

I  am  the  hymn  the  Brahman  sings. 

—  Emerson. 


J 


% 


Monism  is  not  the  identity  of  nature  of  mind  and 
matter,  which  is  to  say  is  not  the  intercommen^urability 
of  mind  an<i  matter,  which  are  no  more  intercommens- 
urable  than  are  petal  and  perfume  of  a  flower,  but 
identity  of  origin,  as  are  petal  and  perfume  of  a  flower 
of  identity  of  origin,  namely,  the  seed. 


i 


PREFACE 

It  is  proposed  in  this  dissertation  and  polemic 
to  show  up  the  bubble  and  monstrosity  of  the 
Kantian  metaphysic;  its  utter  absurdity,  its  utter 
silliness,  its  utter  —  well,  what  stronger  terms  shall 
I  use?  For  surely  and  indeed,  what  does  a  man  see 
when  he  looks  —  or  rather  what  perceive  when  he 
perceives?  Perceives  what  primarily  his  perception 
is  aimed  at,  or  something  else  short  of  it?  Kant 
said  he  perceives  in  the  direction  of  an  outlying 
world  absolute  —  which  he,  Kant,  when  not  con- 
tradicting himself,  dogmatically  assumed  and  af- 
firmed to  exist,  —  but  perceives  it  not ;  perceives  in 
the  direction  of  such  world,  but  perceives  only  its 
some  effects  on  the  mind,  and  nothing  of  that  world 
itself ;  —  or  no,  perceives,  indeed,  hardly  even  those 
any  effects  on  the  mind,  hut  only  the  mind's  effects 
on  those  effects;  —  which  is  in  fact  not  to  perceive 
quite  those  any  effects  on  the  mind,  even.  And  this 
pronouncement  of  Kanf s  is  echoed  from  the  chairs 
of  philosophy  of  a  thousand  universities  the  world 
over. 

The  only  alternative  proposition,  of  course,  is 
that  a  man  peers  out  at  an  external  world  absolute 
and  perceives  it;  perceives  it,  something  of  it,  very 
it  itself,  the  external  world  absolute  that  his  per- 


/ 


8 


Preface 


ception  primarily  is  aimed  at.  And  that  proposition 
we  will  find  the  true  one;  any  other  and  contrary 
one,  only  ridiculous. 

That,  as  perceiving  that  world,  very  it  itself, 
we  should,  or  should  not  perceive  it  for  such  alto- 
gether as  it  is  in  itself,  does  not  matter;  we  still 
perceive  it,  very  it  itself.  That,  for  the  distance,  I 
should  not  distinguish  between  a  horse  and  a  cow, 
does  not  matter  as  wherefore  that  I  should  not  still 
perceive  the  horse  or  the  cow;  should  not  still  per- 
ceive something,  something  common  to  them  both; 
should  not  still,  as  it  is  an  absolute  object,  perceive 
the  absolute  object. 

But  now,  mind  you,  that  on  the  Truth  or 

FALSITY  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  PERCEPTION  OF 
AN  OUTLYING  WORLD  ABSOLUTE,  HINGES  PRIMARILY 
THE  VALIDITY  OF  THE  WHOLE  KaNTIAN  TRANSCEN- 
DENTAL ESTHETIC,  AND  EVEN  METAPHYSIC.     It  doCS 

not  hinge  primarily,  as  some  are  prone  to  suggest, 
on  the  possibility  of  knowledge  independent  of 
(sensuous)  experience. 

Therefore,  undermine  the  notion  that  we  per- 
ceive only  what  Kant  calls  "phenomena,"  and  all 
that  is  distinctive  and  vital  of  his  philosophy  is  ex- 
ploded.  Or,  once  prove  either  that  there  are  no 
direct  effects,  effects  properly  such,  of  an  external 
world  absolute  on  the  mind,  still  that  there  should 
be  such  world;  or  that,  either  as  there  are,  or  are 
not,  any  direct  effects  of  that  world  on  the  mind, 
yet  is  such  world  as  that  which  perception  is  pri- 
marily aimed  at,  perceived,  something  of  it,  very 
itself  perceived ;  —  and  at  once  is  the  entire  Kantian 


i 


Preface  9 

doctrine  of  knowledge  shattered  from  end  to  end; 
it  is  annihilated. 

But  now,  yet,  I  am  to  add  that,  still  that  I  have 
said  that  prove  so  and  so  and  follows  so  and  so,  yet 
does  the  burden  of  proof  not,  after  all,  rest  with 
the  sceptic  to  prove  the  negative  to  an  earlier  posi- 
tive, but  with  the  doctrinaire  of  the  earlier  positive 
doctrine  to  prove  that  earlier  positive  doctrine.  And 
it  is  Kant's  that  is  the  earlier  positive  doctrine, 
namely,  that,  in  external  perception  we  perceive 
only  another  world  than  the  one  absolute  as  outly- 
ing the  mind;  only  another  than  the  one  at  which 
the  perception  is  primarily  aimed.  And  hence  it 
is  with  him  rests  the  burden  of  proof,  and  to 
demonstrate  his  positive  contention. 

However,  as  I  have  myself  something  of  a  meta- 
physical philosophy  of  my  own  that  is  famishing 
for  amplification  and  further  airing,  I  propose  to 
take  over  to  myself  somewhat  of  the  burden  of 
proof  properly  resting  with  Kant,  and  to  direct  it 
to  the  establishment  of  my  own  doctrine  as  against 
his,  and,  in  part,  in  this  manner,  overthrow  his, 
while  in  another  part,  affording  the  finishing  ex- 
tinguishing touches  to  him  and  his  as  is  kept  up,  at 
the  same  time,  a  running  fire  more  direct  on  his 
crucial,  fundamental,  and  stupendous  errors. 

This  may  not  be  making  assault  on  an  enemy  ac- 
cording to  academic  formula,  but  the  formula  is  yet 
mine;  and  I  shall  still  expect  to  make  it  effective  in 
making  plain  the  unquestionable  humbug  Immanuel 
Kant  was  as  a  metaphysical  philosopher;  effective 
in    bringing    into    the    limelight    the    bubble    and 


10 


Preface 


monstrosity  of  the  fundamental  fancy  or  fancies  of 
the  whole  phantasmagoria  of  his  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason ;  to  say  nothing  of  what  is  worse  even,  that 
of  his  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  practically  the  follow- 
ing is  a  treatise  driven  to  double-harness,  as  it  were, 
in  which  is  strenuously  argued  an  original  meta- 
physical and  otherwise  philosophy;  and,  again,  in 
which  a  fierce  assault  is  made  on  Immanuel  Kant 
as  a  philosopher;  Kant  who  is  surely  by  a  future 
generation  to  be  shoved  from  his  present  pedestal, 
and  his  metaphysic  suffer  little  better  than  consign- 
ment to  oblivion. 


k 


\ 


At  the  present  stage  of  the  game,  the  stage  of  our 
own  and  all  things*  existence,  it  is  first  and  last  the  egg 
with  the  hen  sandwiched  between;  but  with  the  uni- 
verse in  the  beginning,  it  was  (is)  first  the  egg,  and 
only  afterwards  the  hen  which  lays  the  egg. 


"REASON  NOT  THE  ARBITER  OF  REALITY?" 

Well  it  IS,  indeed  that  arbiter  — as  distinguish- 
ing what  is  only  contingent  Reality  from  Absolute  Real- 
ity. And  Reason's  dictum  is  that  anything  that  obtains 
at  all,  though  but  contingently,  that  is,  but  as  dependent 
on  other  Reality,  is  Reality;  while  Absolute  Reality  is 
Reality  dependent  on  no  other  Reality  and  on  nothing. 

Thus,  the  waves  of  the  sea  are  Reality  as  much  as 
is  anything  —  while  they  last ;  but  are  only  as  contingent 
Reality  to  Absolute  Reality,  which  Itself,  relatively,  the 
sea  is ;  and  so,  again,  what  you  think,  whatever  it  is,  is, 
as  much  as  is  anything.  Reality  —  while  you  think  it ;  but 
is  only  contingent  Reality,  contingent  as  dependent  on 
other  Reality  which  itself  you  yourself  are  and  on 
which  it  is  contingent. 

Consequently,  as  will  be  understood,  a  snake  seen  by 
a  man  suflfering  from  delirium  tremens  is  just  as  much 
Reality  while  he  sees  it,  as  a  snake  seen  by  the  normal 
mind;  just  as  much  Reality,  only  nothing  of  Absolute 
Reality  which  yet  the  snake  seen  by  the  normal  is 
verily  something  of,  and  by  the  normal  mind  verily 
seen,  just  as  much  seen  as  is  the  abnormal  snake  by  the 
abnormal  mind  —  Kant  and  all  his  following  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 


~> 


Part  I 
CRITIQUE  OF   PURE   REASON 


Page  123— 7th   line    from   bottom,    read— better,    in    place    of 

"beter." 
Page  255— 8th  line  from  bottom,  read— sensibility,  in  place  of 

"sinsibility." 
Page  276— 1st  line  from  bottom,  read— spiritual,  in  place  of 

"spirtal." 


What  Illusions  and  Delusions  do  men  live  in  in  their 
Theories^  What  Reality  do  they  live  in  in  their  practi- 
cal, every-day  lifef 


K 


1 


CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  KANT 


If  ever  there  was  in  the  whole  history  of  Philosophic 
thought  what  has  been  more  barren  of  truth,  meanwhile, 
more  rife  with  dire  mischief  than  anything  else,  it  is 
Philosophy  understood  as  the  contemplation  of  mind  in 
the  abstract,  and  as  "the  occupation  of  the  reason, '  the 
reason  as  divorced  from  the  senses,  "with  itself,  and 
on  which  it  is  dogmatically  assumed,  that  the  activ- 
ity of  the  senses,  if  not  even  the  senses  themselves,  is 
dependent.  And  yet  this  describes  not  only  Kantian 
but  also,  in  good  part,  academic  Philosophy,  since  the 
triumvirate  of  Kant,  Hegel,  and  Schopenhauer. 


A  Foreword  on  Historical  and  Current  Metaphysic 

In  General 

Even  in  Kant's  time,  as  well  as  in  all  time  be- 
fore him  and  his  great  work  —  great  in  bulk  — 
was  evolved  and  written,  the  general,  well-nigh 
universal  conviction  was  that  the  manifest  universe 
was  a  snap  creation ;  but  that  notion  is  now  as  com- 
pletely obsolete  with  all  intelligent  minds  as  a  last 
year's  setting  sun.  The  universe  an  evolution  has 
come  to  take  its  place;  the  universe  an  evolution 
what  is  as  fundamentally  a  different  thing  from  the 
universe  a  snap  creation  as  is  a  grown  rose  from  a 
maufactured  one.  And,  necessarily,  miust  a  meta- 
physic or  philosophy  that  is  a  fit  for  the  latter  be  a 
misfit  for  the  former;  and,  too,  be  now  antiquated 
and  worthless.  And  yet,  even  today,  the  academic 
hierarchy  at  the  centres  of  learning,  in  their  dis- 
gusting and  deadly  Bourbonism,  go  right  on  dis- 
coursing metaphysics  and  philosophy  in  terms  of 
the  universe  a  snap  creation,  as  though  the  only 
difference  between  the  one  universe  and  the  other 
was  that  between  tweedledom  and  tweedledee;  go 
right  on  discoursing  as  though  nothing  had  hap- 


/ 


i8 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


pened  in  the  last  hundred  years,  —  no  earthquake, 
as  it  were,  with  the  earth  opening  and  swallowing 
up  their  childish,  petty,  and  petted  notions ;  no  bomb 
explosion  at  the  very  heart  of  metaphysics  and 
philosophy  current  since  the  days  of  Kant,  Hegel 
and  Schopenhauer. 

And,  still,  it  is  very  truth  that  the  increase  of 
knowledge  during  the  last  century  has  been  greater 
than  during  all  the  thousand  centuries  or  more  gone 
before  put  together  that  man  has  been  on  the  planet. 

But  what  is  that  to  a  stupid,  stolid,  and  effete 
metaphysics !    What  is  it  to  an  Egyptian  mummy ! 

Then  again,  the  drift  of  this  vast  increase  of 
knowledge  of  which  the  universe  an  evolution  is  one 
considerable,  and  perhaps  the  leading  item,  is  to 
reduce  the  extreme  or  absolute  divorce,  of  Kant's 
day,  of  the  any  manifestation  from  that  manifest- 
ing, divorce  of  the  physical  from  mind,  to  well-nigh 
the  vanishing  point. 

But  what,  again,  is  even  that,  momentous  as  it  is, 
to  that  same  stupid,  stolid,  effete  metaphysics;  what 
to  an  Egyptian  mummy ! 

And,  yet,  is  ifc  nothing  to  be  reckoned  with,  in- 
deed, that  it  has  come  to  be  seen  that  you  can  little 
better  wrench  the  physical  from  mind  and  still  have 
anything  left  at  all,  left  anything  at  all  even  of  mind, 
than  you  can  wrench  from  a  plane  one  of  its  two 
surfaces  and  still  have  left  anything  even  of  the 
plane  at  all? 

Nevertheless,  the  Kantian  metaphysic,  which  is 
identified  with  this  almost  absolute  divorce,  is  still 
the  "golden  calf'  before  which  to  this  hour  the 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General      19 

whole  academic  world  is  prostrate  as  before  a  very 
god  —  prostrate  before,  I  had  liked  to  have  said,  as 

before  very  God ! 

Men,  in  truth,  are  slow  enough  to  move  out  of 
the  old  and  into  the  new  even  when  of  the  error  of 
the  old  and  of  the  truth  of  the  new  there  is  physical 
demonstration  to  be  afforded,  as  the  history  of  the 
warfare  of  science  only  too  abundantly  assures  us; 
but  when,  as  in  metaphysical  philosophy,  there  is 
never,  or  rarely,  such  physical  demonstration  with- 
in reach,  and  only  a  rational  one  at  the  most,  within 
the  possibilities  in  support  of  a  proposition,  they  are 
infinitely  slower  still  to  move  out  of  a  rut  of  their 
long  training  and  thinking,  until  it  would  seem 
sometimes  as  though  only  a  million  horse-power 
derrick  could  lift  them  out  of  it.  And  hence  what 
is  only  the  to  be  expected  is  likely  to  happen ;  and 
that  metaphysical  philosophy,  and  philosophy  in 
general  in  fact,  will  lag  a  thousand,  perhaps  ten 
thousand  years,  behind  physical  science,  and  the 
world's  progress  generally. 

Meantime,  it  has,  every  now  and  then  its  fresh 
makeshifts  for  genuine  straight  philosophy  as  just 
now,  for  example,  it  has  in  Pragmatism  what  itself, 
metaphorically  speaking,  is,  at  best,  but  as  a  fugus 
to  a  musical  theme;  still  that  its  sponsors,  and  par- 
ticularly its  most  eminent  one,  would  seem  working 
night  and  day,  straining  every  nerve  to  jack  it  up 
—  to  keep  up  the  figure  —  to  the  dignity  of  very  a 
musical  theme,  pure  and  simple,  itself. 

Meantime,  I  say,  metaphysical  philosophy  in- 
clines to  have  its  makeshifts,  as  just  now  in  Prag- 


20 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


matism,  but  not  its  revolution  which  is  its  most 
pressing  need;  not  revolution,  because  those  re- 
sponsible for  the  former  have  just  independence 
and  originality  enough  to  conjure  up  a  freak  substi- 
tute, but  not  enough  to  discover  and  correct  the 
gross  fundamental  errors  of  what,  once  these  were 
eliminated,  might  assume  in  very  truth  the  dignity 
of  genuine  metaphysical  philosophy  itself. 

But  why,  why,  for  centuries,  has  academic  meta- 
physical philosophy  made  no  material  advance? 
True,  system  has  succeeded  system;  but  mere  suc- 
cession of  systems  is  not  progress.  There  is,  to  this 
hour,  not  onl^  no  theory  of  mind  and  its  relations 
to  its  medium,  commanding  the  interest  and  respect 
of  intelligent  and  cultivated  minds,  generally,  but 
there  is  not  such  at  his  moment,  having  even  the 
indorsement  of  metaphysicians,  in  general,  them- 
selves;—  and  wherefore,  as  I  have  said,  Pragma- 
tism and  Humianism,  the  latest  freak  candidates  for 
philosophical  recognition. 

Meanwhile,  for  metaphysicians  themselves  as  a 
class,  there  is,  among  men  of  sense  and  learning, 
outside  metaphysicians  themselves,  only  a  waning 
regard,  only,  as  just  hinted,  an  ill  concealed  con- 
tempt even,  quite  the  contrary  of  the  growing  re- 
spect in  which  men  of  modern  science  are  being 
held.  But  why  only  stagnation  in  one  case,  and  all 
progress  in  the  other?  Why  only  a  pitying  suffer- 
ance for  the  metaphysician,  but  a  profound  regard 
for  the  man  of  science?  Why  but  that,  on  a  last 
analysis,  every  philosopher  of  front  rank  down  to 
this  hour,  has  set  out  with  a  pure  assumption  instead 


I 


« 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General     21 

of  only  with  what  is  of  the  most  absolute  knowl- 
edge; has  set  out  with  the  rank  dogmatic  assump- 
tion of  the  primacy  and  transcendency  of  the  con- 
sciousness or  conscious  mind  what  we  can  by  no 
possibly  positively  know  and  can  at  best  only  be- 
lieve ;  a  proposition,  in  fact,  the  most  childish  and  in- 
ane, and  of  which  there  is  not,  high  nor  low,  far  nor 
near,  so  mjuch  as  the  shadow  of  evidence  or  proof; 
—  has  set  out  with  this  instead  of  with  the  three 
great  primary  facts  of  consciousness  of  which  we 
have  the  most  absolute  knowledge.  This  on  a  last 
analysis. 

And  then  on  a  proximate  one  why,  again,  but 
that  the  metaphysician  —  or  philosopher  —  prima- 
rily makes  himself  utterly  ridiculous;  — 

(i)  generally,  when  not  wobbling  as  to  the 
validity  of  the  primary  consciousness,  by  repudiat- 
ing that  validity. 

(2)  often,  by  expending  oceans  of  mental  ammu- 
nition in  debating  whether  the  external  world  of 
our  sensuous  perception  is  a  world  absolute,  or  not; 
and  this,  too,  yet  that  assuming  at  the  outset  with- 
out question  or  quibble,  the  existence  of  other  human 
beings  than  himself,  which  other  human  beings  are 
themselves  an  external  world  absolute  (supposing 
them  to  exist),  and  known  to  exist  only  with  a 
knowledge  contingent  on  very  that  of  the  existence 
of  the  external  physical  absolute  about  the  existence 
of  which  is  all  this  academic  fuss  and  feathers  of 
uncertainty ; 

(3)  often,  again,  by  wasting  many  times  the 
samje  amount  of  brain  force  in  debating  whether  we 


22 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


veritably  perceive  such  world,  or  not,  and  ending, 
as  a  rule,  with  flatly  denying  that  we  do ; 

(4)  almost  invariably,  by  divorcing  such  as  he 
recognizes  as  alone  the  mental  from  the  physical, 
and  then  harrying  a  fraction  of  that  mental  into  the 
endeavor  to  lift  itself  by  its  own  bootstraps  as  it 
were;  the  endeavor,  that  is,  to  spin  unassisted  out 
of  its  own  belly,  spider  like,  the  philosophy  of  its 
own  nature  and  relations;  and  even  not  only  that 
of  its  own  nature  and  relations  but  also  that  of  what 
might  be  the  nature  and  relations  of  the  whole 
mental  altogether,  —  an  endeavor  as  senseless  and 
futile  as  would  be  an  attempt  at  the  explanation  of 
a  rectangular  plane,  blind  to  one  of  its  surfaces,  in 
the  absence  of  which  the  plane  itself  does  not  even 
exist  to  explain ; 

(5)  by  religiously  refusing  to  recognize,  for  a 
moment,  physics  as  anything  that  could  in  the  least 
afford  a  clue  to  the  solution  of  problems  in  meta- 
physics ; 

(6)  by  steadily  either  overlooking,  or  ignoring 
one  of  the  three  great  primary  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, one  yet  well-nigh  as  conspicuous  and  unques- 
tioned by  the  mind  as  answering  to  objective  reality 
absolute  as  either  of  the  two  others  of  awareness 
of  one's  own  existence,  and  again  of  external  per- 
ception, the  fact,  namely,  of  the  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  a  plurality  of  minds  and  their  experi- 
ence ;  —  either  by  overlooking,  or  by  ignoring  this 
fact,  first,  as  a  fact  of  consciousness  simply,  and 
again,  as  a  working  factor,  in  any  attempt  at  the 
elaboration  of  a  system  of  philosophy ;  and  this  last, 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General     23 

still  that,  as  a  working  factor,  such  recognition  is  a 
sine  qua  non  datum  in  any  demonstration,  the  any 
primary  demonstration  at  least,  of  the  objective  truth 
absolute  of  the  existence  of  an  objective  world  ab- 
solute, even  of  a  two^fold  such  world. 

And  let  here  clearly  be  understood  a  most  im- 
portant discrimination  to  be  made.  So,  mind  that 
I  do  not  say  that  the  metaphysician  has  not  recog- 
nized the  existence  of  other  minds,  other  human 
beings,  than  himself,  as  objective  realities,  for  that, 
of  course,  he  has  done,  and  which  it  is  only  vulgar, 
not  philosophical  to  do.  That  is  not  by  complaint  and 
his  error.  But  what  is,  is  that  he,  as  a  metaphysician 
or  philosopher,  has  not  recognised  our  recognition 
of  other  minds,  first,  as  a  primary  fact  of  conscious- 
ness simply,  and  then  again  as  a  working  factor  in 
the  solution  of  mind-world  problems.  It  is  that  he 
has  not  recognized  our  recognition  of  the  existence 
of  a  plurality  of  minds,  between  which,  the  recogni- 
tion of  our  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  plural- 
ity of  minds  as  a  simple  fact  of  consciousness,  and 
the  recognition  of  their  existence  as  an  obpjective 
fact  absolute,  there  is  an  infinite  difference. 

And  I  repeat,  —  and  note  well  the  discrimina- 
tion, —  that  my  criticism  is  not  that  he,  at  such 
time,  has  not  assumed  in  the  matter,  for  he  has; 
and  assumed  the  existence  of  other  minds  than  his 
own.  It  is  not  that  at  all,  since  he,  as  a  metaphys- 
ician, has  no  business  to  assume  at  the  outset  the 
objective  existence,  the  objective  existence  absolute, 
of  anything.  His  business  at  starting  is  solely  with 
the  primary  facts  of  consciousness,  and  his  con- 


I 


24  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

sciousness,  for  he,  in  the  beginning,  is  not  supposed 
to  know  any  other;  and  with  the  primary  facts  of 
consciousness  as  such  facts  of  consciousness  simply ; 
and  only  with  the  any  possible  correlated  objective 
facts  absolute  as  such  are  first  argued  and  demon- 
strated from  those  primary  facts  of  consciousness. 
The  latter  are,  at  the  ou|et,  the  metaphysician's  only 
asset ;  his  only  legitimate  capital  to  set  up  in  busi- 
ness with.  Or  these,  shall  we  say,  are  the  shell 
which  the  chick  of  subjective  knowledge  is  to  peck 
its  way  out  of  into  the  open  of  objective  knowledge, 
even  of  objective  knowledge  absolute.  Only  these 
primarily  has  he  to  labor  with  for  returns,  which  is 
to  say  for  convictions  whether  as  to  other  subjec- 
tive, or  as  to  objective  truth,  such  absolute,  or  other- 
wise. 

Whether  there  are  actually  other  minds  than 
each  his  own  to  recognize,  is  no  matter.  That 
recognition  that  such  there  are  is  just  as  much  a 
fact  of  consciousness  as  were  there  none  other;  just 
as  much  such  fact  as  is  the  perception  of  stone  or  tree, 
or  as  is  one's  awareness  of  his  own  existence.  And 
to  slight  the  bearing  of  even  one  of  the  three  great 
primary  facts  of  consciousness  were  bad  enough ;  but 
to  blink  that  one  of  the  immeasurable  moment  of 
the  recognition  of  other  minds  than  each  his  own 
and  their  experience,  borders  on  a  philosophical 
crime.  It  is  at  least  a  stupendous  mistake  fraught 
with  nothing  less  than  philosophic  calamity;  and 
still  a  mistake,  as  I  repeat,  and  repeat  made  by  every 
philosopher  since  philosophy  began. 

The    mistake    makes    simply    impossible    the 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General     25 

demonstration,  or  at  least  impossible  the  most  pri- 
mary demonstration,  of  the  one  thing  of  forempst 
philosophical  concern,  the  thing,  namely,  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  two-fold  external  world  absolute,  of 
one  part  a  plurality  of  minds,  and  of  another,  of 
what  we  recognize  as  the  physical. 

In  short,  it  might  about  as  soon  be  expected  to 
determine  the  dimensions  of  a  triangle  with  a 
knowledge  of  only  two  of  the  three  geometrical  ele- 
ments that  must  be  known  to  do  it,  as  to  expect  a 
solution  of  mind-world  problems  with  a  recognition 
of  only  two  of  the  three  facts  of  consciousness  in- 
volved in  that  solution.  It  would  be  nearly  as  hope- 
less in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  The  two  facts 
of  consciousness,  facts  of  awareness  of  one's  own 
existence,  and  of  external  perception,  and  then  the 
third,  one  of  the  recognition  of  the  existence  of 
other  minds,  as  facts  of  consciousness  simply,  are 
the  bed-rock  foundation  of  all  genuine  metaphysics 
and  philosophy  —  and  nothing  less  is.  And  par- 
ticularly, with  this  last  fact  scorned,  or  overlooked, 
is  every  metaphysical  or  philosophical  system,  how- 
ever elaborately  and  ingeniously  mortised  and 
girded,  but  a  tumble-down  shack  from  the  start. 
And  still,  for  all  this,  as  I  am  going  to  assure  the 
reader  even  again,  it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that 
every  philosopher  born  under  the  sun  since  the  be- 
ginning of  philosophy,  has,  in  his  any  attempt  to 
work  out  a  solution  of  mind-world  problems,  either 
scorned,  or  overlooked  it  —  overlooked  it,  rather, 
as  would  appear.  And  still,  too,  have  they  one  and 
all,  these  pseudo  philosophers,  who  have  scuttled 


26 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


their  own  ships  at  the  moment  of  weighing  anchor, 
hoped  to  reach  port  and  haven  of  philosophic  rest; 
and  have  even  made  pretense  of  having  done  so. 
But,  of  course,  it  was  only  to  their  own  satisfaction 
that  they  ever  did,  not  to  that  of  others.  Doubt  it  ? 
Well,  that  no  one  has  achieved  more  is  testified  to 
to  this  very  hour,  of  the  time  immemorial  lack  of 
unanimity  of  opinion  touching  philosophic  funda- 
mentals among  the  maritime  brethren  each  on  a  like 
voyage  of  discovery  of  all  the  others. 

Meanwhile,  every  voyager  has  created  more 
problems  than  he  has  solved,  besides  raising  no  little 
dust  of  uncertainty  about  not  a  few  he  has  affected  to 
clear  up  but  failed  to. 

These,  then,  the  foregoing,  in  part  at  least,  why 
academic  transcendental  philosophy  has  so  long  re- 
mained at  a  standstill,  besides  being  sneered  at; 
and  why  metaphysicians  themselves  command  but 
indifferent  regard.  But  systems  of  philosophy— sys- 
tem of  Kant,  system  of  Hegel,  system  of  Schopen- 
hauer, and  that  of  Fichte  and  of  Schiller  and  the 
rest  —  the  crazy-patch  philosophy  of  the  conglom- 
erate ensemble  of  them  all !  Yet,  why  should  there 
be  systems  of  philosophy,  more  than  systems  of 
modern  science?  Why  is  there?  Why?  —  Only, 
that  every  one  extant  of  them  all  is  rotten  at  the 
core  in  respect  at  least  of  somie  one  or  more,  or  even 
all,  the  fundamental  fallacies  I  have  named,  and 
with  special  emphasis  on  the  one  I  have  particularly 
called  attention  to.  Or  only,  again,  th^t  the  scien- 
tific method  in  metaphysic,  if  not  positively  scouted, 
is  at  least  ignored. 


.v; 

A". 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General     27 

But  it  is  at  least  astonishing  that  in  the  whole 
history  of  philosophy,  no  system  has  ever  set  out  with 
the  recognition  of  all  the  three  great  primary  facts 
of  consciousness,  upon  which  I  have  laid  so  much 
stress,  namely,  fact  of  awareness  of  one's  own  ex- 
istence, fact  of  external  perception,  and  fact  of  the 
recognition  of  the  existence  of  other  minds  than 
each  his  own ;  astonishing  that  none  has  ever  started 
with  the  recognition  of  all  these  as  facts  of  con- 
sciousness simply,  and  again,  as  working  factors,  all 
of  them,  in  the  solution  of  mind-world  problems, 
only  as  with  the  recognition  of  which  it  started, 
and  as  with  which  labored  or  wrestled,  could  the 
system  promise  a  success  and  be  any  way  worthy 
of  the  august  appellation  of  either  metaphysic  or 
philosophy;  only  as  with  which  it  set  out  could  its 
conduct  be  after  the  manner  of  science  in  physics. 

But  is  there  never  to  be  escape  out  of  this  meta- 
physical wilderness,  this  philosophical  delirium, 
this  crazy-patch  ensemble  of  speculations  of  Kant, 
Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  and  the  lesser  lights  in  the 
metaphysical  firmament,  ensemble  so  intellectually 
sickening  for  its  contradictions  and  absurdities  that 
even  the  exponents  of  it  themselves  suffer  by  reflec- 
tion in  the  estimate  in  which  their  fellowmen  hold 
them? 

No,  never;  or,  at  least,  not  until  that  revolution 
I  have  hinted  at  comes  and  when  then  philosophy 
will  start  with  something  better  than  assumption, 
and  the  pure,  raw,  rank  assumption,  implicit  when 
not  explicit,  of  the  primacy  and  transcendency  of 
the  consciousness  or  conscious  miind.       This  as- 


28 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


sumption  is  its  very  damnation  from  the  outset 
from  which  no  enterprise  of  pursuit  of  it  afterwards 
ever  retrieves  it.  The  philosopher  worthy  of  the 
name,  has  at  setting  out,  no  business  with  assump- 
tions —  not  with  one,  as  I  have  already  insisted  on. 
And  I  repeat  that  his  business,  primarily,  is  only 
with  the  facts,  the  three  great  primary  facts,  of 
consciousness  what  are  nothing  of  assumption 
whatever,  but  matters  of  the  most  absolute  knowl- 
edge. And  a  philosophy  is  worse  than  worthless, 
it  is  a  positive  calamity  as  it  has  any  other  begin- 
ning than  with  these,  and  with  less  than  them  all. 
And  yet,  must  I  say  aguin,  that  there  is  not  a  meta- 
physician of  any  considerable  note  in  the  whole 
history  of  metaphysical  philosophy,  not  one  of  the 
present  generation  even,  who  has  not  set  out  other- 
wise—  not  one;  not  one  who  has  set  out  with  the 
three  primary  facts  of  consciousness,  alone; 
not  one  who  has  not  at  least  overlooked  the  one  of 
them  of  foremost  moment  of  the  three ;  not  one  who 
has  set  out  only  with  what  he  absolutely  knows; 
not  one  who  has  not  set  out  with  what  simply  he 
can  only  believe,  and  with  the  assumption  of  the 
aboriginality  and  transcendency  of  consciousness, 
or  the  conscious  mind  which  he  can  by  no  possibility 
more  than  believe. 

However,  once  comes  the  revolution  above 
hinted,  once  a  philosophy  that  sets  out  with  only 
what  we  absolutely  know,  and  what  then  ? 

Why  then,  maybe,  that  even  yet,  it  will  turn 
out  that  the  vulgar  view,  the  view  even  of  the  plain- 
man  of  the  back-woods,  of  the  nature  and  relation 


A  Foreword  on  Metaphysics  in  General     29 

of  mind  and  matter,  what  the  stilted  and  pedantic 
academic  would  hardly  deign  to  consider,  will  prove 
at  last  more  nearly  the  true  view  after  all.  Maybe, 
even  yet,  that  the  academic  legend  that  "mind 
knows  only  mind,"  which  has  well-nigh  passed  into 
an  axiom,  will  prove  in  the  end  to  have  no  standing 
in  court  at  all,  but,  rather,  be  relegated  to  the  refuse 
heap  of  academic  old  junk. 

Well,  we  are  to  see  what,  if  might  be,  some 
opening  and  auguries  of  such  coming  event. 


The  mystery  of  mysteries  is  how  anything  came  to 
be,  how  anything,  mind  or  matter  came  to  be,  not  how 
a  particular  universe  and  ours  found  being.  The 
former  answered  and  the  latter  is.  To  say  it  had  an 
author  is  only  to  push  inquiry  further  back,  for  who 
or  what  was  the  author  of  that  author?  To  affect 
even  to  apprehend  in  regard  to  it  were  bad  enough; 
but  to  aflfect  to  comprehend  in  the  matter  altogether 
and  to  comprehend  it  as  Kant  did,  and  as  does  every 
Idealist, —  to  say  nothing  of  others, —  as  conscious 
mind  as  author  of  itself  and  all  things,  only  exercises 
•    every  rational  mind  with  sickening  disgust. 

But  yet  we  may,  at  least,  from  the  evidences  within 
our  knowledge  know  something,  if  not  of  the  author- 
ship of  the  universe  of  mind  and  matter  that  we  know 
obtains,  then  of  its  origin,  or  if  not  of  its  final  origin, 
then  of  irs  proximate  final  origin,  if  I  may  so  say,  and 
that  that  is  what  is  much  the  analogue  of  seed  and 
egg:  is  much  that  analogue,  and  when  then  again  we 
are  face  to  face  with  the  mystery  of  mysteries  of  how 
anything  came  to  be,  how  that  what  in  the  universe 
is  much  the  analogue  of  seed  and  egg,  came  to  be. 


The  most  primary  movement  of  the  Absolute  Reality 
(the  Primordial  Mental,)  of  which  we  have  any  knowl- 
edge, is  that  as  that  Absolute  Reality  projects  Itself 
in  the  centrifugal,  and  returns  upon  Itself  in  the  cen- 
tripetal; and  in  virtue  of  which,  the  movement  itself, 
worlds  revolve  about  suns,  and  suns  about  suns;  and 
again,  in  virtue  of  the  return  stroke  of  the  centripetal 
of  which  movement  and  the  ensuing  impact  of  the  Ab- 
solute Reality  on  Itself,  life,  mind  and  consciousness, 
in  ascending  order,  result. 


II 

Kant  No  Exception 

But  now,  the  point  that  chiefly  concerns  us  just 
here,  in  the  present  writing,  is,  Was  there  never  an 
exception  among  pretenders  to  philosophy  as  to  the 
fundamental  errors  indicated,  and  that  exception 
Immanuel  Kant?  No,  not  even  one,  and  that  one, 
Kant.  Not  even  he,  but  at  starting  makes  the  same 
tumble  into  the  same  pitfalls,  pitfalls  of  his  own 
digging,  with  all  the  rest.  For,  at  the  outset,  (a) 
he,  even  he,  impeaches  the  validity  of  the  primary 
consciousness;  (b)  even  he  overlooks  or  ignores 
the  primary  fact  of  consciousness,  as  such  fact 
simply,  of  our  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a 
plurality  of  minds  and  their  experience,  and  fails 
to  avail  himiself  of  it  as  a  working  factor  in  the 
solution  of  mind-world  problems;  (c)  even  he  thinks 
to  divorce  utterly  the  reason  from  the  senses,  the  sen- 
suous experience,  and  the  external  world  absolute, 
and  it  still  function  at  all  and  in  all  its  integrity 
independent  of  them;  (d)  even  he  is  exercised  with 
no  little  doubt  and  debate  as  to  whether  there  is  an 
outlying  world  absolute,  or  not;  (e)  even  he  denies 
outright  our  perception  of  such  world;  and  (f)  he, 
even  he,  is  given  over  to  the  bewilderment  and  aca- 
demic inanity  of  the  mix-up,  interaction,  and 
mutual  modification  of  the  subject  absolute  and  the 
object    absolute,    such   that   neither   is    itself   any 


34 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Kant  No  Exception 


35 


longer,  yet  that,  at  the  last,  the  two,  such  as  they  have 
become,  constitute  the  percipient  and  the  perceived 
of  that  external  perception  as  in  the  end  falls  to  us, 
the  perceived  thereof  constituting,  v^e  are  assured, 
v^hat  is  our  only  external  v^orld  v^e  are  privileged 
to  perceive.  And  these  fatal  fallacies  of  Kant  ob- 
taining early  in  the  exploitation  of  his  metaphysical 
notions,  necessitated  that  his  whole  scheme  of 
metaphysics  be  a  crumbling  ruin  at  his  heels  with 
every  step  taken  in  its  elaboration ;  necessitated  that 
—  to  change  the  figure  —  the  offspring  of  his 
metaphysical  travail  be  an  infant  still-born,  and 
which  his  whole  after  agony  of  dialectics  was  only 
an  effort  to  galvanize  into  an  appearance  of  a  thing 
of  life  what  was,  in  fact,  only  a  thing  of  death. 
And,  indeed,  any  one,  of  itself  and  alone,  of  these 
stupendous  blunders  is  quite  enough  to  hand  over  to 
oblivion  at  last  any  theory  of  mind  and  its  relations 
however  skilfully  and  ingeniously  drawn,  —  and 
of  course  it  does  this  for  Kant's;  does  this  for  his 
which,  still  that  for  more  than  three  gen- 
erations the  whole  academic  world  has  been  buncoed 
]jy  it,  has  not  the  merit  of  being  thus  drawn,  and 
has  only  the  demerit  of  being  so  clumsily  exploited 
with  a  mixture  of  fog  and  fancy  as  to  be  quite  the 
despair  of  his  expounders  and  critics  with  any 
unanimity  to  resolve  into  clear  and  intelligent  mean- 
ing. 

Moreover,  even  nothing  more  than  the  second 
(b)  of  these  most  michievous  mistakes  is  needed 
to  account  for  the  situation,  hereafter  again  to  be 
alluded  to,  in  which,  at  one  stage  of  his  exploitation 


> 

■i 


i 


of  his  doctrine,  Kant  found  himself,  and  of  which 
was  for  the  moment  made  so  impressively  aware; 
nor  needed  again  why,  most  surely,  will  at  last  his 
whole  Transcendental  ^thestic  be  relegated  to  the 
limbo  of  metaphysical  old  junk;  and  he  himself  left, 
not  at  all  a  milestone  to  mark  the  progress  of  meta- 
physical philosophy,  but  left  merely  a  notable  figure 
in  its  history. 

Besides,  it  is  not  to  be  passed  over  without  re- 
mark that  these,  Kant's  fundamental  blunderings 
and  errors,  some  of  them  at  the  very  threshold  of 
his  entry  upon  the  discussion  of  his  subject,  and  all 
of  them  early  in  that  discussion,  imposed  upon  him 
much  what  a  lie,  once  told,  does  upon  the  liar  to  keep 
his  lie  in  countenance,  as  we  say.  As  the  liar,  to 
accomplish  this,  has  to  follow  up  his  first  departure 
from  the  truth  by  endless  hedging  and  dodging,  and 
even  with  a  thousand  and  one  other  straight-out 
lies,  so  Kant,  to  afford  his  own  early  departures  from 
inerrant  doctrine  the  varnish  of  the  living  truth, 
had  to  follow  them  up  with  a  grossly  inflated 
apologetic  of  a  thousand  and  one  pages  of  contra- 
diction, enigma,  and  mystifications,  and  even  other 
as  unequivocal  error  as  his  original.  And  as  with 
the  lie  of  the  outright  liar,  had  it  but  been  the  truth, 
only  a  few  words,  comparatively,  would  have  been 
needed  to  afford  it  exhaustive  utterance;  so  with 
Kant's  foundation  stone  to  his  philosophy,  had  it 
but  been  solid  rock  instead  of  quicksand,  not  a  tithe 
of  the  literature  of  the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason 
—  to  say  nothing  of  the  needlessness  altogether  of 
the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  —  would  have 


36 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


been  required  for  a  genuine  metaphysic  or  philoso- 
phy; meantime  would  have  been  avoided  the  con- 
tradiction, enigma,  and  absurdity  with  which  that 
philosophical  romance  abounds. 

And  indeed,  we  are  all  quite  aware  how  the 
space  around  a  mathematical  point  is  infinite,  while 
the  point  itself,  even  a  concrete  one,  if  such  might 
be  assumed,  occupies  very  little.  And  so  Kant, 
having  first  missed  the  truth  itself  is  found  swirling 
and  discoursing  voluminously  around  it  and  far 
around  it  —  not  knowing,  of  course,  that  it  is  only 
round  it  he  is  talking  —  and  in  the  vain  endeavor  to 
come  upon  it,  the  truth  itself:  hence  the  bloated 
volumes  of  his  two  Critiques. 

However,  nevertheless  the  gigantic  intellectual 
throes  to  make  pass  the  spurious  for  the  genuine, 
error  for  truth,  the  still-born  for  the  living,  still,  in 
the  main,  only  the  spurious,  only  error,  only  the 
dead,  have  we  after  all,  in  the  Critique  of  the  Pure 
Reason  of  Imimanuel  Kant.  Only  this  after  all,  and 
more  for  the  one  reason  than  for  any  other  that  he 
sought  to  determine  the  parallax,  as  one  might  say, 
of  the  remotest  metaphysical  fixed  star  or  stars  with 
only  as  it  were  the  earth's  diameter  for  a  base  line, 
which  could  be  calculated  with  nothing  less  than  the 
^earth's  orbit's  diameter  for  such  line;  sought,  in 
other  words,  to  solve  fundamental  problems  of  mind 
with  less  than  the  recognition  of  all  the  primary 
facts  of  consciousness,  what  could  be  exhaustively 
solved  only  with  the  recognition  of  all,  and  with, 
withal,  the  recognition  at  least  of  the  validity  of  the 
primary  consciousness,  to  start  with. 


Kant  said  that  we  have  only  subjective  knowledge, 
and  because  having  only  such,  can  have  no  knowledge 
of  objective  truth,  objective  truth  absolute;  that  is,  can 
have  no  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  even; — that 
we  can  have  none,  we  whom  we  can  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of,  but  whom  still  we  know  to 
know  tnat  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  our  own  ex- 
istence, and  because  our  knowledge  is  only  subjective! 
Oh!  wonderfully  profound  Immanuel  Kant!  wonder- 
fully profound! 


The  solution  of  problems  in  metaphysics  involves 
an  appeal  to  physics  for  suggestion,  demonstration, 
and  illumination;*  and  only  as  this  is  recognized  must 
not  solution  limp  and  halt  and  finally  in  many,  if  not 
in  all  instances,  fail  altogether.  Wlio  does  not  know 
this  in  this  day  and  generation  must  himself  be  little 
better  than  a  fraud  as  a  philosopher,  and  his  philos- 
ophy a  joke  in  the  estimation  of  first  intelligences  of 
all    mankind. 


Ill 

Kant's  Scorn  of  the  Possibility  of  Knowledge  of 
Objective  Truth  Absolute 

But  Kant  setting  out  under  such  a  cloud  of  mis- 
giving and  error,  setting  out  even  with  a  repudiation 
of  the  validity  of  the  primary  consciousness  itself, 
)liow  would  it,  how  could  it,  be  expected  that  he 
would  ever  arrive  at  truth  at  all?  How  would  it, 
how  could  it,  be  expected  that  he  would  ever  know 
whether  there  was  or  was  not  such  a  thing  as  ob- 
jective truth  absolute,  the  truth  that  first  and  above 
all  it  should  have  been  his  wish,  and  was  his  need 
to  know?  —  how,  even  know  whether  he  himself 
really  existed,  much  less  whether  there  are,  or  are 
not, the  other  objective  truths  absolute  of  an  objective 
world  absolute,  and  of  the  perception  of  that  world, 
as  there  were  any  such?  Of  course  it  would  not, 
could  not,  be  expected  that  he  would,  or  could,  ever 
know;  nay,  more,  and  that  he  should  ever,  would 
be  impossible  —  and  he  did  not  know.  And  indeed 
he  himself  as  much  as  declared  that  he  did  not,  for 
he  contended  that  "Knowledge  of  objective  truth 
[absolute]  is  impossible";  which  was  even  to  say 


40 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


that  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  is  impossible ; 
was  to  say  that  he,  Kant,  didn't  know  that  he  ex- 
isted !    And,  pray,  didn't  Kant  know,  poor  man,  that 

he  existed? 

I  have  said  was  to  say  that  we  do  not  know  that 
we  exist;  for,  what  is  objective  truth  absolute? 
What,  but  truth  that  does  not  depend  on  our  think- 
ing, thinking  its  existence  for  its  existence;  and  our 
own  existence,  of  course,  does  not  depend  on  our 
thinking  that  existence.  So,  I  say  that  very  our  own 
existence  is  objective  truth  absolute,  or  else  zve 
don't  exist;  and  we  have  knowledge  of  that  objec- 
tive truth  absolute,  or  else,  again,  we  don't  know 
that  we  exist ;  which  as  we  do  not,  then  our  aware- 
ness of  our  existence  as  it  would  seem  to  be,  is  no 
evidence  either  of  our  own  existence,  or  of  our 
knowledge  of  that  existence,  which  —  that  our  own 
awareness  of  our  own  existence  is  no  evidence  either 
that  we  exist,  or  that  we  know  that  we  do  —  is 
nothing  less  than  a  reductio  ad  absurdam,  of  the 
whole  proposition  that  "knowledge  of  objective 
truth  [absolute]  is  impossible." 

And  was,  then,  Kant  quite  altogether  a  fool,  as 
he  as  good  as  declared  that  our  awareness  of 
our  own  existence  is  no  evidence  of  our 
existence,  or  of  our  knowledge  of  it?  —  as  he  de- 
clared that  all  knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute 
is  impossible?  One  would  almost  say  so.  Besides, 
reflect  that  Kant,  in  contending  that  knowledge  of 
objective  truth  absolute  is  impossible,  was  contend- 
ing that  consciousness,  as  it  delivered  that  we  had 
knowledge  of  the  objective  truth  absolute  of  our 


"*V?Jrt,> 


Knowledge  of  Objective  Truth  Absolute     41 


own  existence,  was  an  unmitigated  falsifier,  if  not 
a  deliberate  liar !  —  which  is  of  itself  a  stupendous 
absurdity  enough,  one  would  think,  to  discredit  be- 
yond redemption  any  system  of  philosophy  that 
assumed  as  m^lch,  even  were  there  nothing  else  to 
do  it;  and  it  does  this  for  Kant's  even  were  there 
nothing  else  to  do  it  —  which,  however,  to  do  it, 
there  is,  unfortunately,  much  else. 

And,  altogether,  how  are  the  propositions  that 
we  have  no  knowledge  of  our  own  existence,  and 
that  the  primary  consciousness  is  an  out  and  out 
falsifier,  if  not  liar,  for  a  starter  and  augury  for  a 
system  of  philosophy  of  any  sense,  or  validity?  — 
how,  but  for  one  that  must  prove  the  silliest  of  ab- 
surdities, or  infinitely  worse  ? 

But  to  notice  another  form  of  Kant's  putting 
of  it,  in  his  pressing  of  the  matter,  and  as  he  says 
—  "All  within  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge  is  no 
more  than  phenomenal."  And  isn't  it?  Very  well, 
then ;  but  is  not  his  own  existence  "within  the  sphere 
of  his  knowledge"  ?  If  it  is,  then,  accordingly,  his 
own  existence  was  only  "phenomenal" ;  it  was  noth- 
ing real;  he  only  thought  that  he  existed,  that  he 
did  who  himself  had  no  existence  to  think  that 
thought!  Could  anything  short  of  drooling  idiocy 
go  much  further,  and  not  be  it  indeed? 

But  the  end  of  Kant's  absurdity  and  bewilder- 
ment of  mind  in  the  matter  is  not  even  yet.  For  if 
"all  within  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge  is  no  more 
than  phenomenal,"  then  the  existence  of  other  minds 
than  each  his  own  is  not  within  the  sphere  of  our 
knowledge;  or  else,  as  it  is,  then  it  is  only  phenome- 


42 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


nal,  and  other  minds,  other  human  beings  than  each 
himself,  have  no  real  being,  only  each  himself  has, 
—  or  has,  only  that,  as  we  have  just  seen,  even  each 
himself  has  none !  Oh  ye  gods !  of  what  profundity 
was  the  mind  of  Immanuel  Kant ! 


To  affect  to  vault  somehow  into  a  judgment-seat 
above  consciousness  and  solemnly  "hand  down  de- 
cisions" of  its  validity  or  of  its  invalidity,  after  the 
manner  of  a  court  of  last  resort,  would  be  excruciat- 
ingly ludicrous  were  it  not  so  idiotic.  And  yet,  not 
only  Kant,  but  every  genuine  idealist  —  which  Kant 
was  not  —  does  just  this  thing! 


i 


Consciousness,  according  to  Kant,  only  lacks  intent 
to  falsify  — and  with  some  doubt,  indeed,  of  its  lack- 
ing even  that  — that  it  should  not  itself  be  the  ab- 
original and  most  monumental  of  all  Ananiasesl 


IV 

Kant's  Charge  of  the  Consciousness  with  Being  a 
Monumental  Falsifier  if  not  a  Downright  Liar 

And  is  not  the  cast  of  mind  indicated  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  just  the  cast  you  might  expect 
would  impeach  the  validity  of  the  primary  con- 
sciousness? Have  not  I  just  shown  that  Kant  did 
impeach  it?  Isn't  there  denial  of  validity  in  the 
denial  of  all  knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute? 
—  in  the  denial  even  of  objective  truth  absolute 
itself?  Does  not  consciousness  declare  the  objective 
truth  absolute  of  our  own  existence?  and  again,  that 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  objective  truth  absolute  of 
our  own  existence?  And  isn't  then,  to  deny,  our 
any  knowledge  of  such  facts  or  truths  in  effect  to 
impeach  the  validity  of  consciousness? 

Then,  again,  there  is  the  delivery  in  conscious- 
ness of  external  perception,  perception  external  to 
the  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  that  declares 
it ;  which,  either  means  that  there  is  perception,  the 
perceptive  act  itself,  external  to  the  consciousness  or 
conscious  mind  —  which  even  Kant  himself  would 
say,  as  would  his  every  disciple,  was  nonsense;  or 
else  means  that  there  is  by  the  mind  the  perceptive 
act,  and  the  perception  extending  beyond  the  mind. 
But  in  either  case  there  is  delivered  an  external,  is 


46 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


delivered  and  declared  an  out,  out  absolute,  to  that 
namely,  the  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  that 
delivers  or  declares  it ;  and  is  delivered  and  declared 
that  out  absolute  in  the  very  delivery  and  declara- 
tion in  consciousness  of  external  perception. 

In  other  words,  —  even  if  it  be  to  repeat,  —  there 
is  deliverance,  in  consciousness,  of  external  percep- 
tion which  deliverance  is,  ipso  facto,  deliverance  of 
an  out,  out  absolute,  of  the  mind;  which  is  to  say 
that  awareness  or  knowledge  of  external  perception 
is,  ipso  facto,  awareness  or  knowledge  of  an  out 
absolute;  and  is  to  say,  moreover,  that  as  that  out 
absolute  as  an  out  absolute,  as  it  obtains,  is  an  ob- 
jective truth  absolute,  awareness  or  knowledge  of 
an  out  absolute  is  awareness  or  knowledge  of  objec- 
tive truth  or  fact  absolute  and  of  the  objective  truth 
absolute  of  an  out  absolute  of  the  mind. 

When,  therefore,  Kant  declares  knowledge  of 
objective  truth  absolute  impossible,  which  is  to  say 
knowledge  of  the  objective  truth  absolute  of  an  out 
absolute  of  the  mind,  is  impossible,  which  the  pri- 
mary consciousness  delivers  and  declares  is  not  only 
possible  but  actual,  he  simply  slaps  consciousness  in 
the  face  with  the  accusation  of  falsifying,  if  not  with 
lying?  If  his  proposition  of  the  impossibility  of 
knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute  is  not  to  the 
effect  of  impeaching  its  validity,  what  is  it  to  the 
effect  of? 

Besides,  what  makes  the  situation  all  the  more 
incongruous,  and  Kant^s  impeachment  of  the  primary 
consciousness  in  the  matter  all  the  more  amazing, 
and  his  stupidity  all  the  more  stupendous  is  that  he 


Consciousness  No  Liar 


47 


has  already  committed  himself  to  the  fact  of 
the  existence  of  an  out  absolute  of  the  mind, 
and  even  to  our  knowledge  of  it,  in  his  assumption 
and  affirmation  of  an  outlying  world  absolute, 
2vhich  itself  a  world  absolute  involves  an  out  abso- 
lute for  it  to  obtain  in,  and  a  knowledge  of  which 
zvorld  absolute  involves  a  knowledge  of  that  out 
absolute  in  which  it  obtains ! 

But  even  once  more.  There  is  not  only  delivery 
and  declaration  in  consciousness  of  an  out  absolute 
of  the  mind,  which  even  Kant  himself  in  one  J>reath 
implicitly  proclaims  there  is,  though  in  another  most 
explicitly  announces  that  he  and  we  cannot  possibly 
know  anything  of  it,  but  there  is  delivery  and  declar- 
ation of  the  perception,  very  the  perception  of  very  a 
not-self  in  that  out  absolute  of  the  consciousness  or 
conscious  mind's  deliverance  and  declaration  that 
there  is,  and  even  of  Kant's  wobbling  affirmation  that 
there  is,  and  which  not-self  in  that  out  absolute  must 
itself  be  a  thing  as  absolute  as  the  out  in  which  it  is. 

And  here,  again,  is  not  Kant  accusing  conscious- 
ness with  falsifying,  if  not  with  lying  ?  Is  not  his 
frantically  denying  perception  in  the  least  of  such 
not-self  an  outstanding  entity,  of  the  mind,  and  in- 
sisting that  what  only  is  perceived  are  ''phenomena" 
what  are  wholly  within  the  mind,  to  do  so,  when  the 
consciousness  or  conscious  mind  is  delivering  and 
declaring  directly  the  contrary,  and  that  the  not-self 
perceived  is  verily  an  entity  absolute  perceived,  and 
perceived  in  the  out  absolute  of  the  consciousnesses 
deliverance  and  declaration  in  the  deliverance  and 
declaration  in  consciousness  of  external  perception? 


48 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


If  to  contend  that  the  world  of  our  external  percep- 
tion is  nothing  more  substantial  than  a  mirage  of 
the  not-self  absolute  is  not  to  do  so,  what,  pray, 
would  be  to  do  it  ? 

And  now  if  trampling  under  one's  feet  the  plain 
deliverances  of  the  primary  consciousness  after  this 
straight-away  fashion,  and  to  the  pitch  even  of 
grounding  a  whole  metaphysic  on  a  defiance  of 
them  is  not  repudiating  the  validity  of  the  primary 
consciousness,  it  would  be  more  than  interesting  to 
know  what  would  be.  And,  indeed,  Kant  might, 
or  the  Kantian  disciple  and  academic  after  him,  may 
twist,  summersault,  back  and  fill,  and  juggle  with 
the  situation  as  much  as  he  will,  it,  yet,  still  comes 
to  this,  that  the  corner-stone  to  Kant's  metaphysical 
edifice  is  a  challenge  of  the  validity  of  the  primary 
consciousness.  And  be  it  remembered  that  every 
academic  attempt  at  explanation  how,  or  why,  the 
consciousness  should  declare  is  out  of  the  mind  what 
is  only  within,  is  a  confession  that  the  consciousness 
does  say  out  when,  as  it  should  tell  the  truth,  it 
would  say  within;  is  a  confession,  in  a  word,  that  the 
consciousness  falsiiies,  at  least,  if  it  does  not  even 
lie.  And  be  it  remiembered,  moreover,  what  seems 
quite  overlooked,  that,  whatever  the  explanation, 
and  however  true  it  should  be,  it  still  does  not  do 
away  with  the  fact  that  the  consciousness  falsifies. 
You  saying  the  wind  is  east,  you  thinking  it  east, 
when  in  truth  it  is  west,  does  not  do  away  with  the 
fact  that  you  falsify,  though  it  may  with  that  of 
your  lying. 

And  yet,  if  Kant  repudiated  the  validity  of  the 


Consciousness  No  Liar 


49 


primary  consciousness,  and  in  that  repudiation,  in 
eflfect  denied  all  possible  knowledge  even  of  his  own 
existence,  how  is  it  still,  it  might  be  asked,  that  he 
should  yet  affirm,  as  he  did,  the  existence  of  an  ex- 
ternal world  absolute  which  the  primary  conscious- 
ness declares  there  is,  but  which,  consistent  with 
the  invalidity  of  the  primary  consciousness  as  the 
latter  declared  there  was  such  world,  there  should 
not  be,  and  Kant  should  not  have  affirmed  there 
was?  Yes,  and  how  is  it  again  that  he  should  affirm 
there  is,  when  he  was  affirming,  too,  and  arguing, 
if  arguing  it  may  be  called,  with  all  his  might  that 
"all  within  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge  is  only 
phenomenal";  which  as  were  so,  we  could  know 
nothing  of  such  world,  which  as  an  outside  reality 
is  not  what  is  phenomenal  at  all,  and  of  which  as 
not,  he  said  we  could  know  nothing?  How  is  it? 
How  ?  Oh,  that's  only  Kant's  inconsistency  time  and 
time  and  time  again  on  exhibition,  and  yet  still  here 
again,  in  this  matter,  on  display !  How  ?  Oh,  only 
that  here  as  elsewhere,  does  he  contradict  himself 
as  the  exigencies  of  his  metaphysical  romancing 
make  it  convenient  or  imperative ! 

However,  he  still  does  it;  still  flies  right  in  the 
face  of  consciousness  to  charge  it  with  being  an  in- 
continent falsifier ;  yes,  and  even  with  little  less  than 
with  being  a  downright  liar.  In  fact,  no  man  ever 
more  plainly,  though  perhaps  more  directly,  accused 
another  with  at  least  falsifying,  than  does  Kant  ac- 
cuse consciousness  with  it. 

And,  indeed,  the  very  key-stone  to  the  whole 
arch  of  the  Kantian  metaphysic  is  that  we  perceive 


go  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

and  know  nothing  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  blazing 
pronouncement  of  the  primary  consciousness  that 
we  do  perceive  and  know  something. 

Every  attempt  by  Kant,  or  by  his  academic 
idolator,  to  explain  how  what  is  only  within  the 
mind  should  still  appear  outside  is  a  confession,  I 
say  again,  that  the  consciousness  declares  it  outside. 
Kant,  then,  contending  that  it  is  wholly  within  the 
mind,  it  is  but  a  stultification  of  the  intellect  that 
should  still  insist  there  is  no  challenge  by  him  of 
the  validity  of  the  primary  consciousness,  even  if 
not  of  its  sincerity. 

And  not  only  Kant,  but  every  genuine  idealist 
—  which  Kant  was  not  —  impeaches  the  conscious- 
nesses validity  and  does  it  wholesale.  Indeed  every 
genuine  idealist's  only  chance  of  success  in  his 
moonshine  attempt  of  conjuring  into  being  his 
gossamer  universe,  hinges  on  his  doing  so;  and  this 
he  makes  short  shrift  in  doing  from  the  start. 

Meanwhile,  for  Kant  himself  to  have  set  up,  or 
for  his  disciples  after  him  to  set  up,  that  he  was 
positively  championing  the  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness is  simply  ridiculous;  and  not  only  that  but 
positively  intellectually  nauseating,  when  no  thinker 
ever  lived  who  more  flagrantly  insisted  on  practi- 
cally its  mendacity. 

But  what  better  could  you  expect  of  a  philoso- 
pher who  so  little  sensed  what  objective  truth  ab- 
solute meant,  and  what  knowledge  of  objective 
truth  absolute  meant,  that  he  had  not  discernment 
enough  to  know  that  very  his  own  existence  —  as, 
haply,  he  verily  existed  —  was  such  truth ;  and  that 


Consciousness  No  Liar 


51 


very  his  any  knowledge  of  his  own  existence  —  as 
he  verily  had  any  such  —  was  knowledge  of  objec- 
tive truth  absolute?  What  better  could  you  expect 
of  such  a  philosopher  than  this;  and  so  his  denial 
of  all  possibility  of  knowledge  of  objective  truth  ab- 
solute, altogether? 

Or  what  better  again,  expect  of  a  philosopher 
who  had  not  discernment  enough  to  know  that  an 
outlying  world  absolute  is  demonstrable,  and  to 
formulate  himself  the  demionstration  thereof;  who 
could,  in  fact,  only  guess  and  assume  its  existence, 
and  even  wavered  at  that ;  who  doubtless  never  had 
it  once  cross  his  mind  that  but  as  there  was  such 
world,  world  absolute,  would  be  utterly,  utterly,  im- 
possible his,  or  anybody's,  knowing  or  even  being 
afforded  so  much  as  a  hint  of  any  other  human 
mind's  existence  than  just  his  own?  What  better 
could  you  expect,  I  say,  of  such  a  philosopher,  phil- 
osopher as  he  should  so  style  himself,  or  others  so 
style  him  —  but  what  a  pitiful  show  for  a  philoso- 
pher indeed !  —  than  that  he  should  charge  the  mind 
with  primarily  delivering  falsely,  and  even  with 
little  better  than  lying?  — that  he  should  deny  that 
the  world  of  the  mind's  external  perception,  which 
the  mind  delivers  as  external  to  itself,  is  thus  ex- 
ternal, and  anything  of  very  the  external  world  ab- 
solute itself?  — yes,  and  that  he  should  still  think 
that  the  consciousness,  yet  thereafter  might  be 
trusted  to  prove  anything  at  all,  or  trusted  for  any 
knowledge  at  all ;  should  still  think  that  it  might  not 
be  as  misleading  when  it  delivered  space  and  time 
as  a  priori  intuitions  as  zvhen  it  declared  that  they 


52 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


were  external  to  the  mind  and  absolute?  What  bet- 
ter, in  a  word,  might  you  expect  of  a  philosopher 
who  beheved,  or  disbelieved,  in  the  validity  of  the 
deliverances  of  consciousness  according  as  the  ex- 
igencies of  his  metaphysical  romancing  required? 

And,  indeed,  if  besides  what  has  already  been 
said  as  assuring  us  of  the  existence  of  an  outlying 
world  absolute  and  of  our  perception,  very  percep- 
tion of  very  it  itself,  we  might  anticipate  the  com- 
ing, perhaps  more  properly,  demonstrations  of  as 
much  on  a  subsequent  page,  it  would  give  the  look 
as  though  Kant  himself  might  be  the  falsifier,  not 
to  say  liar,  in  the  mixup  rather  than  that  it  was 
consciousness  that  was  —  as  either  was;  and  where- 
fore  he  himself  having,  at  the  outset,  at  least  falsi- 
fied, must  thereafter  elaborate  on  the  prodigious 
scale,  he  did,  of  nearly  a  thousand  printed  pages, 
in  the  vain  attempt  to  make  the  false  appear  the 
living  truth;  just  precisely,  as  I  have  before  said,  as 
is  the  sad  experience  of  the  vulgar  out  and  out  liar 
who,  having  once  told  his  witting  falsehood,  must 
needs  follow  it  up  with  endless  dodging  and  hedg- 
ing, and,  likely,  a  thousand  and  one  other  straight 
out  lies,  would  he  keep  in  countenance,  as  we  say, 
the  first  one.  But  nobody  believes  Kant  a  deliberate 
liar,  and  why  believe  it  of  the  consciousness  ?  It  is 
bad  enough  that  he  thought  it  the  incontinent  falsi- 
fier that  he  did. 

But  what  would  be  the  unspeakably  ludicrous 
part  of  it  all,  if  it  were  not  so  astounding,  is  Kant's 
yet  seeking  to  establish  the  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness, having  once  questioned  it!     Why,   the  man 


Consciousness  No  Liar 


S3 


who  would  seek  to  establish  the  veracity  of  con- 
sciousness anyway  is  little  better  than  a  fool !  How 
are  you  going  to  establish  the  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness when  it  is  only  by  its  veracity  that  you  are  to 
estabHsh  it?  —  But!  as  if  that  were  not  bad  enough 

—  just  think  of  it!  —  just  think  of  it!  — 
think  of  first  positively  questioning  that  veracity 
and  then  expecting  that  on  the  strength  of  proposi- 
tions and  rriiental  processes  the  veracity  of  the  in- 
volved consciousness  of  which  is  questioned,  to  es- 
tablish that  veracity!    Oh!  the  Copernican  intellect 

—  but  forgive  us  Copernicus !  forgive  us !  —  the 
Copernican  intellect  of  Immanuel  Kant ! 

And  as  to  what,  yet  that  wholly  of  the  mind 
and  within  the  mind,  being  still  perceived  as  out  of 
it,  it  is  to  be  said  that  absolutely  inconceivable  is  any 
logical  connection  between  the  two,  absolutely  in- 
conceivable by  any  human  mind. 

True  enough,  we  can  think  of  such  a  thing  as 
perceiving  to  be  out  of  the  mind  what  is  wholly 
within  it,  as  we  can  think  of  a  thousand  things 
which  we  can  never  once  think,  think  as  realizing, 
and  which  in  fact  are  not  true.  We  can  think  of  it 
as  we  can  think  of  two  and  two  as  being  five;  but 
we  cannot  in  the  least  think  it,  think  it  as  realizing 
it,  as  we  can  think  two  and  two  as  being  four  as  real- 
izing that. 

Men  are  constantly  mistaking  what  is  only 
thinking  of  a  thing  for  thinking  it  —  as  I  may  have 
remarked  more  than  once  before,  and  may,  even, 
have  occasion  more  than  once  to  remark  ag^in. 
Even  cultivated  men,  men  of  trained  minds  as  they 


54 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


flatter  themselves  as  being,  only  think  of  very  many 
things  they  think  they  think,  think  as  realizing, 
which  they  never  do.  And  just  one  of  those  men 
v^as  Immanuel  Kant;  and  just  one  of  those  things 
v^hich  he  thought  he  thought  as  realizing  v^as  that 
what  is  of  the  mind  and  in  the  mind,  the  mind  yet 
could  deliver  in  consciousness  as  out  of  it !  And  his 
inflated  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  of  a  thousand 
pages  largely  owes  its  disgusting  bulk  to  proposi- 
tions he  indeed  could  think  of,  and  doubtless  thought 
he  thought  as  realizing,  which  he  in  fact  could  not 
once  thus  think  to  save  his  life  —  nor  anyone  else. 

Anyway,  that  a  purely  mental  event,  what  is 
wholly  of  the  mind  and  within  it  should  yet  be  per- 
ceived as  out  of  it  is  absolutely  incomprehensible 
by  the  human  intellect.  There  is  absolutely  no  logi- 
cal connection  between  the  two  propositions.  And 
yet  but  as  there  were,  must  not  Kant,  as  must  not 
also  every  idealist,  be  understood  to  charge  con- 
sciousness with  falsifying,  if  not  with  actual  lying. 


Consciousness  is  not  already  the  content  itself  of 
two  bottles,  as  it  were,  which  content,  the  bottles  be- 
ing knocked  together  and  breaking,  simply  releases,  but 
is  the  Howing  of  the  content  once  that  release ;  the 
Halving,  alone,  being  consciousness  itself,  consciousness 
in  actuality,  and  as  contradistinguished  from  con- 
sciousness only  in  possibility,  or  latent  in  embryo  as 
it  were,  in  the  bottles  which  the  knocking  together 
and  breaking  of  developes,  or  affords  opportunity 
for  development,  into  experiencable  and  recognizable 
reality.  The  Hawing  were  impossible  before  the  re- 
lease ;  and  so  consciousness  itself  in  actuality  impossible 
before. 


Consciousness  results  from  the  impact  —  the  ex- 
citing cause  —  of  the  Absolute  Reality  (the  Primor- 
dial Mental)  on  Itself,  Itself  the  predisposing  cause. 
Whether  that  impact  with  the  result  of  consciousness 
is  limited  to  the  brain  and  nervous  tissue  of  animal 
life,  or  whether  not,  no  one  knows  or  is  ever  likely  to 
know,— with  the  probabilities,  however,  rather  that 
it  is  not.  But,  anyway,  consciousness  whether  ob- 
taining outside  animal  life,  or  only  inside,  results  from 
an  event  logically  and  historically  anticipating  it,  and 
is,  therefore,  in  any  case,  itself,  nothing  aboriginal,  noth- 
ing primary. 


It  is  the  primary  axiom  of  the  doctrine  of  Evolu- 
tion that  only  that  aboriginally  obtains  which,  only 
as  it  thus  obtains,  can  at  all;  and  consciousness  can 
not  be  understood  as  one  of  those  things  which,  only 
as  it  aboriginally  obtains,  can  at  all,  and  must,  there- 
fore, itself,  be  held  ^o  be  nothing  aboriginal. 


The  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  is  not  finite 
because  "made"  finite;  but  finite  because  a  devolopment. 


Consciousness  is  not  itself  an  attribute  of  the 
mind  any  more  than  is  reflection  itself,  as  in  a  mirror, 
a  property  of  the  mirror ;  only  latent  capacity  for  con- 
sciousness is  an  attribute  of  the  mind,  as  is  only  latent 
capacity  for  reflection  a  property  of  the  mirror. 


The  Vanity  and  Farce  of  Academic  Explanations 

of  How  What  is  Within  the  Mind  is  Yet 

Perceived  as  Without  It 

I  have  said  that  any  attempt  at  explanation  how 
or  why  the  consciousness  delivers  as  out  of  the 
mind  what  is  only  within  it  is  a  confession  that  the 
former  in  external  perception,  really  delivers  as  out 
of  the  mind  what  it  delivers  at  all.  And  here  fol- 
lowing are  samples  of  such  attempts  as  one  writer- 
up  of  the  history  of  philosophy  puts  it  as  he  says 
—  "Without  the  capacity  of  ordering  the  sensible 
objects  as  out  of  himself  and  out  from  other  objects 
and  side  by  side  with  them,  there  can  be  no  percep- 
tion at  all."  "Ordering"  themi  out  of  himself! 
Ordering  them!  Ordering  them  out  of  himself! 
Why,  for  man  to  know  of  his  thus  ordering  them 
out,  he  should  be  conscious  of  so  doing;  and  what 
man,  living  or  dead,  was  ever  conscious  of  any 
such  performance?  Or,  should  he  still  be  given  to 
functioning  that  way,  but  be  unconscious  of  it,  he 
yet  could  know  of  it  only  as  there  was  evidence,  in 
fact  or  reason  known  to  him  of  his  doing  so.  And 
who  knows  of  any,  the  least  whatever? 

Indeed  I  cannot  imagine  a  ranker  dogmatic  and 
grotesque  assumption  than  this  one  of  man's  ^'order- 
ing"'  sensible  objects  to  be  perceived  as  outside  the 


58 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


mind  and  wherefore  he  perceives  them  as  outside! 

But  now  to  take  another  writer  on  the  history 
of  philosophy  who  makes  the  same  attempt  of  the 
one  just  quoted,  to  explain  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  Kantian  mietaphysic  how  or  why  the  conscious- 
ness proves  an  incontinent  falsifier  if  not  an  outright 
Ananias ;  to  take  another  as  he  says,  —  "The  rea- 
son an  object  seems  to  be  external  and  independent 
is  simply  this:  that  the  act  by  which,  in  external 
perception,  the  Ego  constitutes  the  object  is  not  in 
itself  a  reflective  and  self-comprehending  act,  but 
is  directed  only  toward  the  result,  the  percept,  and 
another  act  is  needed  to  reveal  it  to  itself  and  its 
real  source.  In  the  absence  of  this  second  reflective 
act,  therefore,  it  looks  upon  itself  as  necessarily  de- 
termined by  an  external  power,  instead  of  being,  as 
it  is,  a  free  creation."  Now  isn't  that  explanation 
brilliant?    Let  us  see  how  brilliant. 

In  the  first  place  he  says,  "the  act  by  which  the 
Ego  constitutes  the  object," — what?  the  Ego  con- 
stitutes the  object  by  an  act!  By  what  act?  This 
is  a  curiosity  to  begin  with.  But  then,  he  continues 
—  "it  is  not  a  reflective  act,"  and  "another  act  is 
needed  to  reveal  it  to  itself"  which  another  he  de- 
scribes as  "a  second  reflective  act,"  which  if  a 
second  reflective  act  makes  the  original  act  itself  a 
Urst  reflective  one  which  he  has  just  said,  however, 
is  ''not  a  reflective  act."  So  here  you  have  a  flat 
contradiction,  for  a  next  thing.  But  he  goes  on 
to  say  that  "in  the  absence  of  the  second  reflective 
act,  therefore,  it  —  the  first  and  ''not  reflective  act" 
— "looks  upon  itself  as  necessarily  determined,"  etc., 


Parce  of  Academic  Explanations 


59 


etc.  But  the  first  or  original  act  he  has  just  said, 
I  repeat,  is  "not  reflective,"  and  if  not  reflective  then 
it  is  without  thought.  And  how  can  that,  without 
thought,  how  can  that  which  does  not  think,  still  look 
upon  itself  to  think  itself  "as  necessarily  deter- 
mined," etc.,  etc.?  —  how  can  that  think  a  particu- 
lar thing  which  does  not  think  at  all!  So  here, 
again,  flat  contradiction.  And  is  that  any  less  than 
jargon  and  nonsense  which  is  freighted  with 
contradiction  after  contradiction?  But,  besides, 
what  are  these  declarations  of  the  Ego  constituting 
the  object  by  an  act,  of  the  act  not  a  reflective  one, 
of  another  act,  a  reflective  one,  being  needed  to  re- 
veal the  first  one  to  itself,  of  yet  the  absence  of  the 
former  and  of  its  therefore  looking  upon  itself  as 
necessarily  determined  by  an  external  power, — 
what  are  these  but  a  series  of  dogmatic  assumptions 
—  nothing  better  ?  What  is  there  in  fact  or  reason 
in  their  support? 

But  now  in  how  great  contrast,  let  me  point  out, 
with  the  above  in  reasonableness  and  intelligibility, 
is  the  explanation  as  sensible  objects  are  indeed  out 
of  the  mind  as  the  primary  consciousness  delivers 
them  as  being. 

Take  for  illustration,  visual  light.  Imagine  an 
ether  vibration  entering  the  eye  and  passing  on  to 
the  brain,  setting  up  within  the  visual  cerebral  area 
as  it  is  called,  a  cerebral  agitation  vibratory  or  other, 
and  with  the  result  of  visual  light,  as  also  with  the 
correlated  result  of  its  resurgence  in  opposite  direc- 
tion as  in  the  event  of  two  waves  meeting.  Now 
why  the  light  in  the  moment  of  the  attention  being 


6o 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


directed  outwards  is  seen  to  be  outside  the  mind 
and  even  the  brain,  is  because  the  resurgent  ether 
vibration,  on  which  rides  as  it  were  and  rides  out- 
ward the  resurgent  light,  is  itself,  (that  resurgent 
ether  vibration)  outside  the  mind  and  brain;  outside 
the  latter  still  even  when  within  the  brain's  periph- 
ery; outside  as  the  water  in  a  sponge  is  still  outside 
the  sponge's  texture  though  yet  within  the  sponge's 
periphery.  What  could  be  a  more  reasonable  and 
intelligible  view  and  explanation  than  this? 

What  a  more  reasonable  and  intelligible  view 
than  that  which  is  outside  should  be  seen  as  outside  ? 

And  then,  on  the  other  hand,  let  us  add  why,  in 
the  moment  of  the  attention  being  directed  imuard, 
the  resultant  of  this  collision  of  ether  and  cerebral 
vibrations  is  realized  as  being  within  the  mind,  and 
of  the  mind  as  I  or  Ego  and  percipient  perceiving 
the  outlying  light,  is  because  the  resurgent  agita- 
tional movement  vibratory  or  other,  on  which  rides, 
as  it  were,  and  rides  inward,  the  inward  resurgence 
of  that  resultant,  a  movement  vibratory  or  other, 
is  of  the  very  Hhres  of  very  the  brain  itself,  and  of 
the  mind  itself  as  allied  with  brain. 

And  here  again,  could  any  better  explanation 
possibly  be  afforded  why?  —  any  plainer  or  more 
sensible  ?  Could  anything  be  more  rational  or  read- 
ily understood  than  that  what  is  of  the  brain  and 
within  it  and  within  the  mind,  the  mind  as  identi- 
fied with  brain,  should  be  felt  to  be  of  the  mind  and 
the  perceiving  percipient?  —  as  well  as  that  what 
is  outside  brain,  and  mind,  and  perceived,  should 
be  realized  as  outside? 


Farce  of  Academic  Explanations 


6i 


Altogether,  the  above  academic  attempts  noted, 
in  explication  of  how  the  consciousness  should  de- 
liver as  out  of  the  mind  what  is  only  within  it  are 
futile  and  farcical  in  the  extreme,  as  must  prove  to 
be  all  such. 

And  indeed  and  finally,  it  is  but  simply  meta- 
physical suicide  for  any  metaphysical  theory  that  it 
must  needs  immolate  on  its  altar  the  veracity  of  the 
primary  consciousness  to  start  with;  that  it  must 
needs,  in  the  very  beginning,  charge  the  latter  with 
duplicity  even  but  in  effect,  whether  in  intent  or  not. 

But  just  this  was  found  the  necessity  of  Kant's 
system  of  metaphysic,  and  its  suicide  followed,  as 
inevitably  it  must,  at  the  very  threshold  of  that 
metaphysic's  exploitation. 


Consciousness  may  obtain  as  often  as  ever  there 
is  impact  of  the  Absolute  Reality  on  Itself,—  or  it  may 
not;  only,  as  the  former  is  the  case,  then  it  obtains 
cos'mically,  and  our  consciousness  is  one  with  that  of 
the  cosmos  or  universe,  our  brain  as  brain,  merely 
functioning  neither  as  the  origin  of  our  consciousness, 
nor  even  of  its  content,  at  all  but  only  as  determm- 
ing  its  content  such  as  it  is;  or  then,  as  still  the  former 
should  not  be  the  ca .  se,  and  the  latter  should  be,  and 
consciousness  should  obtain  only  in  the  event  of  ani- 
mal life,  then  our  brain  as  brain  functions  as  the  sprmg 
both  of  our  consciousness  itself,  as  also  of  its  content 
at  all,  and  of  its  content  altogether;  altogether,  that 
is.  both  of  its  content  at  all,  and  of  its  content  jmcA 
as  that  is;— the  former  though,  and  that  conscious- 
ness obtains  as  often  as  there  is  that  impact,  be  it 
said,  being,  perhaps  the  more  likely. 


It  is  only  because  the  consciousness  is  but  a  de- 
velopment and  an  aftermath  and  nothing  aboriginal 
and  primary  that  it  does  not  directly  reveal,  which  is 
to  say  that  the  mind  does  not  directly  know  every- 
thing, or  the  universe  of  Being  exhaustively.  It  is 
only  because  the  consciousness  is  but  a  development 
and  an  aftermath  and  nothing  aboriginal  and  primary, 
and  has  eyes  only  for  a  look  forward  and  not  for  a 
look  behind,  as  only  for  the  former  have  yours  and 
mine,  that  it  reveals,  that  the  mind  knows,  nothing 
of  what  is  behind  it  save  only  as  what  as  behind  as 
extension,  figure,  and  resistance  is  brought  round, 
as  it  were,  and  thrust  objectively  before  the  mind, 
and  when  then  and  only  then,  is  revealed  and  known 
thus  much  at  least  of  what  is  behind,  even  though  noth- 
ing more. 


VI 

Primary  Demonstration  of  an  External  World 

Absolute 

But  now,  supposing  that  Kant,  instead  of  re- 
pudiating the  validity  of  consciousness,  repudiating 
it  except  in  such  instances  as  it  suited  his  whim,  or 
the  exigencies  of  his  speculations  to  recognize  it, 
had  credited  it  with  veracity,  he  would  then,  in  the 
first  place,  have  believed  in  such  a  thing  as  objective 
truth  absolute,  and  in  his  possible  knowledge  of  it ; 
and  in  such  a  thing  as  the  possible  objective  truth 
absolute  of  his  own  existence  as  also  his  possible 
knowledge  of  it ;  believed  that,  possibly,  he  himself 
existed,  as  also  that,  possibly,  he  knew  he  really  did. 
In  the  next  place  he  would  have  said  to  himself 
that,  as  the  consciousness,  besides  declaring  that  he 
himself  really  existed,  declared  also  an  out  of  him, 
and  a  not-him,  and  that  not-him  in  that  out  of  him, 
and  that  that  not-him,  in  that  out  of  him,  itself,  very 
itself  be  perceived,  the  presumption  is  not  only  that 
he  himself  really  existed,  and  knew  it,  but  that  there 
is  really  an  out  of  him  and  that  in  that  out  of  him 
there  was  really  a  world  absolute  external  to  him- 
self, and  that  that  world  itself,  very  itself  he  per- 
ceived. 


66 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Then,  having  said  to  himself,  or  recognized  this 
much,  he  would  have  sought  to  demonstrate  how 
things  are  as  they  appear  rather  than  how  they  are 
not  as  they  appear,  which  latter  is  the  whole  burden, 
primarily,  of  his  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  to 
demonstrate. 

And  then  suppose  further  that,  not  content  with 
any  mere  presumption  in  the  matter,  and  to  the  end 
of  a  demonstration,  he  had  recognized  that  it  was 
only  with  the  very  most  primary  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, and  with  these  as  such  facts  simply,  he  had 
primarily  to  labor,  and  that  only  yet  as  quite  all 
these  were  recognized  and  labored  with,  and  most 
particularly  the  one  he  actually  either  overlooked  or 
ignored,  the  one,  namely,  of  our  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  a  plurality  of  minds  and  their  experi- 
ence, might  all  demonstration  fail,  then  he  would, 
as  he  had  been  capable  of  reasoning  and  not  simply 
romancing,  have  argued  with  himself  much  in  this 
wise:  — 

I  have  no  direct  consciousness  of  other  minds 
than  my  own ;  but  here  within  my  sensuous  experi- 
ence are  all  the  physical  signs  conceivable  as  should 
there  be  another  and  other  minds,  all,  indeed,  that 
should  logically  warrant  the  conviction  of  there 
being  others.  For,  it  is  inconceivable  that  I  should 
be  exercised  with  so  much  as  a  hint  even,  much  less 
with  a  most  unwavering  conviction,  of  there  being 
another  or  other  minds,  in  the  absence  of  all  such 
signs.  It  is  equally  inconceivable  that  there  should 
be  present  them  all,  even  what  would  appear  an  ex- 


\ 


Demonstration  of  External  World  Absolute  67 

haustive  presentation  of  such,  and  with  not  one  to 
the  contrary,  and  still  there  not  be  another  or  other 
minds  active  behind  them.  There  is,  first,  within 
my  sensuous  experience  the  perception  of  other 
physical  forms  like  unto  my  own,  which  of  itself  is 
highly  suggestive  of  other  minds,  minds  like  my 
own,  within  those  like  physical  forms.  But  there, 
again,  within  that  same  sensuous  experience  is  an 
interchange  of  active  physical  signs  such  as  might 
be  those  of  my  own  mind  in  actual  indirect  com- 
munication with  another  or  other  minds.  So  that, 
altogether,  it  is  positively  inconceivable  that  there 
should  not  be,  is  even  utterly  ridiculous  to  entertain 
a  doubt  that  there  are  in  very  fact,  other  minds  than 
my  own,  and  with  which  I  am  in  daily  communica- 
tion. 

But  now,  again,  this  what  I  recognize  as  the 
physical  of  the  signs  in  question  only  in  virtue  of 
which  have  thus  suggested  to  me,  and  even  afforded 
me  assurance  of  the  existence  of  another  or  other 
minds  than  my  own,  must  either  be  something  per- 
ceived by  us  in  common,  or  be,  at  least,  something 
with  which  in  common,  that  of  our  independent 
perceptions  is  allied;  otherwise,  another's  manipu- 
lation of  his  physical  world,  I  should  know  nothing 
about,  and  my  manipulation  of  my  physical  world 
he  would  know  nothing  about,  and  all  tokens  of  each 
other's  existence  be  absent. 

Evidently,  then,  the  physical  cannot  possibly  be 
the  former,  if  that  something  be  only  mental  phe- 
nomena [Kant's  "phenom<ena"],  since  then  what  is 


68 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  physical  world  of  each,  being  only  of  and  within 
each  his  own  mind,  would  be  shut  from  view  by 
every  other,  there  being  no  direct  access  to  one  mind 
by  another,  no  direct  consciousness  one  mind  of 
another. 

The  only  possible  alternative,  then  is  that  the 
something  affording  the  signs,  and  which  I  recog- 
nize as  the  physical,  must  be  something  outside  our 
minds;  and  as  outside,  then  something  absolute; 
and  either  that  the  world  of  our  external  perception 
is  itself  that  something  outside  and  absolute,  or  that 
one  outside  that  but  with  which  the  world  of  our 
external  perception  is  allied  is  that  something  outside 
and  absolute,  and  which  provokes  for  each  and  all 
of  us  and  all  minds,  an  independent  but  similar  ex- 
ternal world  of  our  perception,  In  either  case,  as  I 
note  well,  there  must  be  an  outlying  world  absolute. 

So  that,  as  I  note  well  also,  with  all  the  assur- 
ance I  may  have  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  absolute  of  a  plurality  of  minds,  with  all  that 
assurance  must  I  be  exercised  with  the  conviction 
of  the  existence  of  what  I  can  only  recognize  as  an 
external  physical  world  absolute,  world  only  in 
virtue  of  which  —  a  world  outside  and  absolute  — 
could  I  have  even  a  hint,  much  less  a  conviction,  as 
unwavering  as  that  of  my  own  existence,  of  that 
plurality  of  minds. 

Now  had  Kant  but  recognized  the  three  great 
primary  facts  of  consciousness,  and  particularly  the 
one  he  altogether  overlooked  or  neglected,  the  fact, 
namely,  of  our  recognition  of  other  minds  and  their 


Demonstration  of  External  World  Absolute  69 

experience,  then  the  foregoing  is  the  order  of 
thought  he  would  have  pursued  as  pursuing  the  logi- 
cal order,  setting  out  from  those  primary  facts ;  — 
and  from  those  facts,  and  that  order  of  thought 
as  the  logical  order,  there  is  no  possible  escape. 
And  as  such  logical  order,  it  has  the  dignity  and 
force  of  very  a  demonstration  of  the  certain  exist- 
ence of  a  two-fold  external  world  absolute  of  one 
part  of  other  minds  and  their  experience,  minds 
other  than  each  itself  and  its  experience,  and  of  an- 
other part  of  what  we  recognize  as  the  physical. 
And  as  a  demonstration,  it  is  what  only  confirms 
what,  as  I  have  said,  is  already  in  advance  the  every 
presumption  in  the  matter  from  the  primary,  direct 
and  immediate  delivery  of  the  consciousness  touch- 
ing it. 

I  might  add,  that  Kant  did  not  even  think  to 
utilize  his  assumed  fact  of  the  existence  of  minds 
and  their  experience  other  than  his  own  and  its  ex- 
perience, to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  an  external 
physical  world  absolute.  For  only  had  he  thought 
to,  he  might  have  reasoned  from  it  much  in  this 
^ise:  —  Having  myself  no  direct  consciousness  of 
another  mind,  and  being  wholly  dependent  for  my 
knowledge  of  its  existence  on  its  manipulation  of 
the  physical  for  signs  of  its  existence,  I  still  could 
have  no  knowledge  of  that  existence  as  that  physical 
it  was  manipulating  was  but  "phenomena,"  that  is, 
was  but  som/ething  subjective;  since  then,  what  was 
its  physical  would  be  wholly  within  itself,  itself 
which  I,  having  no  direct  consciousness  of,  no  direct 


V 


y 


.>s 


70 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


access  to,  could  have  no  knowledge  of  its  contents, 
and  so  none  of  its  physical  which  it  might  be  manipu- 
lating, and  so  none,  again,  of  its  manipulation  of  its 
physical,  and  so,  still  again,  as  none  of  its  manipula- 
tion on  which  I  am  wholly  dependent  for  indication 
of  its  existence,  then  none  whatever  of  its  existence. 
Therefore,  I  could  have  no  knowledge  of  another 
or  other  mind's  existence  save  only  as  the  physical 
was  not  simple  "phenomena"  but  something  in  part 
or  altogether  outside  the  mind  and  absolute;  and 
as  I  do  have  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  other 
minds  and  their  experience,  therefore,  again,  there 
is  an  outlying  world  absolute  what  I  recognize  as  a 
physical  such  world. 

Or,  then,  again,  Kant  having  assumed  the  same 
fact,  might  have  gone  ahead  and  reasoned  in  regard 
to  space  and  time  in  much  the  following  fashion: 
—  It  is  inconceivable,  since  men  have  no  direct 
consciousness  one  mind  of  another,  that  there 
should  be  unanimity  of  attestation  among  them  as 
to  the  particular  time  and  place  of  objects  and 
events,  save  only  as  the  time  and  place  with  which 
they  are  identified,  were  things  entirely  outside  the 
several  minds  involved,  and  were  things  absolute; 
therefore,  what  only,  is  conceivable,  at  least,  is  that 
space  and  time  are  things  thus  outside  and  absolute. 

Of  course,  these  deductions  are  worthless,  if  for 
nothing  else  than  that  the  one  leading  premise  with 
which  the  reasoning  sets  out  is  but  an  unsupported 
assumption,  and  itself  worthless  to  reason  from. 


Demonstration  of  External  World  Absolute   71 

But  the  wonder  is  that  the  mind  that  should  have 
assumed  where  there  was  no  logical  business  to, 
should  not  have  kept  on  and  come  to  the  truth  even 
if  it  were  to  have  no  better  foundation  than  sand 
or  air  to  rest  on. 


\   V 


Must  ever  be  borne  in  mind  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  external  universe  and  the  manifest  uni- 
verse- the  former  being  the  universe  external  to  our 
minds,  and  the  latter  the  universe  including  our  mmds; 
and  ever  the  distinction  again  between  the  universe 
external  to  man's  mind,  and  the  universe  external  to 
the  man  himself,  which  includes  not  only  his  mind 
but  his  body  and  brain  as  well.  By  the  external  world 
Kant  affirmed  to  exist  is  meant  always  the  former, 
the  world  external  to  man's  mind. 


We  never  come  so  near  the  Absolute  Reality,  cer- 
tainly never  so  primarily  and  directly  near,  as  we  do 
in  sensuous  experience  —  never.  No  thinking  can  bring 
us  so  near.  Thinking,  possibly,  may  bring  us  nearer 
the  any  cosmic  or  universal  consciousness,  should 
there  be  any,  as  is  likely  there  is,  but  which  yet,  re- 
member, is  but  a  development  and  an  aftermath;  but 
not  bring  us  nearer  the  Final  or  Absolute  Reality 
Itself. 


VII 

Second  and  Physical  Demonstration  of  an  External 

World  Absolute 

But  now  to  return  to  what  we  have  found  to  be 
altogether  the  presumption  in  the  matter  of  the  ex- 
istence of  an  external  world  absolute,  and  of  which 
the  most  positive  demonstration  is  to  be  afforded 
also,  as  we  have  shown,  —  to  return  to  that,  and  I 
say  that  had  Kant  not  scouted  the  primary  dictum 
of  the  consciousness;  and  again,  had  he  but  recog- 
nized  our  recognition  of  a  plurality  of  minds,  one 
of  the  three  primary  facts  of  consciousness,  and 
which  he  had  neglected  or  overlooked,  he  had  not 
need  to  have  assumed  what,  before  demonstrated, 
he  had  no  metaphysical  business  to,  and  assumed 
an  outlying  world  absolute;  no  more  business  to 
assume  one  of  other  minds  than  his  own  than  he 
had  to  assume  one  of  what  we  recognize  as  the  physi- 
cal. On  the  contrary,  he  might  have  done  as  only 
he  should  have  done,  and  what  only  a  philosopher 
worthy  of  the  name  would  do,  namely,  have 
demonstrated  at  the  outset  the  twofold  world  of 
other  minds  than  his  own,  and  of  what,  if  not  the 
world  of  our  external  perception  itself,  is  world  at 
least  with  that  allied. 

But  now,  yet  that  I  have  said  that  recognition 
of  the  one  of  the  three  primary  facts  of  conscious- 


76 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


ness,  hitherto  either  overl(x>ked  or  neglected,  af- 
forded the  only  primary  demonstration  of  the  ex- 
istence of  an  external  world  absolute,  it  still  does  not 
afford  the  only  demonstration  as  there  are  at  least 
two  others  to  be  marshalled  in  confirmation  of  the 
one  more  primary,  meantime  that  is  not  to  be  lost 
sight  of,  what  is  the  presumption  altogether  in  the 
matter  in  advance  of  all  positive  proof. 

One  of  these  two  others  is  even  a  physical 
demonstration  of  an  external  world  absolute.  It  is 
not  often  that  we  can  command  physical  demonstra- 
tion of  a  metaphysical  fact.  But  here  we  can ;  and 
here  it  is  as  we  summon  to  the  stand  the  photogra- 
pher's art  to  testify  in  the  matter.  And  what  is  the 
camera's  testimony?  Why,  we  have  its  unimpeach- 
able word  for  it  that  there  is  an  outlying  world  ab- 
solute most  assuredly;  else  would  be  absolutely 
impossible  the  transcription  of  scene,  or  of  anything 
whatsoever,  to  the  sensitive  plate.  For,  of  course, 
the  camera  has  no  access  to  the  human  mind  and 
can  know  nothing,  therefore,  of  Kant's  ''phenome- 
na"; nothing  of  the  any  effects  or  impressions  an 
external  world  absolute,  should  there  be  any  such, 
may  make  on  the  mind.  It  can  take  cognizance  of 
nothing  of  that  sort,  and  must  transfer  to  the  sensi- 
tive plate,  only  the  "God  of  things  as  they  are,"  in- 
dependent of  our  minds  —  or  transfer  nothing. 
And  "the  God  of  things  as  they  are,"  is  as  they  are 
independent  of  our  minds.  Either  it  must  transfer 
what  we  see,  something  of  it  at  least,  in  which  case 
what  we  see,  something  of  it  at  least,  is  free  of  any 
constructive  action  of  the  mind,  and  is  outside  the 


Physical  Demonstration  of  Such  World       JJ 

mind,  and  thing  such  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  very  the 
outlying  world  absolute;  or  it  must  transfer  what 
is  behind  what  we  see,  and  upon  which,  once  the 
transcription  to  the  sensitive  plate,  our  minds  put 
the  same  construction  as  upon  the  original  before 
the  transcription.  But,  in  either  case,  is  involved  an 
outstanding  reality  absolute  transferred;  in  either 
case,  involved  an  external  world  absolute;  in  either 
case,  we  have  demonstration  of  the  most  solid  and 
unquestionable  sort  of  such  world,  as  solid  and  un- 
questionable as  anything  in  Euclid  of  Euclid's  most 
obvious  and  indisputable  propositions.  Indeed,  we 
might  have  produced  this  proof,  this  physical  proof, 
to  start  with,  of  an  external  world  absolute,  and 
rested  the  matter  then  and  there  considering  all 
other  evidence  as  no  better  than  altogether  superflu- 
ous. 

But  now  yet,  we  have  even  still  a  third  demon- 
stration of  an  external  world  absolute  to  offer,  but 
only  incidentally  to  appear  as  we  proceed  to  demon- 
strate the  perception,  very  the  perception  of  such 
world,  perception  of  very  it  itself,  which  perception 
of  such  world,  as  we  demonstrate,  we  demonstrate, 
of  course,  by  implication,  incidentally  its  existence. 

But  before  proceeding  to  this,  let  us  first  ask  — 
Why  did  not  Kant  himself  demonstrate  its  existence, 
instead,  practically,  of  rankly  and  baldly  afiirming  it  ? 

Why  did  he  not  but  that  simply  he  did  not  know 
how  to?  And  yet,  as  would  appear,  he  was  not 
quite  at  ease  with  rank  affirmation;  or  at  least  not 
quite  so  in  respect  of  a  world  physical  as  it  would 
appear  to  be,  even  if  quite  so  in  respect  of  one  of  a 


78 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


plurality  of  minds.  And  so,  to  reassure  himself, 
he  made  some  feint  as  would  he  afford  a  semblance 
of  having  reasoned  the  matter  out.  But,  oh!  the 
travesty  of  all  reasoning  it  is !  Oh,  the  travesty  of 
all  reasoning!  We  have  sensations,  and  how  shall 
we  account  for  them,  as  it  would  seem,  he  ques- 
tioned with  himself.  How  should  we  have  a  ruffled 
sea,  but  for  an  outside  wind  to  ruffle  it ;  and  how  a 
ruffled  mind  but  for  an  external  world  to  ruffle  that  ? 
Ergo,  Kant  seems  to  have  reasoned,  —  heavens, 
reasoned!  —  then  there  is  an  outside  world  to  ruffle 
the  mind.     Great  dialectician,  Kant!     Great! 

Here  are  what  are  for  him,  to  make,  four  pure, 
assumptions,  namely,  (i)  that  the  sensations  are 
not  spontaneous;  (2)  that  there  is  an  external  world 
absolute;  (3)  that  the  mind  is  ruffled;  and  (4)  that 
it  is  the  external  world  absolute  that  ruffles  it;  — 
four  assumptions  in  support  of  not  one  of  which 
had  he  —  whatever  anyone  else  may  have,  or  not 
have  —  one  single  substantial  fact,  or  one  solid  war- 
rant in  reason  to  offer  —  not  one. 

There  is,  certainly,  nothing  "given"  in  the  sensa- 
tions that  they  are  not  spontaneous  —  as  everybody 
should  know,  and  he  himself  knew.  And  even  were 
there  an  outside  world  absolute,  he  never  demon- 
strated its  existence  and  so  could  never  know  any 
logical  connection  between  it  and  the  sensations. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  only  out  of  what  is  all  this  ab- 
sence of  certain  data,  and  of  correlation  of  data, 
from  which  to  reason,  that  Kant  conjures,  as  out  of 
a  vacuum,  his  justification  of  himself  in  assuming 
an  external  world  absolute! 


Physical  Demonstration  of  Such  World       79 

Meanwhile  his  eyes  were  either  wilfully  shut 
fast,  or  he  was  involuntarily  blind,  to  the  one  most 
primary  trump  card  that  could  score  him  definite 
knowledge  in  the  matter,  namely,  that  of  a  pri- 
mary fact  of  consciousness,  fact  of  our  recognition 
of  the  existence  of  a  plurality  of  minds  with  their 
experience;  and  again,  either  ignorantly  or  wilfully 
blind  to  the  more  secondary  such  card,  secondary 
yet  only  so  in  logical  order,  but  one  otherwise  which 
as  physical  is  the  one  par  excellence  and  competent 
to  take  the  opponent  in  the  game's  whole  hand,  and 
even,  as  one  might  say,  the  whole  pack  of  cards  out 
of  the  game  as  well  as  in. 

And  so  Kant,  having,  perhaps,  affected  at  least 
to  demonstrate  such  world,  but  really  failing  alto- 
gether of  doing  so,  has  still  the  hardihood  of  as- 
suming and  affirming  its  veritable  existence;  and 
this,  too,  yet  that  little  better  than  charging  con- 
sciousness with  being  a  monumental  liar  in  its  deliv- 
erance of  our  very  perception  of  such  world. 

But  what  business  had  Kant,  in  logic  or  reason, 
still  to  assume  and  affirm  an  external  world  abso- 
lute; and  particularly  what  business  had  he  to  as- 
sume and  affirm  one  as  obtaining  under  the  utterly 
inconceivable  condition  of  its  obtaining  in  the  ab- 
sence of  all  space  to  obtain  in,  as  he  did  ? 

Besides,  the  funny  thing  about  it  is  that  he  ex- 
pects you  to  imagine  it  to  obtain  in  the  absence  of 
the  very  thing,  he  said  himself,  you  could  not  think 
the  absence  of!  the  very  thing,  he  said  himself,  you 
could  not  think  azvay!  Mind  you,  he  never  con- 
tended that  this  outlying  world  absolute,  which,  he 


8o 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


said,  we  don't  perceive,  is  in  the  space  he  prestidig- 
itatured  a  priori  intuition  into  being  for  us 
to  perceive  the  external  world  in  which  he  said 
we  do  perceive.  Rather,  we  are  called  upon  to  un- 
derstand that  the  external  world  absolute  of  his 
assumption  and  affirmation  obtains  neither  in  the  a 
priori  intuition  space  of  his  conjuring  into  being,  nor 
in  space  outlying  and  absolute.  In  a  word,  we  are 
called  upon  to  think  a  world  exists  in  what  is  to  be 
thought  absent  which  yet,  he  says,  you  cannot  think 
absent,  cannot  think  away!  !  !  Great  is  Immanuel 
Kant!    Great! 

That  he  should  do  this,  is  quite  enough  of  itself 
and  alone  to  utterly  condemn  him  as  a  philosopher. 
And  I  ask,  again,  and  would  a  thousand  times,  for  I 
know  the  infinite  significance  there  is  to  the  query 
— What  business  had  Kant,  anyway,  in  logic  or  rea- 
son to  assume  and  affirm  an  external  world  abso- 
lute ;  but  then,  particularly,  to  assume  and  affirm  one 
under  utterly  inconceivable  conditions,  even  under 
what  he  himself  said  were  such?    And  yet  it  ^yas 
his  dilemma  that  he  had  to,  as  his  a  priori  intuition 
were  to  have  any  excuse  for  being.       He  had  to, 
since,   with   outlying   space   absolute,    there    could 
be  no  such  excuse.    It  was  his  dilemma  that  he  had 
to,  or  give  his  whole  case  away,  give,  in  fact,  him- 
self away.    But  that  he  had  to  assume  and  affirm  an 
external  world  absolute  assumed  to  obtain  under 
the  inconceivable  condition  of  its  existence  in  what 
was  to  be  thought  away,  what,  he  said  himself,  could 
not  be  thought  away,  is  of  itself  and  alone  enoug-h 
utterly  to  condemn  his  philosophy,  as  is  that  he  did 


Physical  Demonstration  of  Such  World       8i 

assume  and  affirm  as  much,  to  utterly  condemn  him 
himself  as  a  philosopher. 

One  has  but  to  realize  this  to  know  of  a  certainty 
that  his  philosophy  is  at  last  to  go  to  the  junk  heap, 
and  himself  left  standing  but  a  pitiful  figure  in  the 
history  of  metaphysics. 


I 


Take  a  cube  of  anything,  say  of  wood,  and  tie  a  string 
to  it  and  whirl  it  swiftly  round  and  round;  it  will  look 
to  be  a  ring.  The  philosophy  of  what  you  fail  to  see, 
and  of  why  you  fail  to,  is  the  philosophy  of  external 
perception,  as  it  is  an  illusion,  in  a  nutshell. 


Do  not  forget  for  a  moment  that  with  most  abso- 
lutely certain  an  external  world  absolute,  and  with 
most  absolutely  certain  the  conscious  mind  declaring 
the  perception  of  a  world  external  to  itself,  the  pre- 
sumption, the  well-nigh  infinite  presumption  is  that  the 
mind  does  perceive  such  world.  So  that  when  Kant 
butts  in  to  establish  his  world  of  "phenomena,"  and 
our  external  perception  as  perception  of  only  such 
world,  he  does  it  in  defiance  of  a  well-nigh  infinite  pre- 
sumption to  the  contrary. 


VIII 

Demonstration  of  the  Perception  of  the  External 

Physical  World  Absolute  and  Incidental  Third 

Demonstration  of  Its  Existence 

I  have  said  that  we  have  yet  a  third  demonstra- 
tion of  the  existence  of  an  external  w^orld  absolute, 
v^orld  absolute  as  it  is  physical  at  least,  but  one  pri- 
marily of  its  perception,  and  only  incidentally  of  its 
existence;  and  yet  necessarily  incidentally  of  that 
since  its  perception  involves  its  existence. 

Of  course,  it  does  not  of  necessity  follow  from 
the  simple  fact  of  such  a  world  that  we  should  per- 
ceive it,  or  know  anything  of  its  nature.  But  with 
the  absolute  certainty  of  its  existence,  joined  with 
the  most  explicit  deliverance  of  the  consciousness  of 
the  perception  of  a  world  as  external  to  the  mind, 
which  deliverance  no  one  disputes,  necessarily  fol- 
lows the  presumption,  the  infinite  presumption,  that 
the  mind  perceives  the  external  world  absolute  that 
we  know  to  exist.  We  have,  then,  do  not  forget, 
the  infinite  presumption  to  start  with  that  we  per- 
ceive the  external  world  absolute,  as  well  as  that  it 
exists.  So  that,  when  Kant  butts  in  to  deny  per- 
ception of  that  world,  he  is  up  against  the  infinite 
presumption  of  his  stupendous  error. 

But  now  if  we  were  to  employ  a  figure,  we  should 
say  that,  to  Kant's  view,  mind  was  a  pane  of  glass 


86 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


smashed  by  a  flying  brick,  which,  the  pane  of  glass, 
supposing  it  conscious,  knows  everything  of  its  be- 
ing smashed,  but  nothing  of  the  flying  brick  in  the 
instant  of  the  glass's  destruction ;  knows  of  the  pres- 
sure of  the  brick  on  itself,  the  glass,  in  the  instant 
of  the  brick's  crashing  through,  but  has  no  sense, 
in  the  same  instant,  of  thing  pressing! — and  this,  too, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  there  is  in  the  consciousness, 
as  it  were,  of  the  pane  of  glass,  no  immediate  de- 
liverance of  its  being  smashed,  and  only,  only  im- 
mediate deliverance  of  perception  of  the  flying  brick! 

Or,  dropping  metaphor,  the  mind,  as  Kant 
would  have  it,  knows  everything  of  its  being  acted 
on  by  the  outlying  world  absolute,  but  nothing  of 
the  world  which  acts  on  it;  knows  of  the  effects 
wrought  or  impression  made  on  it  of  that  world  in 
the  instant  of  the  effects  wrought  or  impression  be- 
ing made,  but  knows,  in  the  same  instant  of  know- 
ing these,  nothing  of  that  bringing  these  mental 
phenomena  to  pass  —  and  this,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  there  is  in  the  consciousness  no  immediate 
deliverance  of  the  mind's  being  acted  on,  and  only 
immediate  deliverance  of  the  cognition  of  the  world 
which  a<:ts  on  it! 

But,  really,  the  notion  of  the  mind  being  acted 
on  of  the  external  world  absolute  is  only  an  aca- 
demic after-thought. 

And  then,  again,  only  an  academic  after-thought 
is  it  that  that  action,  or  action's  effects,  should  be 
perceived,  and  not,  in  the  same  instant,  be  perceived 
that  world  itself  then  acting,  that  world  itself  as 
something  at  least,  if  not  anything  more  definite, 


' 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


87 


thus  acting  on  the  mind.  The  notion  of  its  not  be- 
ing perceived  is  a  notion  think-o/-able,  but  still  not 
in  the  least  thinkable,  thinkable  as  realizable. 

It  certainly  is  nothing  self-evident,  that  is,  think- 
able as  realizable,  that  that  thus  acting  is  not  per- 
ceived, even  though  it  were  nothing  self  evident  that 
it  is;  while  there  is  not  one  assured  fact,  nor  one 
valid  reason  to  sustain  the  assumption  that  it  is  not. 
It  most  certainly  could  not  be  argued  that  the  in- 
cognizable nature  of  that  world  would  forbid  such 
perception  for  nothing  positive,  of  a  certainty,  of 
that  world's  nature  is  known  beyond  its  mechani- 
cality;  or  nothing  at  least  as  sensuously  />^rceived, 
and  only  something  as  rationally  conceived,  and  the 
latter  nothing  that  should  be  understood  as  incog- 
nizable.    Neither  could  it  be  argued  that  any  such 
as  effects  on  the  mind  by  that  world  would,  like  a 
dust  raised,  preclude  the  perception  of  it,  for,  as 
must  be  understood,  in  the  event  of  any  such  effects, 
there  would  be.  in  the  moment  of  them,  two  objects 
almost  simultaneously  before  the  mind;  one  the  ef- 
fects as  object,  that  object  perceived  as  within  the 
mind;  and  the  other  the  outlying  world  absolute 
provoking  those  effects  as  object,  that  object  per- 
ceived as  out  of  the  mind.     Almost  simultaneously 
but  not  quite,  of  course,  since,  in  both  logical  and 
historical  order,  the  latter  comes  first  before  the 
mind,  and  the  former  only  after ;  and  so,  of  course, 
must  come  the  perception  of  the  external  world  ab- 
solute itself  first,  as  there  was  to  be  perception  of  it 
at  all,  before  that  of  its  any  effects,  as  there  were 
any  such  effects  at  all,  which,  themselves  as  object 


88  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

coming  only  after,  could  not  preclude  altogether  at 
the  outset  the  perception  of  the  absolute  object  itself 
which  came  before,  yet,  too,  that,  being  followed  so 
close  by  perception  of  effects  as  object,  conscious 
perception  of  the  former  should  be  indistinguishable 
from  that  of  the  latter,  and  be  overborne  by  it. 

Moreover,  and  still  again,  it  could  not  be  said 
that  the  external  world  absolute,  because  not  being 
perceived  for  such  altogether  as  it  is  in  itself,  there- 
fore it,  nothing  of  it,  is  being  perceived.    That  is, 
it  could  not  be  said  that,  because  we  do  not  perceive 
what  distinguishes  a  thing  from  another  as  well  as 
what  does  not  thus  distinguish  it,  therefore  we  do 
not  perceive  what  does  not  distinguish  it;  that  be- 
cause what  only  we  perceive  of  a  thing  is  what  is 
common  with  another,  or  even  with  everything  else 
of  our  perception,  therefore  do  we  see  nothing  at  all 
of  that  thing.    All  of  which  would  be  like  arguing 
that  an  object  which,  because  of  its  distance,  I  could 
not  realize  whether  it  be  tree,  horse,  or  man,  there- 
fore I  cannot  be  seeing  the  tree  horse,  or  man, 
whichever  it  is,  at  all ;  that  because  I  cannot  be  see- 
ing the  whichever  it  is  as  the  whichever  it  is,  there- 
fore I  cannot  be  seeing  it  at  all  —  cannot  be  seeing 

even  anything  at  all! 

Altogether,  then,  considering  that  effects  or  im- 
pressions made  on  the  mind  by  the  external  world 
absolute  must,  as  object,  be  object  perceived  as  with- 
in the  mind  where  they  are;  and  that  the  external 
world  absolute  must,  as  object  perceived,  be  per- 
ceived as  external  to  the  mind  where  it  is,  yet 
that    conscious    perception    of    it    be    later    over- 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


89 


ridden  and  obscured  by  perception  of  effects  or  im- 
pressions as  object,  as  there  were  any  such;  and 
considering  that  effects  or  impressions  on  the  mind 
are  nothing  "given"  in  external  perception,  much 
less  "given"  as  being  perceived,  while  what  is 
"given"  therein  is  a  consciousness  of  a  world  ex- 
ternal to  the  mind,  —  the  only  logical  conclusion, 
as  well  as  was  the  infinite  presumption,  is  that  there 
is,  at  least,  perception  of  that  world  absolute,  per- 
ception of  it,  very  it  itself,  whether  of  its  any  possi- 
ble effects  or  impressions  on  the  mind,  or  not. 

That  is,  the  presumption,  and  as  well,  too,  the 
logical  inference  from  the  facts,  is  that  the  external 
world  absolute  is  perceived  unless,  as  I  keep  repeat- 
ing, consciousness  be  the  altogether  consummate 
falsifier,  not  to  say  downright  liar,  that  Kant  and 
the  academic  brethren  the  world  over  would  have  it 
that  it  is. 

But  the  consciousness,  very  indeed,  is  not  that 
inveterate  falsifier,  not  to  say  downright  liar;  is  not 
even  that  falsifier,  or  not  more  that,  at  least,  than 
from  the  mind's  finiteness  it  is  compelled  to  be, 
which  is  not  to  say  that,  from  this  cause,  it  is  at  all ; 
and  no  one  has  ever  yet  showed,  and  as  before  was 
noted,  that,  from  this  cause,  it  must  needs  perceive 
nothing  of  the  external  world  absolute;  nor  again 
that  it  must  yet  report  that  object  which  is  only 
within  the  mind  to  be  still  outside  it. 

Anything  to  the  contrary,  then  of  very  percep- 
tion of  very  the  external  world  absolute  is  not  to 
be  entertained  until  as  much  is  proven ;  the  burden 
of  proof  in  the  matter  resting,  not  with  who  would 


iili 


90  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

affirm  such  perception  and  knowledge  and  the 
veracity  of  consciousness,  but  with  who  would  in- 
sist otherwise,  and  charge  consciousness  with  men- 
dacity. And  as  Kant  insisted  on  the  contrary,  the 
burden  of  proof  of  the  contrary  rested  with  him  at 
least,   even   if,  besides,  with  the  whole  academic 

world. 

But  now  let  us  see  what  can  be  offered  in  the 
way  of  a  positive  demonstration  in  support  of  this 
infinite  presumption,  as  I  have  declared  it  be,  of  our 
perception  of  the  external  world  absolute  we  must 

know  to  exist. 

Of  course,  as  I  have  already  said,  it  does  not 
necessarily  follow  from  the  simple  fact  of  such 
world  that  we  should  perceive  it,  or  know  anything 
of  its  nature ;  but  it  does  necessarily  follow  from  our 
being  able  to  demonstrate  its  existence  that  we 
should  be  in  conscious  touch  with  it,  either  directly, 
or  indirectly;  follow  that,  in  that  demonstration, 
would  be  being  realized  our  perception  and  knowl- 
edge either  of  it  itself,  or  of  its  effects  on  us;  and 
which  is  to  say,  as  said  above,  only  in  other  words, 
that  we  should  be  in  conscious  touch  with  it  either 
directly,  or  indirectly.  Kant  said  touch  with  it  only 
indirectly ;  that  is,  in  touch  directly  only  with  mental 
phenomena,  themselves  as  it  were  a  dust  kicked  up 
by  the  action  of  that  world  on  the  mind,  and  oc- 
cluding perception  of  that  world  itself,  and  leaving 
only  the  dust  or  mental  phenomena  to  receive  cog- 
nition. And  our  primary  demonstration  of  such 
world  did  not  dispute  this,  as  it  was  one  that  in  no 
wise  involved  conscious  relation  directly  with  that 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


91 


world,  yet  that  most  assuredly  it  did  involve  as  much 
with  it  indirectly. 

But  this,  now,  our  demonstration  of  the  per- 
ception of  such  world,  and  incidentally  a  third  such 
of  its  existence,  involves,  it  will  be  found,  conscious 
touch  with  it  directly.  And  here  is  the  demonstra- 
tion as  follows. 

Thus  we  have  no  experience,  or  knowledge,  of 
mind  being  ever  once  conscious  but  as  primarily  it 
is  so  only  as  it  is  first  in  the  presence  of  objects,  ob- 
jects of  an  external  world  absolute  as  it  would  ap- 
pear to  be,  and  which  objects  or  external  world 
absolute  in  awakening  consciousness,  awakens  per- 
ception of  those  objects  and  that  world.  And  what 
is  the  nature  of  those  objects  and  that  world  which 
are  the  cause,  the  exciting  cause  at  least,  of  con- 
sciousness, and  of  our  perception  of  them,  as  it 
would  appear?  Why,  mechanical  anyway,  what- 
ever more  they  or  it  may  be.  Surely  are  not  exten- 
sion, figure,  resistance,  motion,  which  we  perceive 
in  external  perception  all  mechanical  ?  It  is  what  is 
the  mechanical,  then,  whether  or  not  anything  more, 
which,  as  would  appear,  is  the  cause  or,  in  medical 
parlance,  the  exciting  cause  at  least,  of  conscious- 
ness, and  of  our  perception  of  extension,  figure,  and 
so  on.  It  is  that  that  is  the  positive  and  exciting 
cause  even  if  not,  and  most  likely  not,  the  predis- 
posing (medical  parlance  again)  cause  also,  and 
cause  altogether  of  it.  It  is  the  exciting  cause  and 
that,  only  for  which,  however  strenuous  the  predis- 
posing cause,  would  consciousness  ever  obtain  at  all, 
so  far  as  we  know.    That  is,  prior  to  the  action, 


g2  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

action  as  it  is  said  to  be,  of  external  objects  or  the 
external  world,  on  the  mind,  only  capacity  —  and 
hardly  that  —  potential  or  latent,  obtains,  and  not 
consciousness  itself  at  all  that  obtains ;  the  same  as, 
prior  to  its  disturbance  from  without,  motionless 
water,  at  a  temperature  of  31  degrees  or  lower,  is 
only  a  predisposition,  only  a  capacity  —  and  hardly 
that— potential  or  latent,  for  being  ice,  but  is  not  ice 
itself;  or  the  same,  again,  as  the  egg,  prior  to  being 
the  subject  of  an  increase  of  temperature,  is  only  a 
predisposition,  only  a  latent  or  potential  capacity, 
and  hardly  that,  for  becoming  a  chick,  but  is  not 
already  the  chick  itself.    I  say  hardly  that,  for  were 
the  capacity,  in  respect,  say,  of  the  chick,  fully  such, 
we  would  have  the  chick  already  arrived,  without 
the  adjuvant  of  increased  warmth  to  enable  it  to 
become  such ;  but  which  as  it  could  never  become  but 
for  that  rise  in  temperature,  the  latter  is  something 
needed  that  full  capacity  altogether  obtain,  and  the 
actual  chick  realized. 

However,  as  would  appear,  once  the  mechanical, 
as  exciting  cause,  is  brought  to  bear  on  the  mind,  — 
on  the  mind  as  is  said  —  then  we  have  conscious- 
ness and  perception  of  what  would  appear  to  be  ab- 
solute external  objects  — that  is,  we  are  brought  in 
touch  with  such  directly.  This  all  is  only  as  would 
appear;  but  it  is  proposed,  actually  to  demonstrate 
the  apppearance  and  the  more  cursory  and  vulgar 
observation,  to  be  reality;  actually  to  demonstrate 
that  what  is  at  least  mechanical,  whatever  more  it 
is,  is  such  cause;  and  again  that  it  is  the  mechanical 
and  objective  reality  outside  the  mind  and  absolute 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


93 


I 


that  is  such,  and  which  we,  as  perceiving,  veritably 
perceive  what  is  outside  and  absolute,  and  what  is 
the  external  world  absolute. 

And  the  demonstration  is  in  this:  that  it  is,  as 
science  makes  known  to  us,  to  what  is  only  mechani- 
cal change  that  is  due  a  change  of  consciousness 
(that  is,  of  its  content)  as  when  only  to  a  change 
of  wave-lengths  and  of  frequency  of  wave  impulses 
—  themselves,  as  also  the  change  itself,  what  are 
only  mechanical  —  is  due  a  change  of  consciousness 
from  a  consciousness,  say  of  red,  to  a  consciousness 
of  green,  or  other  color;  and  that  therefore,  prima 
facie,  if  to  what  is  only  a  mechanical  change  is  due 
a  change  of  consciousness,  that  is,  a  change  of  its 
content,  then  to  what  is  simply  the  mechanical 
minus  the  change,  that  is,  to  what  is  the  mechanical 
in  statu  quo,  as  the  exciting  cause,  is  due  content  at 
all;  and  due,  as  we  know  consciousness  only  as  with 
content,  very  consciousness  itself,  due  consciousness 
itself  at  all, 

I  repeat,  that  is  here  demonstrated  that  to  the 
mechanical  itself  in  statu  quo,  as  exciting  cause,  is 
due  content  of  consciousness  at  all,  is  due  conscious- 
ness itself  at  all ;  what  accords  with  what  I  said  in 
the  beginning,  was  the  more  cursory  or  vulgar  ob- 
servation in  the  matter,  namely,  that  the  world  of 
our  external  perception,  the  objects  of  which  are 
mechanical  of  form,  is  the  exciting  cause  at  least, 
of  consciousness  and  of  our  perception  of  those  ob- 
jects of  that  world. 

But  here  to  stop  a  moment  just  to  note  the  tre- 
mendous significance  of  this  demonstration  that  to 


94 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  mechanical,  and  the  mechanical  impact  on  the 
mind  —  on  the  mind  as  would  appear  —  is  due  the 
contents  of  consciousness,  is  due  very  consciousness 
itself,  in  a  word.  That  significance  is  that  in  the 
Aboriginal  and  Absolute  Reality,  in  the  beginning, 
so  to  speak,  there  does  not  inhere  consciousness  itself 
but  only  the  latent  capacity  for  it;  does  not  inhere 
consciousness  in  actuality  but  only  in  possihility^ 
only  as  latent,  only  as  in  embryo  as  it  were,  which 
only  a  subsequent  event,  the  subsequent  event  of  im- 
pact of  the  mechanical  on  that  Aboriginal  and  Abso- 
lute Reality,  transmutes  into  consciousness  in  actu- 
ality. In  brief  that  significance  is  even  the  actual 
demonstration,  yes,  the  most  absolutely  incontestible 
demonstration  that  the  consciousness  or  conscious 
mind  is  nothing  primary;  that  it  has  no  being  in  actu- 
ality, in  the  beginning;  yes,  and  note  well,  that  the 
concept,  too,  as  being  thought,  which  can  obtain 
only  with  the  event  of  consciousness,  can  itself  be 
nothing  primary;  can  itself  have  no  being  in  the 
beginning  —  and  which,  that  it  cannot,  is  a  complete 
explosion  of  Kant's  leading  contention. 

But  now  to  return  to  what  I  was  saying.  I  was 
saying  that  is  here  demonstrated  that  to  the  mechani- 
cal itself  in  statu  quo,  as  exciting  cause,  is  due  con- 
tent of  consciousness  at  all,  is  due  indeed  conscious- 
ness itself,  at  all.  But  now  is  in  order  to  demon- 
strate—  if  to  articulate  the  self-evidency  of  a  self- 
evident  proposition  is  to  demonstrate  it  —  that  this 
mechanical,  as  the  exciting  cause  of  consciousness, 
and  which  itself,  in  external  perception,  we  per- 
ceive, cannot  be  a  mere  precept ,  a  mere  subjective 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


95 


event  or  phenomenon,  as  Kant  would  be  understood 
to  affirm  it  to  be,  in  objective  disguise;  cannot  be  a 
mere  phantom  of  the  mind,  and  only  be  a  thought 
as  being  thought;  but  must  be,  on  the  contrary,  an 
objective  thing  absolute  and  reality  outside  the  mind 
altogether,  and  be  what  is  in  itself  such  as  appears, 
and  what,  moreover,  with  whatever  more  it  is,  is 
thought  as  not  being  thought,  that  is,  is  what  is  un- 
being-thought  thought  as  a  locomotive,  or  any  ma- 
chine, is  unbeing-thought  thought,  and  which,  we  in 
perceiving,  it  must  be  an  outlying  world  absolute, 
and  the  outlying  world  absolute  that  we  perceive. 

It  is  now  in  order,  I  say,  to  make  evident  that 
mechanicality  as  a  mere  percept  cannot  possibly  be 
the  any  cause  whatever  of  consciousness.  And  this 
would  seem  easy  enough  since  everyone  can  but 
understand  that  what  itself  involves  or  obtains  only 
in  virtue  of  involving  consciousness  could  not  itself 
be  obtaining  in  advance  of  that  in  advance  of  which 
it  must  obtain  to  be  cause;  that  is,  mechanicality  as 
a  mere  percept,  obtaining  only  in  virtue  of  involv- 
ing consciousness  as  it  does,  could  not  be  itself  ob- 
taining in  advance  of  that  only  in  advance  of 
which  as  it  did  obtain  could  it  be  conscious- 
nesses cause,  and  so  is  not  such  cause.  Only 
mechanicality,  then,  as  void  of  consciousness,  which 
is  to  say  as  not  being  thought  and  as  outlying  con- 
sciousness, can  be. 

Consciousness  itself  the  cause  of  consciousness, 
is  an  impossibility  and  an  absurdity  as  all  will  un- 
derstand and  no  one  dispute. 

Manifestly  the  only  way  out  of  this  impasse  and 


96 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


rankest  incongruity  possible,  that  something  of  con- 
sciousness is  the  cause  of  consciousness,  is  to  back 
out;  and  to  understand  that  the  mechanicaUty  in 
question  is  not  a  percept  at  all,  nothing  involving 
consciousness  at  all,  but  something  lying  outside  all 
mind  and  consciousness,  and  absolute. 

But  now  again,  it  is  utterly  inconceivable  as  pos- 
sible that  there  should  be  mechanicality  of  outline 
absolute,  that  is,  that  there  should  be  right-line, 
angle,  or  curve  absolute,  but  as  it  should  be  mechani- 
cality of  outline  absolute,  be  right-line,  angle,  or 
curve  absolute,  of  something,  something,  as  it  were 
substance  itself  absolute,  something  as  of  body 
itself  absolute.  Nay,  to  put  it  even  stronger  —  and 
note  well  the  distinction  —  it  is  even  positively  con- 
ceivable that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that  there 
should  be  outlying  mechanicality  of  outline  absolute, 
be  right-line,  angle,  or  curve  absolute,  but  as  it  was 
the  outlying  mechanicality  of  outline  absolute,  was 
right-line,  angle,  or  curve  absolute,  of  something 
itself  absolute,  something  as  body  itself  ab- 
solute such  as  connoted  by  resistance,  itself 
in  turn  connoting  such  as  quantity,  quality  and 
so  on;  positively  conceivable  I  say,  as  infinitely  im- 
possible ;  and  what  is  positively  conceivable  as  in- 
finitely impossible  is  impossible,  as  goes  anything 
as  such  as  thus  conceivable  by  the  human  mind  to 
be  so.  Outlying  mechanicality  of  outline  absolute, 
and  what  we  understand  as  body  connoted  by  re- 
sistance, are  linked  fast  in  indissoluble  embrace,  as 
are  curvilinear  plane  and  its  two  surfaces.  As  you 
could  not  demonstrate  such  plane  but  as  you  did 


Demonstration  of  Its  Perception 


97 


its  two  surfaces,  or,  vice  versa,  so  you  can  not 
demonstrate  such  as  outlying  right-line  absolute  but 
as  you  do  something  substance  as  it  were,  outlying 
and  absolute  of  which  such  as  the  outlying  right- 
line  absolute  is  the  outlying  right-line  absolute  of; 
and  vice  versa,  but  as  you  do  something  what  is 
connoted  by  resistance  which  itself  in  turn  connotes 
in  a  way,  quantity,  quality,  and  so  on. 

Moreover,  no  more  than  could  there  be  outly- 
ing right-line  absolute  but  as  there  was  outlying 
something,  substance  as  it  were,  absolute,  which  the 
outlying  right-line  absolute  was  the  outlying  right- 
line  absolute  of,  could  there  be  perception  of  the 
fomner  but  as  there  was  perception  of  the  latter. 

And  this  would  be  saying  that,  as  is  made  incon- 
testably  certain  perception  of  mechanicality  of  out- 
line absolute,  is  made  so  species  of  a  somewhat  the 
genera  of  which  are  of  the  sort  of  Kant's  categori- 
cals ;  which  species,  therefore,  themselves  are  as  much 
objects  of  sense  and  outlying  the  mind  and  absolute 
and  what  are  primarily  experienced  rather  than 
primarily  thought,  as  are  space  and  time,  or  exten- 
sion and  figure,  — Kant  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. 

So,  here  I  have  demonstrated  that  our  external 
perception  is  perception  of  the  external  world  abso- 
lute itself,  very  perception  of  very  it  itself  the  ex- 
ternal world  absolute,  by  demonstrating  (i)  first 
that  the  mechanicality  we  perceive  in  external  per- 
ception is  the  exciting  cause  of  consciousness,  (2) 
and  again,  that  that  mechanicality  is  no  mere  per- 
cept what  lies  inside  the  mind,  but  is  what  must  lie 


98 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


outside  the  mind  altogether,  and  (3)  still  again, 
that  that  mechanicality  of  outline  absolute  must  be 
mechanicality  of  outline  of  something,  something  as 
it  were  substance  or  body,  itself  outside  the  mind 
and  absolute. 

And  now,  finally,  it  will  be  noticed  that,  having 
demonstrated  our  perception  of  the  external  world 
absolute  we  have  also,  the  existence  of  such  world; 
for  how  could  there  be  perception  of  such  except  as 
it  had  an  existence? 

And  thus  at  last  we  have  established  with  cer- 
tainty, first  from  the  primary  facts  of  consciousness, 
with  particular  emphasis  laid  on  that  one,  of  the 
three,  of  our  recognition  of  the  existence  of  other 
minds  than  each  of  itself  alone,  that  there  is  a  two 
fold  external  world  absolute;  and  then  confirmed  it 
first  by  an  independent  physical  demonstration  abso- 
lutely incontestable;  and  again  done  so  incidentally 
as  we  demonstrated  our  perception  of  such  a  world. 
And  this,  altogether,  practically  amounts  to  what 
are  three  distinct  demonstrations  of  an  external 
world  absolute. 


It  was  the  crucial  despair  of  Kant  to  realize  how 
what  there  was  sensuous  experience  of  in  the  sensu- 
ous experience  of  space,  the  idea  concept  or  a  priori 
intuition  of  was  no  experience  of  at  all  and  so  could 
be  no  contribution  to.  It  was  his  crucial  despair  to  un- 
derstand how  what,  on  the  mountaintop,  there  was 
experience  of  as  there  was  experience  of  the  purity, 
exhilaration,  and  benefit  of  the  mountain  air,  and 
which  experience  kept  up  should  have  saved  him 
from  dying  of  tuberculosis,  an  idea,  concept,  or  a 
priori  intuition  of,  as  he  was  come  down  into  the 
valley  again,  is  nothing  an  experience  of  at  all,  and 
nothing  that  could  save  him  from  dying  of  that  di- 
sease just  the  same  and  as  soon  as  were  the  idea, 
concept,  or  a  priori  intuition,  never  once  in  his  con- 
sciousness, or  had  he  never  been  on  the  mountain- 
top.  Hence  the  fatal  miscarriage  of  his  philosophical 
exploitation,  and  why  a  thousand  years  from  now  he, 
as  a  philosopher,  shall  be  but  a  memory,  and  his  phil- 
osophy a  by-word. 


,  I 


Kant  gives  rank  to  conceptual  mind  which  cannot 
define  life  because  it  cannot  realize  life,  oyer  ex- 
periential or  perceptual  mind  which  realizes  it 
though  cannot  define  it!  But  with  what  reason?  — 
or,  rather,  want  of  reason! 


Certain  "innate  a  priori  forms,"  conceptions  or 
what  not,  are  no  more  necessary  conditions  of  cog- 
nition, no  more  a  subjective  necessity  of  it,  than  they 
are  of  a  glass  mirror  that  that  should  cognosce,  as 
it  were,  objects  in  order  to  reflect  them. 

Latent  capacity  for  a  hole  in  the  mud  may  be 
necessary  for  there  to  be  a  hole  in  it  once  a  bullet 
is  dropped  into  it;  but  that  there  must  first  be  a  hole 
in  it  in  anticipation  of  a  bullet  being  dropped  into  it 
in  order  that  there  should  be  a  hole  in  it  once  a 
bullet  is  dropped  into  it  is  both  Kantian  and  academic 
rubbish. 


IX 

Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  as  External 

And  Absolute 

But  now,  with  most  absolutely  certain  an  ex- 
ternal world  absolute,  and  with  most  absolutely  cer- 
tain our  perception  of  it,  perception  of  very  it  itself, 
what  becomes  of  Kant's  "phenomena,''  phenomena 
of  space  and  time  as  "forms  of  the  sensibility,"  or 
"forms  of  perception"  ? 

And  what,  again,  of  these  forms  as  being,  pri- 
marily, of  a  priori  intuition?  And  what  of  his  our 
a  priori  intuition,  anyzvayf 

Well,  his  "phenomena,"  and  his  our  a  priori  in- 
tuition are,  as  it  were,  swallowed  up  of  oblivion; 
there  is  not  a  vestige  of  them  left  more  than  had 
they  never  existed,  —  which,  that  they  in  reality 
"ever  had,"  except  in  the  perverted  and  exuberant 
fancy  of  Immanuel  Kant,  is  the  fact  in  the  matter? 
In  short,  the  whole  Kantian  metaphysic  is  exploded, 
it  is  a  complete  wreck,  it  is  annihilated :  and  no  more 
need  be  said  about  it. 

No  more,  for,  that  we  perceive  nothing  of  an 
external  world  absolute,  and  that  space  and  time 
with  their  contents  are  nothing  external  to  the  mind, 
and  absolute,  are,  from  one  point  of  view  at  least. 


I02 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  very  corner-stone  of  the  whole  Kantian  meta- 
physical ediiice,  which  undermined,  and  the  entire 
superstructure  tumbles  in  a  heap ;  the  bubble  of  it  is 
burst;  and  the  monstrosity  of  it  exposed  beyond 
even  \niinite  power  to  recall  its  original  disguise  of 
normality  and  respectability. 

But  how,  then,  not  only  false  but  silly  becomes 
all  this  chatter  about  space  and  time,  being  in  us 
rather  than  we  in  space  and  time !  How  not  only 
false  but  silly  this  claim  of  Kant's  that  space  and 
time  are  either  a  priori  intuition,  or  things  of  a  priori 
intuition  (and  which  is  it  according  to  Kant?)  and 
such  as  antecedent  to  all  experience,  still  that  ob- 
taining "only  because  of  experience"!  And  how 
not  only  false  but  silly  his  dictum  that  space  and 
time  are  but  forms  of  the  sensibility !  —  but  forms 
of  perception ! 

I  have  said,  no  more  need  be  said  about  it ;  that 
is,  no  more  if  men  only  had  insight  enough  to  real- 
ize the  significance  of  some  things,  short  of  a  more 
elaborate  statement  of  them.  For,  plainly  enough, 
as  to  space  and  time,  there  being  veritably  an  ex- 
ternal world  absolute,  and  there  obtaining  veritably 
our  perception  of  it,  then  since,  as  would  no  one  dis- 
pute, our  external  perception  of  things  is  perception 
of  them  only  as  in  space  and  time,  our  any  perception 
of  that  world  must  be  perception  of  it,  too,  as  in  space 
and  time ;  which  world  itself  being  outside  the  mind 
and  absolute,  the  space  and  time  in  which  we  perceive 
it  must  themselves  be;  must  themselves  be  outside 
and  independent,  not  inside  and  contingent ;  outside 
as  ideas  in  the  concrete  and  as  not  being  thought. 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  103 

not  inside  and  dependent;  outside,  as  ideas  in  the 
concrete  and  as  not  being  thought,  not  inside  and  in 
the  abstract  and  as  thought  only  as  being  thought; 
—  and  from  this  there  is  no  possible  escape. 

Meanwhile,  not  only  do  space  and  time  obtain 
external  to  the  mind  and  absolute  but,  moreover, 
are  they  things  themselves  perceived  by  the  mind, 
and  perceived  as  external  to  it  and  absolute  — 
which,  external  and  absolute,  they  are.  They  are 
things  verily  perceived,  yet  that  Kant  and  his  apolo- 
gists and  worshippers  in  defense  of  his  doctrine  of 
their  mere  phenomenality,  insist  that  such  as,  say 
space,  can  not  be  an  object  of  sense  because  some- 
thing negative.  And  can't  it?  —  Can't  because 
something  negative?  And,  pray,  what  distinctively 
is  an  object  of  sense?  Surely  not  something  as  be- 
ing conceived,  something  in  the  abstract,  something 
as  being  thought;  not  this,  as  that  would  be  object 
itself  within  the  mind  as  only  could  we  then  con- 
ceive it  to  be;  and  which,  as  only  within  the  mind 
as  only  could  we  then  conceive  it  to  be,  then  only, 
as  perceived,  perceived  as  within  it  —  perceived  as 
within  the  mind  as  only  as  perceived  within  in  it 
could  we,  by  any  possibility  realize  the  perception 
as  being. 

Surely  not  this,  I  say,  but  something  as  not  being 
conceived,  as  not  obtaining  in  the  abstract,  as  not 
being  thought,  and  which  because  not  being 
thought,  may,  therefore,  be  something  outside  the 
mind,  and  conceived  as  out  of  it  and,  as  perceived, 
conceived  as  only  realizingly  can  it  be  conceived, 
ad  being  out  of  it. 


I04 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


This,  I  say,  is  an  object  of  sense,  as  we  must 
understand  it  as  experienced,  and  perceived  —  and 

nothing  else  is. 

But  how  experience,  how  realize,  and  how  per- 
ceive, —  which  may  be  easy  enough,  comparatively, 
something  positive  —  what  is  something  negative f 

—  how,  space,,  for  example?  Not  by  touch  with 
something  positive,  certainly.  A  fly,  as  in  flying  it 
brings  up  against  a  window  pane,  has  no  sense  of 
space  but  of  resistance.  Only  as  it  having  had  a 
sense  of  resistance,  something  positive,  and  then 
flies  away  again,  has  it  sense,  has  it  experience,  real- 
ization and  perception  of  space,  something  negative 

—  and  then  it  has. 

By  the  sense  of  touch,  alone,  of  something  posi- 
tive you  may  —  perhaps  (?) — have  provoked  a 
concept  of  space  (as  some  contend),  but  not  a  sense 
of  it.  In  brief,  experience,  realization,  perception 
of  space  comes  only,  but  comes,  of  the  contrast  be- 
tween an  experience,  realization  and  perception  of 
resistance,  and  the  experience,  realization  and  per- 
ception of  the  absence  of  it ;  or  as  the  perception  is 
visual,  comes  of  the  contrast  between  the  sight  of 
an  object  and  the  absence  of  sight  of  it. 

But  all  this,  Kant  only  disputes.  He  does  not 
allow  space  and  time  to  be  outside  the  mind,  and 
absolute ;  and  he  denies  that  they  are,  because  things 
negative,  and  not  to  be  perceived  even  were  they 
indeed  things  outside  and  absolute. 

And  he  was  primarily  moved  to  denying  them 
to  be  external  and  absolute,  or  at  least  finds  himself 
justified  in  it,  by  not  finding  them  "given,"  as  he 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  105 

says,  in  the  sensations.  So,  he  sets  himself  to  the 
task  of  discovering  them  elsewhere,  and,  as  he  be- 
lieves, succeeds.  He  does  not,  as  he  expected,  find 
the  eggs  in  the  hennery  and  as  laid  by  a  hen,  and  so 
he  is  warranted,  as  he  thinks,  in  assuming  them  laid 
in  a  tree-top  and  laid  by  a  crow  —  the  sensibiHty 
the  tree-top,  and  a  priori  intuition  the  crow! 

Moreover,  as  lodged  with  the  sensibility,  space 
and  time  are,  as  we  are  to  understand,  the  two  forms 
of  it.  In  other  words,  not  finding  them  "given"  in 
the  sensations,  therefore,  so  his  logic  runs,  are  they 
in  the  sensibility,  and  there  as  forms  of  it;  —  and 
only  there! 

Well,  well!  and  pray,  where,  in  all  this,  is  the 
logical  connection  ?  Where,  betv/een  their  not  being 
"given"  in  the  sensations,  and  their  yet  not  being 
there  ?  —  between  their  not  being  there,  if  not,  and 
their  being  in  the  sensibility  ?  —  between  their  being 
in  the  sensibility,  if  there,  and  their  being  there  as 
forms  of  it  ?  —  or  again  between  their  being  there, 
if  there,  and  their  being  only  there?  Where?  —  it 
would  seem  needless  to  say,  not  anywhere ;  no  logi- 
cal connection  whatever  in  a  single  instance ;  in  the 
last,  none  any  more  than  because  there  being  in  a 
mirror,  objects,  reflections  of  objects  outside  it,  still 
that  not  known  to  be  such,  therefore,  are  they  not 
such,  and  are  independent  objects  and  as  absolute 
as  any!  And  yet  Kant  assumes  logical  connection 
in  every  instance ! 

Not  "given"  in  the  sensations  forsooth !  —  Why, 
did  Kant  even  know  what  "given"  in  the  sensations 
means  ?    Did  he  not  know  that  being  "given"  in  the 


io6 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


sensations  has  nothing  to  do  with  their  existence 
there  —  except  that  existence  there  is  necessary  to 
being  "given"  there  and  that  therefore  space  and 
time  could  exist  there,  though  not  there  as  "given"  or 
givenable  at  all  ?  Did  he  not  so  much  as  know  that 
being  "given"  means  being  entertained  in  the  con- 
sciousness as  such,  or  the  thing  it  is  —  know  that  a 
fish  could  entertain  in  its  consciousness,  water  as 
something  being  swum  in  without  entertaining  the 
something  as  such,  and  as  water  swam  in?  and  so, 
that  the  water,  not  being  entertained  as  such  or  as 
water,  only  as  which  it  were  is  it  there  in  the  fish's 
consciousness  in  givenable  shape  to  be  "given"  in 
the  fish's  consciousness  at  all,  is  not  to  be  found 
"given"  there  at  all? 

But  speaking  more  generally,  this  is  to  say  that 
space  and  time  as  not  being  entertained  in  the  sensa- 
tions as  being  there  entertained  in  consciousness  as 
such,  that  is,  as  being  thought,  and  as  space  and 
time,  by  either  fish  or  human,  only  as  which  they 
are,  are  they  there  in  fish  or  human  consciousness 
and  sensations  in  givenable  shape  to  be  therein 
"given"  at  all  are  not  there  to  be  found  as  "given" 
at  all. 

And  yet  that  not  "given"  in  the  sensations,  still 
not  existing  there  ?  No,  says  Kant.  Expecting  to  find 
them  in  the  sensations  as  there  "given"  that  is,  as  be- 
ing thought,  but  not  there  finding  them  as  thus  enter- 
tained, which  he  should  have  known  in  advance 
they  would  not  be,  since  it  is  no  function  of  the 
sensibility,  —  any  more  than  it  is  of  a  leaf  to  gfen- 
erate  the  perfume  of  the  flower,  —  but,  alone,  that 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  107 

of  the  understanding,  according  even  to  his  own 
doctrine,  to  thus  entertain  them  and  entertain  them 
as  concepts  or  conceptions,  —  he  is  blinded  to  their 
being  there  at  all. 

But  how  silly  to  say  that  when  a  fly  brings  up 
against  a  window-pane  that  it  doesn't  experience 
resistance  because  it  doesn't  entertain  in  conscious- 
ness resistance  as  such  or  as  a  concept  or  in  the  ab- 
stract; or  that,  as  it  flies  away  from  the  window- 
pane,  it  doesn't  experience  space  because  it  doesn't 
entertain,  in  consciousness,  space  as  such;  that  is, 
have  a  thinking  and  conceptual  consciousness,  and 
not  merely  a  perctpiml  consciousness  of  space  — 
that,  because  it  doesn't  think  space,  it  doesn't  feel 
it,  forsooth!  or  that  as  space  is  experienced,  it  yet 
is  not  there  to  experience! 

However,  under  stress  to  find  space  and  time, 
after  the  hatching  of  them  by  a  priori  intuition, 
lodged  and  "given"  somewhere,  and  anywhere  in- 
deed, as  he  would  have  it,  but  outside  the  mind,  he 
arbitrarily  lodges  them  with  the  sensibility.  Arbi- 
trarily, for  what  bridge,  as  I  have  asked  before, 
had  he  to  take  him  over  from  not  finding  them  in 
the  sensations  to  finding  them  in  the  sensibility? 
Just  none  at  all.  He  made  a  feint,  of  course,  as 
would  he  logically  make  the  passage  over  from 
one  to  the  other.  But  the  farce  of  it !  oh,  the  farce 
of  it! 

Besides,  what  is  the  sensibility  itself?  Why,  it 
is  a  faculty  —  is  it  not  ?  —  what  is  power  or  organ, 
a  faculty  for  mental  activity,  not  mental  activity 
itself.    The  two  things  are  infinitely  distinct.    And 


io8 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


intuition,  a  priori  or  any  other,  is  an  activity,  a  form 
of  activity,  a  form  of  perceiving.  And  so,  when 
Kant  says  space,  for  example,  is  a  form  of  the  sensi- 
bihty,  and  in  the  same  breath  that  it  is  an  intuition, 
he  flatly  contradicts  himself ;  for  it  is  absolutely  im- 
possible as  it  should  be  one  that  it  should  be  the 
other.    A  ball  in  motion  is  not  itself  that  motion  of 

itself. 

Or,  you  might  as  well  talk  about  the  form  of  an 
object,  which  may  be  that  of  a  cube  as  being  that 
of  its  motion  which  itself  may  be  that  of  a  circle  or 
an  ellipse,  —  it  would  be  talking  wild;  and  Kant 
is  just  that  wild  when  he  would  mount,  say  space, 
at  once  astride  sensibility  and  intuition;  at  once 
astride  what  is  only  a  faculty  for  activity,  and  what 
is  very  the  activity  itself  of  that  faculty,  —  and  not 
know  he  was  contradicting  himself. 

And  then  besides,  again,  what,  in  fact,  are  the 
sensations  themselves  to  the  sensibility?  What  but 
much  what  are  the  waves  of  the  sea  in  a  storm  to 
the  waves  of  the  sea  in  a  calm,  namely,  that  they 
are  there  in  the  sensibility  in  possibility  or  potenti- 
ality only,  and  not  in  actuality  at  all,  as  the  waves 
of  the  sea  in  a  calm  are  in  the  sea  in  possibility  or 
potentiality  only,  and  not  in  actuality  there  at  all? 
So  that,  if  space  and  time  are  not  in  the  sensibility 
save  only  in  possibility  or  latency,  then  for  them  in 
actuality  we  must  look  in  the  sensations,  and  that 
is  just  where  they  are  —  Kant's  elaborate  and  ridic- 
ulous dialectic  exhibition  to  establish  the  contrary 
notwithstanding.  Indeed,  and  indeed,  what  the 
need  of  the  impact,  or  presence  of  an  external  world 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  109 

absolute  to  the  end  of  the  realization  in  conscious- 
ness of  space  and  time,  if  they  obtain  already  in  act- 
uality in  the  sensibility?    What  the  need,  I  repeat? 

However,  as  it  is,  what  the  function  of  such  im- 
pact or  presence  if  not  —  to  change  the  figure  — 
much  that  the  parallel  of  warmth  to  the  egg,  and  of 
moisture  to  the  seed,  namely,  to  bring  into  actuality 
the  sensations  themselves,  and  along  with  them  the 
space  and  time  that  obtain,  as  do  they,  only  in 
latency  of  potentiality  in  the  sensibility  ? 

But  to  perform  the  feat  of  the  reverse  of  this, 
and  lodge  space  and  time  with  the  sensibility,  Kant 
has  to  do  the  double  trick  of  taking  them  over,  and 
at  the  same  time,  of  reducing  them  from  things  in 
actuality  to  things  only  in  potentiality  or  latency. 
And  need  anything  be  said  that  should  be  evident 
the  preposterousness  of  any  affected  achievement 
of  it? 

Or,  even  supposing  he  had  achieved  it,  and  that 
they  are  landed,  in  very  truth,  in  the  sensibility  as 
latently  or  potentially  there  as  a  chick  in  an  egg,  or 
as  a  symphony  in  an  orchestra;  still,  it  is  contrary 
to  all  our  experience  that  we  should  have  any  ad- 
vance knowledge  of  them  as  being  then  there,  and 
not  rather  only  knowledge  of  them  simultaneously 
with  the  event  of  their  obtaining  in  actuality.  The 
former  would  be  like  our  divining  the  tree  in  the 
seed,  the  chick  in  the  tgg,  independent  of  our  knowl- 
edge from  experience  and  observation  in  the  matter ; 
which,  of  course,  everybody  knows  never  fell  within 
the  sphere  of  the  human  mind's  possibility.  And 
with  no  more  reason  may  we  suppose  the  possibility 


no 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


tn 


of  our  a  priori  intuitively  divining  space  and  time 
in  the  sensibility  in  advance  of  their  obtaining  in 
actuality  in  the  sensations. 

And  then,  what,  over  all  is  not  to  be  overlooked 
is  that  that  space  and  time  are  forms  of  the  sensi- 
bility, though,  perhaps,  a  pretty  conceit,  is  yet  ab- 
solutely unthinkable  —  unthinkable  as  being  unreal- 
izable. It  is  simply  think-o/-able  as  is  that  the  moon 
is  made  of  green  cheese,  or  as  is  that  two  and  two 
are  five;  but  that  space  and  time  are  forms  of  the 
sensibility  is  no  more  thinkable,  thinkable  as  real- 
izable than  are  these  other  propositions;  and  what 
is  simply  think-o/-able  is  at  an  infinite  remove  from 
what  is  thinkable.  This  distinction  I  have  noted  a 
thousand  times  before  — or,  rather,  would  have 
liked  to,  for  there  is  occasion  enough  for  it,  since 
men,  even  men  of  boasted  intellect  and  mental  train- 
ing, academic  men,  indeed,  are  continually  failing  of 
making  it,  and  are  constantly  fancying  they  think 
things  which  they  only  think  of. 

The  writer  once  heard  an  eminent  clergyman  de- 
clare in  public  that  he  knew  he  was  immortal  be- 
cause he  could  think  the  iniinite.  But  he  had  never, 
with  all  his  learning  learned  to  discriminate  between 
only  thinking  of  the  infinite  and  thinking  it  thinking 
it  as  realizing  it.  Only  what  is  itself  infinite  can 
think,  think  as  realizing,  the  infinite;  what  is  only 
finite  can  only  think  of  the^finite.  Of  course,  the  emi- 
nent divine,  miscarrying  so  sadly  in  his  premise  most 
sadly  miscarried  again  in  his  conclusion — and  all  be- 
cause, yet  that  he  had  a  university  and  trained  mind, 
he  failed  to  make  the  discrimination  I  have  noted. 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  1 1 1 

But  now,  propositions  only  thinko/able  have  to 
be  substantiated  by  empirical  proof  to  warrant,  in 
any  reason,  their  acceptance  as  the  truth ;  and  that 
space  and  time  are  forms  of  the  sensibility  is  one 
such  proposition,  the  truth  of  which,  it  should  be 
needless  to  say,  Kant  never  produced  the  facts  to 
sustain. 

However,  such  raw  assumptions  serve  one 
whose  work  in  metaphysics  is  mostly  erratic  flights 
of  an  exuberant  fancy  as  was  Kant's,  and  which 
enabled  him  to  spin  out  a  system  of  grotesque  spec- 
ulation to  the  plethoric  limit  of  nearly  a  thousand 
pages;  which,  had  he  but  once  got  down  to  some- 
thing like  realities,  not  a  quarter  of  this  offensive 
bulk  would  have  been  required  for  its  enunciation. 

Well,  next,  Kant  reasons  — heavens!  —  rea- 
sons! that,  because  not  finding  space  and  time 
"given"  in  the  sensations  but  finding  them,  as  he 
thinks,  in  the  sensibility,  they  must  be,  and  are,  in 
the  sensibility  only;  that  is,  that  they  cannot,  besides, 
be  things  outstanding  the  mind  altogether,  and  ab- 
solute. But  may  not  objects,  as  might  they  be  but 
as  objects  in  a  mirror,  and  but  as  shadows  relatively 
to  what  should  be  objects  substantial  and  absolute 
out  of  the  mirror,  even  must  they  not,  as  should  they 
be  but  such,  be  objects  substantial  and  absolute  out 
of  the  mirror,  also?  Where,  then,  is  the  logic  of  the 
inference  that  because  space  and  time  should  be 
found  in  the  sensibility  that,  therefore,  they  obtain 
only  in  it,  and  do  not  obtain  out  of  it  when,  for  all 
Kant  knew,  the  sensibility  or  mind,  in  its  external 
perception  conducts  itself  much  as  a  mirror,  and 


112  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

which,  with  no  little  reason,  it  may  be  argued  that 

it  docs  ? 

Now,  what  I  have  said  of  space  when  I  have 
singled    that    out    particularly    for    illustration    is 
every  whit  as  applicable  to  time.     Time  is  just  as 
much  a  thing  primarily  outside  the  mmd,  and  ab- 
solute as  is  space,  the  academic  brethren  to  the  con- 
trary   notwithstanding.     We    know    nothing    pri- 
marily of  time  but  by  succession  of  events;  and 
wherever  is  succession  of  events,  time  is  involved, 
and  involved  not  as  a  thing  being  thought  but  as  a 
thing  absolute,   as   absolute  as  the   succession   of 
events   itself;   and  primarily   to  be  felt,   and   not 
thought  as  ever  the  mind  is  brought  into  relations 
of  contact  with  it  or  that  succession  of  events. 

The  academic  claim  of  time  as  nothing  only  as  it 
is  something  being  thought  is  as  void  of  warrant, 
and  as  senseless  as  it  is  in  respect  of  space.  What 
brings  it  within  experience,  realization,  and  per- 
ception is  much  the  parallel  of  what  does  space. 

And  now,  I  ask  again,  where  is  the  logical  con- 
nection between  not  finding  space  and  time  in  the 
sensations,  and  their  still  not  existing  there?  — or 
again,  between  their  not  existing  there,  if  not,  and 
their  obtaining  in  the  sensibility?  or,  still  again,  be- 
tween their  obtaining  in  the  sensibility,  tf  they  do, 
and  their  obtaining  there  as  two  forms  of  it?  — or 
yet  once  more,  between  their  obtaining  there  in  the 
sensibility,  if  they  do,  and  their  obtaining  only  there, 
and  not  besides  in  the  outlying  world  absolute?  — 
Where  the  logical  connection?     Why,  simply  no- 
where, as  I  have  already  said,  not  in  one  of  these 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  113 

several  instances.  And  yet  Kant  affects  to  find  it 
there  in  every  one  of  them!  Great  logician,  Kant! 
—  great ! 

But  now  again.  It  was  even  Kant  himself  who 
said  that  "the  understanding  perceives  nothing,  and 
the  sensibility  knows  nothing."  Why,  then,  did  he 
think  to  look  expectantly  for  the  being  thought 
where  all  was  perception  and,  as  he  himself  said, 
nothing  of  the  being  thoughts  Simply  because  he 
had  not  philosophical  acuteness  of  analytical  mind 
enough  to  know  that  the  being  thought  he  was  look- 
ing for  was  the  being  thought  it  was.  In  other 
words,  he  did  not  know  what  was  the  nature  of  that 
in  his  own  mind  for  which  he  was  looking  in  the 
sensations.  If  he  had,  he  wouldn't  have  made  him- 
self ridiculous  by  looking  expectantly  there  for  what 
he  said  himself  had  no  existence  there.  He  was 
looking  for  space  as  such,  for  space  as  entertained 
in  the  consciousness  as  space,  which  is  space  or  the 
idea  of  space,  space  as  being  thought,  but  which,  the 
being  thought,  the  sensibility  itself  does  not  function 
to  afford,  in  the  sensations,  anything  of. 

What  was  at  the  bottom  of,  or  added  to,  Kant's 
confusion  in  the  matter  was,  as  I  have  emphasized 
before,  that  he  could  never  bring  himself  to  under- 
stand that  what  there  is  experience  of  in  the  sensu- 
ous experience  of  space,  the  anything  like  a  concept 
or  conception  of  is  no  experience  of  at  all;  and  so 
could,  by  no  possibility,  be  found  there.  Indeed, 
space  as  being  thought  or  in  the  abstract  is  to  space 
as  not  being  thought,  and  yet  as  being  experienced, 
realized  and  perceived,  much  as  is  the  reflection  of 


114 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


an  object  in  a  mirror  to  the  object  itself  reflected  — 
it  is  nothing  of  the  substance,  as  it  were,  of  space 
as  sensuously  experienced,  as  the  object  as  reflected 
in  a  mirror  has  nothing  of  the  substance  to  it  of 
the  object  itself  being  reflected. 

From  the  stifling  air  of  the  valley  I  go  up  onto  a 
mountain  and  experience  the  exhilaration  and  bene- 
fit of  mountain  air.     I  am  come  down  again  into 
the  valley;  but  no  notion  or  idea  of  that  mountain 
air  and  its  exhilaration  and  benefit  is  experience, 
again,  of  that  air,  exhilaration  and  benefit  them- 
selves.    Had  to  remain  on  the  mountain  saved  me 
from  death  from  tuberculosis,  I  shall,  now  that  I  am 
again  in  the  valley,  die  just  as  soon  of  the  disease 
for  all  any  mere  notion  or  idea  of  that  exhilaration 
and  benefit  of  the  mountain  air  availing  anything  to 
save  me.    And  much  the  parallel  of  this  is  space  a 
sensuous  experience  to  space  a  notion,  idea  or  con- 
ception.    The  latter  is  nothing  of  the  former,  and 
vice  versa.    That  is,  what  we  have  sensuous  experi- 
ence of  as  we  hafve  sensuous  experience  of  space,  a 
notion  or  concept  of  is  no  sensuous  experience  of 
at  all;  a  transcendental  experience  of  space  is  no  sen- 
suous   experience    of    it    whatever.       Therefore, 
therefore,  a  mere  concept  of  space  of  a  priori  intui- 
tion, or  any  other  intuition,  or  none  at  all,  cannot 
possibly  afford  any  contribution  to  the  sensuous  ex- 
perience of  it.    And  yet  the  validity  of  Kant's  whole 
Transcendental  Esthetic  hinges  on  that  it  may.  And 
so  Kant,  and  his  academic  disciple,  lost  in  the  de- 
lirium of  supposing  a  sensuous  experience  as  only,  as 
it  were,  a  concept  or  idea  a  flower  in  full  bloom, 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  115 

cannot  understand  how  what  is  no  better  than  a  con- 
cept or  idea  of  space  experienced  cannot  be  an  object 
of  sense. 

But  now  why  should  Kant  think  that  because 
is  not  there  in  the  sensations,  space  as  being  thought, 
it  yet  is  not  there  as  being  feltf  Even  if  to  be 
thought  it  must  be  felt,  to  be  felt  must  it  be  thought  ? 
If  so,  then  either  it  cannot  be  felt,  or  else  as  still  felt 
but  felt  as  being  thought,  then  cerainly  it  must  exist 
there  in  the  sensations,  and  Kant  only  blind  that  he 
could  not  discover  it  there.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
as  it  should  be  felt,  still  that  not  as  being  thought, 
what  could  it  be  as  being  felt  but  space  existing 
there  in  the  sensations,  and  that  space  space  abso- 
lute f  It  is  positively  inconceivable  that  the  situation 
should  be  anything  else  than  space  exisiting  there, 
and  that  space,  space  absolute  —  existing  there,  that 
is,  much  as  a  reflection  in  a  mirror  of  an  object  out- 
side. And  indeed,  it  is  positively  conceivable  that 
such  must  be  the  situation.  If  the  understanding 
cannot  perceive  space  once  it  thinks  it,  or  an  idea 
of  it,  and  the  sensibility  cannot  think  it  to  perceive, 
how  still  is  it  experienced,  realized  and  perceived 
but  as  there  it  is  in  the  sensations  as  being  felt,  and 
there  as  thing  absolute,  even?  And  that  Kant 
should  still  insist  it  as  not  there,  —  what  is  this  but 
more  of  his  sickening  confusion  of  thought?  And 
still  here  follows  yet  more  of  it ;  or  what,  if  already 
has  been  made  to  appear,  is,  here,  still  more  baldly 

to  be  put. 

Thus,  could  Kant  not  have  known  that  every- 
thing necessary  to  external  perception  is  involved  in 


ii6 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


it  ?  —  that  space  and  time  as  involved  in  it  are  that 
necessary  to  it?  Indeed,  he  even  declared  they 
are  that  necessary.  Well  then,  if,  moreover,  they 
are  themselves  the  sensibility  itself,  forms  of  it,  as 
he  said  they  are,  then  external  perception  being  the 
sensibility  active,  which  it  is,  we  have  the  wonderful 
conclusion  to  arrive  at  of  sensibility  necessary  to  the 
activity  of  sensibility!  Who  would  have  dreamed 
it  —  a  wheel  necessary  to  the  revolution  of  a  wheel ! 
—  a  cat  necessary  to  the  activity  of  a  cat !  And 
could  anything  come  much  nearer  a  reductio  ad 
absurdam,  Immanuel  Kant,  of  your  proposition  of 
space  and  time  as  forms  of  the  sensibility,  and  miss 

it? 

But  this  is  but  another  drop  in  the  bucket  of 
Kant's  abounding  absurdity  and  confusion  in  the 
matter.    And,  yet,  still  another,  perhaps  not  suffi- 
ciently already  remarked,  may  be  noted  as  he  declares 
that  space  and  time  are  the  conditions  of  experience ; 
which  is  to  say,  of  our  sensations ;  for  our  sensuous 
experiences  are  our  sensations.    But  if  they  are  the 
conditions  of  our  sensations,  then  manifestly,  they 
must  come  before  such;  and  yet,  as  we  have  seen, 
they  could  obtain  in  actuality  only  in  the  event  of 
the  sensations.     And,  still,  if  they  obtain  only  be- 
cause of  the  latter  as  Kant  said  they  do,  then  they 
must  come  only  after  such.  But,  pray,  how  can  that 
come  only  after  sensations  which  to  come  only  after 
must  come  before  them ! 

This  is  a  more  staggering  antinomy,  and  one  of 
Kant's  own  precious  coinage,  too,  than  any  of  his 
inventory  of  that  sort  of  thing,  but  which  he  quite 


I 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  117 

overlooked  in  that  inventory.  And  it  is  no  joke 
either,  that  it  is  anything  of  that  sort,  for  it  relates 
to  what  is  of  crucial  moment. 

Furthermore,  it  is  not  an  antinomy  little  better 
than  a  mere  play  upon  words  as  are  some,  he  is  at 
so  much  pains  to  give  attention  to;  but  it  is  the 
genuine  article. 

But  may  be  noted  even  still  again,  that  if  space 
and  time  can  come  only  after  experience,  how  can 
they  be  the  conditions  of  experience?  And  prithee, 
man,  can  a  hen  come  of  an  tgg  of  her  own  laying? 
Can  experience  come  of  conditions  which  could 
have  no  existence  save  only  as  it,  experience,  itself 
first  furnishes  them?  No  startling  antinomy,  this, 
too? 

Or,  still,  even  yet,  once  again,  may  be  noted  that 
most  explicitly  does  Kant  declare  that  while  experi- 
ence is  not  the  origin  of  our  consciousness  of  space 
and  time,  there  still  would  be  no  consciousness  of 
them  but  for  experience,  and  which  itself  still,  ac- 
cording to  him,  is  conditioned  on  the  very  things, 
space  and  time,  which  obtain  only  in  the  event  of 
experience!  A  son's  existence  the  condition  of  his 
own  father's  existence,  and  himself  the  son  existing 
before  his  father  is,  in  a  nut-shell,  Kant's  doctrine 
touching  space  and  time!  And  if  this  is  not  the 
doubly  distilled  very  quintessence  of  the  impossible 
and  absurd,  then  what  should  be  deemed  such? 

And,  mind  you  it  will  not  do  to  claim  that  in  all 
these  situations  Kant  meant  only  a  logical  and  not 
a  historical  priority,  for  there  is  a  historical  priority 
involved  in  every  one  of  them  which,  as  there  is,  the 


ii8 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


dodge  of  only  logical  priority  as  meant  will  not 
work.  It  is  worse  than  foolishness  to  talk  about  a 
theoretical  logical  order  only,  when  an  observed  or 
experienced  actual  historical  order  flatly  contra- 
dicts it. 

Moreover,   still  as  noting  even  once  more  as 
showing  yet  further  Kant's  utter  confusion,  observe 
that  he  said  that  these  two  forms  of  sensibility,  that 
is,  that  space  and  time,  would  not  obtain  but  for  ex- 
perience,   still   that   not   derived   from   experience. 
However,  as  experience  obtains  only  with  the  sensi- 
bility active,  then  they  cannot  by  any  possibility  ob- 
tain in  the  sensibility  before  experience ;  that  is,  can 
not  obtain  in  actuality  in  the  sensibility  itself  inac- 
tive or  quiescent  and  as  yet  unacted  on  from  out- 
side; but  obtain  there  in  potentiality,   or  latency 
only,  they  obtaining  in  actuality  only  in  the  sensa- 
tions which  are  themselves  the  sensibility  active  and 
made  so  by  action,  it  is  said,  of  the  external  world 
absolute  on  it.     And  yet,  observe  that,  in  their  ob- 
taining in  actuality  only  in  the  sensations  where  only 
they  do  according  to  Kant's  own  terms  —  I  do  not 
say  according  to  Kant's  own  direct  affirmation,  but 
according  to  his  own  terms  —  they  obtain  exactly 
where  he  could  not  find  them  as  "given,"  and  so,  on 
the  strength  of  the  most  farcical  of  logical  preten- 
sions, concluded  that  they  were  not  there  at  all! 
Meanwhile,  exactly  where,  and  that  in  the  sensi- 
bility, he  thought  he  found  them,  they  now,  in  actu- 
ality do  not  obtain  at  all ! 

That  Kant  should  be  oblivious  of  their  presence 
where  according  to  his  own  terms  they  obtain ;  and 


Demonstration  of  Space  and  Time  Absolute  119 

find  them  where,  according  to  the  same  terms  again, 
they  have  no  actual  existence,  —  is  truly  laughable. 
It  once  more  only  emphasizes  the  density  of  the  fog 
he  was  in  in  attempting  to  navigate  impossible 
waters. 


\ 


Nothing  could  more  incontes'tably  show  up  the  utter 
metaphysical  bankrupt  Kant  was  even  at  the  very 
threshold  of  his  excursion  into  metaphysics  than  his 
failure  to  explain  how  the  out-absolute,  in  which  ob- 
tained the  world-absolute  which  he  affirmed  to  exist, 
was  not  space-absolute.  For,  of  course,  for  there  to 
be  a  world  external  to  the  mind  there  must  be  an 
out  of  the  mind  for  that  external  world  to  be  m. 
And  as  the  world  in  question  affirmed  by  Kant  was 
itself  an  external  world  absolute,  the  out  in  which  it 
obtains  must  itself,  too,  be  an  out-absolute.  And  how 
is  that  out-absolute  not  space-absolute?  It  is  abso- 
lutely inconceivable  by  any  human  mind  that  it  is 
not.  And  that  Kant  could  not  conceive  how  it  is  not 
shows  he  was  at  that  very  moment  a  bankrupt  in 
metaphysics  with  not  a  ghost  of  a  footing  for  further 
progress  in  metaphysical  exploitation.  He  could  not 
show  how  that  out  absolute  was  not  space  absolute 
for  the  simple  reason  that  it  could  not  be  shown,  and 
could  not  be  because  indeed  that  out  absolute  is  very 
indeed  space  absolute. 


But  will  any  canting  Kantian,  the  globe  over,  tell 
us  how  out  absolute  is  not  space  absolute?  If  he  can 
and  will  step  forth  and  do  so,  he  will  at  once  become 
more  famous  than  either  Kant  or  Copernicus,  and 
have  the  everlasting  gratitude  of  all  coming  genera- 
tions of  men. 


Things  as  out  of  space  is  as  absolutely  unthinkable, 
unthinkable  as  unrealizable,  as  is  absolutely  unper- 
ceivahle  things  out  of  space.  It  is  think-of-able,  of 
course,  as  is  that  the  moon  is  made  of  green  cheese, 
which  still  is  not  thinkable,  thinkable  as  realizable, 
and  is  not  true.  And  yet  Kant  assumed  the  external 
world  absolute,  or  the  world,  as  he  called  it,  of  things 
such  as  they  are  in  themselves,  to  be  out  of  space! 
It  was  his  necessity,  the  necessity  of  his  fundamental 
thesis.  But  that  was  only  because  the  latter  is  pro- 
foundest  and  most  ridiculous  error.  It  was  chronic  with 
him  to  be  mistaking  only  the  thinking  of  a  thing  for  the 
thinking  it,  and  then  failing  of  wits  enough  to  know  that 
only  as  the  thinko fable  had  the  sunport  of  direct  ob- 
servation, analogy  or  of  experimental  proof  was  it,  by 
any  decent  intellect,  credited  with  being  true. 


X 

The  Bewilderment  and  Error  of  Kant's  A  Priori 
Intuition  His  Total  Bewilderment  and  Error 

at  a  Climax 

Then  from  his  contention  of  space  and  time  not 
being  "given"  in  the  sensations,  and  their  obtaining 
in  the  sensibility  as  forms  of  it,  Kant  proceeds  to 
mix  up  with  the  unutterable  tangle  and  confusion 
thus  far,  the  further  tangle  and  confusion  of  his 
notion  of  space  and  time  as  being  —  well  —  what? 
—  as  being  a  priori  intuitions,  "forms  of  a  priori 
intuition,"  "forms  of  perception,"  all  of  which 
phrases  seeming  of  much  the  same  import?  or,  as 
being  things  of  a  priori  intuition,  those  things  either 
"forms  of  the  sensibility,"  or  resultants  of  the  pool- 
ing of  the  functionings  of  the  reason,  the  under- 
standing and  the  sensibility?  Which  of  these  did 
he  say,  or  what  mean? 

And  then  a  priori  intuitions  of  (or  of  and  by) 
what?  —  the  reason?  the  understanding?  or  the 
sinsibility?  or  even  of  (or  by)  all  these  jointly? 
Which,  again,  did  he  say,  or  which  mean?  And, 
indeed,  is  it  altogether  so  certain  that  his  own  mind 
was  not  in  a  muddle  of  muddles  as  to  which  he 
said  or  meant? 

Else,  why  all  these  volumes  upon  volumes  of 
exposition  and  criticism  of  Kant;  one  of  them  a 


124  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

work  of  near  a  thousand  pages  written  more  in  exe- 
gesis than  either  in  adverse  or  in  favoring  criticism 
of  him;  and  the  pages  of  other  works  Hterally 
strewn,  some  of  them,  one  might  almost  say  reek- 
ing, with  such  expressions  as,  "Kant  seems  to  have 
meant,''  "Kant  had  probably  in  mind,*'  "it  is  not 
quite  clear  his  meaning,"  "did  Kant  wish  it  under- 
stood?" and  so  on,  and  so  on?  Else,  why,  I  say, 
all  such  confusion  of  thought  as  when  one  enthusi- 
astic disciple  exclaims  —  "Space  and  time  are  abo- 
riginal intuitions,"  and  "aboriginal  intuitions  of  the 
reason  [the  italics  mine]  prior  to  all  experience;  this 
is  the  immortal  discovery  of  Kant ;"  while  another 
disciple  puts  it  that  "universal  space  is  not  itself  an 
object  of  external  perception  but  a  fundamental 
cc?nception  that  makes  external  /perception  possible/' 
—  the  a  priori  intuition  thus  being  made  of  (or  by) 
the  understanding,  not  of  (or  by)  the  reason? 

It  all  can  have  significance  of  but  one  of  two 
interpretations,  if  not  something  of  both;  either 
of  the  immeasurable  intellectual  obtundity  of 
Kant's  expounders  and  critics,  or  of  the  scarcely 
less  immeasurable  failure  of  Kant  himself  either 
to  think,  or  to  write,  with  decent  perspicuity.  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  wrote  far  more  voluminously, 
with  far  greater  contribution  to  the  world's  knowl- 
edge, and  with  vastly  more  broadening  influence 
upon  mankind's  thinking  than  did  Immanuel  Kant. 
But  is  there  yet  one  work  extant  in  exposition  of 
him  in  the  sense  of  re-writing  him  with  the  view  of 
his  being  understood  as  to  what  he  either  said  or 
meant?     And  if  not,  why  not  but  that,  whatever 


Kanfs  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


125 


A 


his  errors  of  fact,  or  of  reasoning,  still,  what  he 
tried  to  say,  or  affected  to  think,  he  thought  and 
said  with  a  precision  and  intelHgibility  that  left  no 
doubt  as  to  what  he  had  clearly  in  mind  as  aiming 
to  say;  while  Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  as  would  ap- 
pear, was  constantly  only  circulating  round  either 
what  he  was  aiming  to  think,  or  what  he  was  vainly 
trying  to  utter;  and  even,  besides,  only  circulating 
round  the  truth  itself,  which  he  rarely  so  much  as 
made  an  approach  to  thinking,  to  say  nothing  of  ut- 
tering? 

In  short,  Kant  himself  at  least,  whatever  is  to 
be  remarked  of  his  legion  of  would  be  Boswells  of 
what  he  wrote,  wrote  slovenly,  and  even  thought 
slovenly.  Hence,  as  I  have  before  stated,  the  volu- 
minousness  of  his  own  Critiques,  as  also  of  the 
critiques  of  those  Critiques  by  his  would  be  Bos- 
wells and  others.  Had  he  written  only  a  small 
work  and  one  therefore  necessarily  very  condensed, 
some  other  explanation  might  pass;  but,  as  it  is,  no 
other  will. 

But  to  return  to  the  question  —  Which  did  he 
mean  ?  and  altogether  what  did  he  mean  ?  For  it  is 
profoundly  important  which  and  what  he  endeav- 
ored to  have  clearly  in  his  own  mind,  and  would 
convey  to  the  minds  of  others. 

If  it  was  the  first,  and  that  space  and  time  are 
a  priori  intuitions,  then  what  is  meant?  Why,  no 
less  than  that  the  intuiting  is  the  intuited;  that  the 
two  are  one.  Or,  phrasing  it  a  little  differently, 
with,  perhaps,  a  shade  of  difference  in  the  import, 
it  means  that  with  the  intuiting,  though  itself  logi- 


126 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


cally  in  advance,  proceeds  still,  practically  pari 
passu,  the  intuited,  the  former  constituting  or  creat- 
ing its  own  object,  namely,  the  intuited,  as  intuit- 
ing proceeds.  It  means  the  two  locked  in  fast  and 
passionate  embrace  as  much  so  as  convex  and  con- 
cave surfaces  and  a  curvilinear  plane;  one  of  which, 
the  intuited  or  the  intuiting,  you  can  no  more  wipe 
out  and  have  left  the  other  than  you  can  either  snuff 
out  the  surfaces  of  the  curvilinear  plane  and  have 
remaining  the  plane  itself;  or  snuff  out  the  plane 
and  have  left  the  surfaces. 

Moreover,  is  meant  what  more?  Why,  that 
the  mind  intuits,  that  it  perceives,  in  advance  of  the 
existence  of  the  object  it  intuits  or  perceives!  But 
who  outside  the  Kantian  circle,  ever  heard  or  knew 
of  the  human  mind's  perceiving  before  it  had  an 
object  before  it  to  perceive?  There  may  be  latent 
capacity  for  sight,  in  the  absence  of  objects,  as  we 
all  know ;  but,  primarily,  no  actual  sight.  And  the 
same  of  external  perception  in  general.  Any  talk 
to  the  contrary,  let  it  be  Kant's  or  whosoever's,  is 
pure  assumption,  and  I  want  to  say  pure  rubbish, 

withal. 

And  here  am  I  to  be  reminded  again  that  Kant 
had  in  mind  only  the  logical  order  ?  It  is  in  vain ; 
for  there  obtains  the  historical  order  in  the  situa- 
tion in  question;  and  where  obtains  the  latter,  the 
plea  that  only  the  former  is  meant  is  a  dodge  that 
will  not  pass. 

But  now  again.  If  Kant  said  and  meant  the 
second  of  the  propositions  in  question,  namely,  that 
space  and  time  are  things  of  a  priori  intuition,  and 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


127 


those  things  two  forms  of  the  sensibility  of  which 
two  there  is  a  priori  intuition,  then  is  meant  that 
they  themselves  obtain  in  advance  of  their  intuition 
or  perception;  is  meant  that  the  intuiting  and  in- 
tuited are  two  things  distinct  and  independent  in 
such  wise  that  you  could  at  least  blot  out  the  intuit- 
ing and  still  have  remaining  intact  the  intuited  — 
which  is  a  very  different  proposition  from  the  other. 

But  now  still  once  more.  If  Kant  said  and 
meant  the  third  of  the  three  propositions,  and  that 
space  and  time  are  not  only  things  of  a  priori  in- 
tuition, but  things  the  resultants  of  the  pooling  of 
functionings  of  the  reason,  the  understanding  and 
the  sensibility  —  if  not  of  the  external  world  ab- 
solute, besides,  —  what  is  meant  in  effect  at  least, 
and  is  anyway,  involved  ?  Why,  the  most  flat  denial 
of  the  mind  as  an  evolution  and  a  development; 
meant  the  assumption  that  as  ever  there  is  mind  at 
all  of  any  order,  there  is  mind  of  all  the  order  that 
there  ever  is  of  mind;  the  assumption  that  there  is 
all  the  order  of  mind  in  the  infant  human  as  in  the 
human  adult;  and  in  the  polype  as  in  the  infant 
human ;  meant  the  complete  obliteration,  practically, 
of  all  distinct  independent  functionings  as  of  dis- 
tinct faculties  in  the  substitution  of  what  in  effect 
is  but  one  faculty  and  that  one  faculty  the  whole 
mind! 

And,  yet,  is  not  the  mind,  our  mind,  the  only 
mind  we  know  anything  about,  is  it  not  an  evolu- 
tion and  a  development?  And,  as  such,  is  it  not  a 
radically  different  thing  from  mind  as  had  God 
said,  "Let  there  be  mind   (finite)   and  there  was 


128 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


mind,"  mind,  such  as  yours  and  mine,  instanter 
with  that  decree?  Is  not  the  universe  an  evolution 
nothing  less  than  a  revolution  on  the  universe  a 
snap  creation  f  And  must  not  mind,  our  mind,  in 
all  consistency,  as  an  evolution  and  a  development, 
be  much  that  revolution  on  mind  a  snap  creation? 
Is  not  mind,  that  comes  to  be  what  it  is  by  a  succes- 
sion of  distinct  faculties,  a  most  radically  different 
affair  from  mind  a  complete  outfit  from  the  start 
of  all  the  faculties  there  ever  are,  these  all  being 
sprung  suddenly  full-fledged  upon  the  scene  like 
Minerva  full  armed  from  the  head  of  Jove?  How 
could  you  imagine  one  thing  more  radically  differ- 
ent from  another  save  only  as  it  was  totally  radi- 
cally different? 

Certainly  it  is  inconceivable  that  all  develop- 
ment should  not  pattern  after  the  same  general  plan 
or  formula.  If  so,  then  what  is  a  plant  as  a  de- 
velopment, mind  as  a  development  must  be.  And 
with  the  plant,  is  it  not,  generally,  first  the  leaf,  and 
then  only  later  the  flower,  and  only  still  later  the 

fruit? 

Moreover,  is  there  an  advance  pooling  of  func- 
tions or  functioning  in  it  all  such  that  the  nature  and 
product  of  the  functioning  of  the  leaf  is  affected  and 
determined  by  anything  of  the  flower?  Have  the 
flower  and  its  functioning  before  they  actually  exist 
any  determining  influence  on  the  leaf  or  its  function 
as  these  first  exist?  Have  the  former  any  more 
after  they  exist?  And  so,  as  with  the  plant  a  de- 
velopment, is  it  not  with  the  mind  a  development? 
As  with  the  plant,  it  is  first  the  leaf,  and  then  only 


Kanfs  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


i2g 


later  the  flower,  is  it  not,  too,  first  some  mental 
organ  and  function  or  other  —  and  who  shall  say 
it  is  not  organ  or  organs  implied  in  sensuous  per- 
ception that  is  first?  —  and  then  only  later  the  un- 
derstanding? And  should  we,  in  reason,  more  ex- 
pect any  pooling  of  functions  or  functionings  in 
respect  of  mind  than  in  respect  of  plant,  such  that 
there  should  not  be  distinctness  and  independence 
intact  there  of  faculty  and  functioning  as  in  the 
plant?  Should  we  more  expect  that,  the  faculty 
for  entertaining  things  as  such,  or  as  abstractions, 
the  faculty,  namely,  of  the  understanding,  before  it 
exists  to  meddlesomely  interfere  and  determine  the 
nature  and  functionings  of  the  faculty  for  sensa- 
tions, the  faculty,  namely,  of  the  sensibility?  or 
more  expect  it  to  do  so  after  it  is  developed  and  ex- 
ists than  in  respect  of  the  plant?  And  yet,  this  last 
at  least,  is  just  zvhat  Kant  expected,  and  so  plainly 
expected  that  one  of  his  exegetical  critics  says  flatly, 
"Kant  indicates  .  .  .  that  we  cannot  have  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  object  of  perception  without  the 
activity  of  the  understanding" !  And  in  this,  what 
is  the  matter  with  Kant?  Why,  as  I  have 
said  before,  that  in  all  his  pondering,  backing  and 
shifting  he  never  could  get  it  through  his  mind  that 
what  there  is  experience  of  in  sensuous  experience, 
a  notion,  idea,  concept  or  a  priori  intuition  of,  is 
no  experience  of  at  all;  so  that,  by  no  possibility, 
could  that  notion,  idea,  concept,  a  priori  intuition, 
be  any  contribution  to  the  sensuous  experience,  as 
Kant  would  have  it  that  it  is,  and  drags  us  vainly 
through  a  thousand  pages  to  prove.     But  this  two- 


I30 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


fold  fact  that  no  notion,  idea  or  concept  of  a  sensu- 
ous experience  can  be  any  experience  of  that  sensu- 
ous experience,  and  therefore  no  contribution  to 
the  sensuous  experience,  is  only  another  of  the 
many  things  that  undermines  and  wrecks  the  whole 
Kantian  metaphysic. 

But  now,  mind,  such  as  mind  an  evolution  and 
a  development,  —  what  a  contrast  to  mind  a  snap 
creation,  and  of  Kant's  sheer  fancy  and  exploita- 
tion ;  mind  of  poolings  and  the  wildest  confusion  of 
functions  and  f unctionings !  And  just  to  think  of 
it  once  more  —  no  sensibility  but  as  there  is  un- 
derstanding!—  no  activity  of  the  former  without 
the  meddlesome  interposition  and  even  overriding 
partnership  of  the  latter!  —  no  space  sensuously 
experienced,  for  example,  until  it  is  first  conceived ! 
—  which  is  as  good  as  saying,  no  leaf  but  as  there 
already  obtains  the  flower,  and  even  the  fruit;  and 
indeed  more  than  even  this,  and  that  there  is  no 
functioning  of  the  leaf  hut  as  the  Hower  has  a  hand 
in  it  —  the  flower  even  whether  it  as  yet  exists,  or 
not!  Such  is  the  metaphysic  that  is  a  cart  before 
the  horse  metaphysic.  Such  the  metaphysic  that 
the  primacy  and  transcendency  of  the  concept  or  the 
being  thought  is  it  in  a  nutshell.  Such  the  meta- 
physic that  it  puts  the  thought  of  Being  before  the 
Being  of  which  there  is  the  thought ! 

If  Kant  in  his  delirium  was  not  contending  for 
much  this  notion  of  the  a  priori  intuition  of  the  re- 
sultants of  the  pooling  of  the  functions  and  func- 
tionings  of  the  understanding  and  sensibility,  as 
much  as  any  other,  even  if  at  times  he  seemed  to  be 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


131 


laboring  with  quite  another  view  inconsistent  with 
it,  how  is  it,  I  ask  again,  that  his  expounders  and 
critics  should  get  it  from  him  that  he  was?  How 
is  it  except  that  they,  in  their  own  minds  should 
themselves  be  floundering  as  badly  in  the  mud  as 
he  in  the  mire?  How  is  it  that  one  should  say  that 
"space  and  time  are  aboriginal  intuitions  of  the 
reason"?  —  another  say  that  "Kant  indicates  that 
we  cannot  have  the  consciousness  of  an  object  of 
perception  without  the  activity  of  the  understand- 
ing' —  that  another,  even  the  most  eminent  of  Eng- 
lish expounders  and  critics,  —  if  the  most  volumi- 
nous is  to  be  rated  the  most  eminent  —  should  say 
that  "universal  space  is  not  itself  an  object  of  ex- 
ternal /j^rception,  but  a  fundamental  conception 
that  makes  external  /perception  possible?"  How, 
but  either  that  Kant  himself  was  befogged  with  the 
notion  of  the  intermeddling  of  the  understanding, 
or  of  the  reason,  with  the  function  and  the  every 
deliverance  of  the  sensibility,  or  then,  that  his  critics 
and  expounders  are  worse  confounded  than  he? 

If  only  one  student  of  Kant  so  construed  him,  it 
might,  very  properly,  be  attributed  to  the  lack  of  dis- 
cernment of  that  one  student.  But  when  many,  or 
all,  derive  such  meaning  from  his  words,  it  would 
seem  impossible  that  such  meaning,  even  if  in  great 
confusion,  should  not  be  there. 

But  just  think  of  it  even  once  again,  what  this 
joint  action,  —  joint,  with  the  concept  leading  in  the 
procession  —  as  there  is  to  be  any  action  of  faculty 
at  all,  means!  Why,  it  means  that  if  "space  is  not 
an  object  of  sense,  but  a  fundamental  conception 


132  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

that  makes  external  perception  possible,"  then  flea 
and  fly  have  no  external  perception  but  as  they 
may  entertain  concepts !  A  fly  endowed  with  abo-ut, 
or  altogether,  the  highest  form  of  mind  with  which 
man  is  endowed,  —  is  that  it  ?  And,  indeed,  could 
idiotic  drivel  go  farther ! 

The  author  above  quoted,  no  better  than  Kant, 
has  any  clear  sense  of  the  realisation  of  space  void 
of  all  conception  of  it  (space)  as  such,  which,  en- 
tertaining it  as  such,  is  peculiarly  the  function  of 
the  tmderstanding  or  conceiving  faculty,  as  I  have 
laid  every  stress  on  in  my  power  to  make  evident. 
For  he  no  better  than  Kant  seems  even  so  much  as 
to  dream  that  what  there  is  sensuous  realization  of 
as  there  is  sensuous  realization  of  space,  the  con- 
ception of,  the  idea  of,  is  no  realization  of  at  all. 
Their  notion  of  a  conception  of  space  would  seem 
to  be  a  sensuous  realization  of  it  —  only  something 

more! 

However,  either,  to  fancy  fly  or  flea  without  ex- 
ternal perception;  or  to  fancy  them  to  have  it  in- 
dependent of  space  and  time  to  have  it  in,  are  the 
sole  alternatives  but  as  it  is  conceded  that  they  do, 
indeed,  have  external  perception,  and  have  it  in 
space  and  time,  and  in  space  and  time  not  as  things 
conceived,  but  as  things  primarily  realized  and  per- 
ceived, perceived  as  realized,  whether  subsequently 
conceived,  subsequently  entertained  as  such,  or  not. 

Altogether,  then,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the 
proposition  of  space  and  time  as  a  priori  intuitions 
or  forms  of  perception  as  they  were  to  be  given  an 
interpretation  involving  a  pooling  of  the  functions 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


133 


and  functionings  of  the  mind's  primary  faculties? 
Why,  as  I  remarked  at  the  outset,  it  is  a  rank  out- 
rage on  the  doctrine  of  evolution. 

Arid  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  theory  altogether 
of  the  sensuous  experience  of  space  and  time  as  in- 
volving the  Kantian  a  priori  intuition  ?  Why,  that, 
to  the  perfect  Babel  of  confusion  that  it  is,  the  Babel 
written  of  in  Scriptures  is  as  very  harmony  itself, 
harmony  the  most  blissful  in  the  comparison! 

That  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  priori  intuition, 
and  of  space  and  time,  with  whatever  else,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  doubt.  But  that  it  obtains  except  as 
latent,  or  in  embryo  as  it  were,  is  not  only  to  be 
doubted  but  scouted  as  among  the  silliest  of  silly 
notions. 

That  it  is  anything  obtaining  in  actuality  either 
as  intuition  prior  to,  or  as  necessary  to,  the  sensu- 
ous experience  of  space  and  time  is  getting  the  cart 
before  the  horse  with  a  vengeance,  contradicting  all 
our  more  vulgar  expectation,  at  least,  and  coining, 
for  truth  and  knowledge,  all  our  propositions  and 
theories  out  of  the  air  instead  of  out  of  ground 
facts.  The  chicken,  in  embryo  in  the  tgg,  obtains 
prior  to  the  action  on  it  of  any  rise  in  temperature 
which  develops  it  into  the  chicken  full  fledged  or 
chicken  in  actuality;  but  obtains  not  necessarily,  nor 
in  fact,  logically  or  otherwise,  prior  to  rise  in  tem- 
perature. So  intuition,  —  in  the  forms  of  the  rea- 
son or  the  understanding,  in  embryo,  —  obtains  as 
a  priori  intuition  as  obtaining  prior  to  the  any  ac- 
tion on  it  of  the  sensuous  experience  which  de- 
velopes  it  into  intuition  in  actuality,  when  then  it  is 


134  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

intuition  no  longer  a  priori;  but  not  necessarily,  nor 
in  fact,  obtaining  in  actuality  prior  to  the  existence 
of  the  sensuous  experience  itself. 

Meanwhile,  it  is  well  to  note  in  passing,  that  the 
chicken  itself,  full-fledged  or  chicken  in  actuality, 
is  not  derived  from  the  rise  in  temperature,  but  that 
the  chicken  in  embryo's  development  is.  And  so 
any  a  priori  intuition  in  the  forms  of  the  reason  and 
of  the  understanding  in  actuality  is  not  derived 
from  sensuous  experience  but  the  development  of  a 
priori  intuition  in  embryo  into  simple  intuition  in 
actuality  is  derived  therefrom,  or,  more  strictly, 
provoked  thereby. 

Meanwhile,  again,  it  is  well  to  note,  too,  that 
the  chicken  full-fledged  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
rise  of  temperature;  and  no  more  has  intuition  of 
the  reason  or  the  understanding  in  actuality  any- 
thing to  do  with  the  sensuous  experience  as  deter- 
mining its  nature  or  the  characteristics  of  its  issues. 

But  to  return ;  only  in  the  above  meagre  sense  is 
there  the  least  truth  in  a  priori  intuition;  and  it  is 
nothing  worth  contending  for  as  even  Kant  would 
himself  allow.  It  is  not  of  the  least  availability  for 
the  purpose  for  which  Kant  invoked  the  fantasy  to 
serve.  His  a  priori  intuition  is  intuition  in  actuality, 
logically  at  least  in  advance  of  all  sensuous  ex- 
perience; an  a  priori  intuition  everything  of  which 
is  little  better  than  the  wildest  chimera  that  ever  dis- 
graced philosophical  literature.  It  is  doctrine  so 
altogether  strained  and  far  fetched,  and  so  utterly 
without  warrant  in  fact  or  reason,  that  veriest  rub- 
bish is  the  only  term  fittingly  to  be  applied  to  it. 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


135 


There  is  surely  coming  a  development  of  human 
intelligence  to  which  it  will  be  a  surprise  how  men 
pretending  to  brains  and  culture  could  ever  once 
give  a  thought  to  such  an  inanity. 

It  should  be  added  that  Kant  himself  knew  little 
or  nothing  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  as  we  have 
it  revealed  to  us  by  modern  science,  and  has  some 
excuse.  But  his  disciples  of  the  present  day  and 
generation  have  none  that  they  do  not  make  the 
discriminations  above  noted,  and  have  done  with  a 
priori  intuition,  in  the  fullness  of  the  Kantian  sense, 
forever.  And  doubtless  they  would  do  this,  only 
that  they  are  so  benumbed  and  swamped  with  the 
childish  notion  of  the  universe  a  snap  creation,  and 
with  the  correlated  notion  of  consciousness  some- 
thing aboriginal  and  primary,  that  they  are  blinded 
to  the  truth  abreast  of  its  advance  along  other  lines. 
Otherwise,  we  might  yet  hope  that  they  would  soon 
throw  the  Jonah  of  the  Konigsburg  philosopher 
overboard  to  save  the  academic  philosophical  ship 
from  foundering  in  a  sea  of  disgust  of  all  intelli- 
gent mankind. 

But  not  even  yet  here  am  I  done  with  Kant's 
bewilderment  and  confusion  in  the  matter  of  his  a 
priori  intuition. 

While  yet  it  perhaps,  may  not  be  doubted  that 
Kant  under  the  spell  of  his  overshadowing  convic- 
tion touching  the  two  propositions,  namely,  of  abo- 
riginality  and  transcendency  of  the  conscious  mind, 
and,  again,  of  the  manifest  universe  as  a  snap  crea- 
tion, could  not  wholly  escape  its  influence  as  afford- 
ing predisposing  cause  for  movement  of  his  thought 


136 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


along  lines  consistent  therewith,  it  still  would  appear 
that  it  was  the  genius  of  Hume's  scepticism  that 
proved  the  exciting  cause,  to  such  predisposing 
cause,  impelling  him  to  the  coinage  of  a  priori  intui- 
tion as  an  escape,  and  the  only  escape,  out  of  a  diffi- 
culty. 

However,  the  trouble  with  Kant  was  that  he 
overshot  his  mark.  To  meet  Hume  it  was  only 
needful  to  explain  how  we  should  conceive  neces- 
sary relations  between  distinct  experiences  where 
we  did  conceive  them,  not  where  we  didn't.  No- 
body but  Kant,  or  a  Kantian,  ever  even  dreamed  that, 
between  the  any  sensuous  experience  and  the  super- 
sensuous  there  is  a  necessary  connection  such  that 
only  as  was  anticipated  the  former  by  the  latter 
could  the  former  obtain.  But  Kant  sought  out  a 
gtm  of  a  calibre,  and  trained  it,  to  shoot  beyond 
Hume's  fortification  and  in  shooting  to  shoot  be- 
yond it  shot  over  it,  and  thus  missed  the  object  it- 
self of  all  his  waste  of  ammunition. 

In  other  words,  in  seeking  to  prove  too  much, 
he  most  wretchedly  and  ignominiously  failed  of 
proving  what  he  sought  to.  Does  this  indicate,  al- 
together, clarity  of  mind? 

Hume  suggested  and  insisted  that  all  our  ex- 
periences are  single  experiences,  in  not  one  of  which 
is  "given"  any  necessary  connection  with  another 
and  others,  and  that  yet  that  we  conceived  such  con- 
nection is  simply  due  to  habit  of  thought  formed  of 
long  observation  of  them  in  certain  constant  as- 
sociation. Thus,  for  example  there  are  the  ex- 
periences of  the  perception  of  the  ball,  of  the  percep- 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


137 


tion  of  the  bat,  of  the  perception  of  the  striking  of 
the  ball  by  the  bat,  and  of  the  perception  of  the  con- 
sequent motion  of  the  ball ;  and  in  not  one  of  these 
single  experiences  is  "given"  any  necessary  con- 
nection with  another ;  and  if  we  have  come  to  con- 
ceiving any  between  them  such  as  cause  and  effect 
wherefore  the  ball  on  being  struck  should  move,  it 
is  due  solely  to  mental  habit  formed  of  long  ob- 
servation of  the  fact  that  invariably  as  the  ball  was 
thus  struck  it  did  move ;  and  not  due  to  any  neces- 
sary connection  as  revealed  to  us  by  those  experi- 
ences themselves  of  cause  and  effect. 

Kant  conceded  that  there  is  nothing  "given" 
in  the  single  experiences  wherefore  we  could  know 
of  necessary  connection  between  them;  and  where- 
fore, in  such  instance  as  the  above,  could  be  pred- 
icated a  necessary  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  But 
he  insisted  that  yet  that  not  "given,"  still  such  is 
there.  He  insisted  that  such  still  is  there,  yet  that 
he  had  assumed  in  respect  of  space  that  that  is  not 
in  the  sensations  because  not  "given"  in  them  as 
being  there!  So  here  again  only  another  of  his 
countless  inconsistencies;  and  right  here  only 
further  illustration  again  of  his  bewilderment  and 
^fnental  confusion  in  his  strenuous  reaching  for- 
ward for  his  a  priori  intuition.  For,  pray,  if  flat 
contradiction  of  himself  is  not  further  illustration 
of  it,  then  what  would  be? 

Surely,  if  space,  because  not  "given"  in  the 
sensations  as  being  there,  therefore  not  there,  then 
how  not  the  any  necessary  connection  between 
single  experiences,  because  not  "given"  in  them  as 


138 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


being  there,  therefore  it  not  there  between  those 
single  experiences  ? 

But,  says  Kant,  it  is  there,  —  and  still  no  mud- 
dle in  Kant's  thinking! 

But  now  once  more.  Kant  is  up  against  a  prob- 
lem, and  feels,  as  I  have  said,  he  must  solve  it,  or 
his  own  philosophy  is  nipped  in  the  budding.  So 
he  does  what  seems  to  him  his  only  recourse,  namely, 
makes  appeal  to  the  reason? 

'*The  reason"  he  says  "made  the  cosmos.''  Made 
the  cosmos  or  manifest  universe!    Made  it! 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  there  is  not  the  slightest 
fact  in  evidence,  nor  one  rational  consideration 
in  support  of  the  proposition  that  the  cosmos  or 
manifest  universe  was  ever  or  is  ^^made"  by  any- 
thing. 

Moreover,  it  is  only  a  rather  obsolete  edition  of 
the  intellect  that,  nowadays  at  least,  gives  credence 
to  any  such  childish  notion.  A  universe  ^^made" 
implies  once  its  non-existence  —  a  notion  scouted 
by  the  most  intelligent  minds  as  absurd  enough; 
and  implies  a  maker  which  or  whom  of  course,  has 
no  existence  if  a  "made  universe"  has  none.  And 
yet  Kant  assumed,  and  practically  the  whole  aca- 
demic philosophical  world  assumes  little  less  than 
that  the  reason  "made"  the  universe!  But,  hold. 
Here  is  a  locomotive  constructed  according  to  the 
principles  of  mechanics;  but  would  you  say  that  the 
principles  of  mechanics  made  the  locomotive?  Not 
unless  you  were  stark  mad  and  a  fit  subject  for  the 
insane  asylum.  Why  more  say  that,  because  the 
universe  is  constituted  according  to  or  consistent 


Kanfs  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


139 


with  the  conscious  reason  that  therefore  the  latter 
made  the  universe?  And  yet  Kant  and  the  whole 
Kantian  academic  philosophical  world  is  just  that 
stark  mad. 

But  the  locomotive  yet  that  not  being  "made" 
by  the  principles  of  mechanics,  still  obtains  coinci- 
dent with  them  and  in  perfect  accord  therewith. 

It  still  obtains  yet  that  not  only  are  not  those 
principles  its  author  but  they  are  not  even  its  origin, 
altogether. 

And  so  of  the  cosmos  or  manifest  universe  and 
the  reason.  The  former  yet  that  not  having  its 
cause,  nor  even  its  origin,  in  the  latter,  still  has  be- 
ing contemporaneous  and  in  perfect  harmony  with 
the  latter.  Moreover,  that  synchronously  and  con- 
sistently with  the  reason  should  obtain  the  cosmos 
or  manifest  universe  though  still  not  as  having  it 
as  cause  or  origin,  is  quite  ample  enough  to  account 
for  the  any  necessary  connection  between 
single  experiences  where  Hume  and  the  rest  of  us 

—  barring  always  of  course  Kant  and  his  following 

—  have  ever  once  conceived  there  to  be  any. 

However,  that  the  reason  "made"  the  universe 
involves  a  necessary  connection  between  sensuous 
experience  and  the  supersensuous  such  that  the 
former  is  dependent  for  its  very  being  on  the  latter, 
even  on  that  supersensuous  experience  of  the  rea- 
son itself;  a  necessary  connection  such  and  where 
Hume  never  once  conceived  there  to  be  any  —  and 
nobody  else  except  Kant  and  his  following;  and 
as  such,  and  where  Hume,  or  we,  never  once  con- 
ceived there  to  be  any  is  such  and  where  as  does  not 


I40 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


come  within  the  range  of  Hume's  problem  whicli 
related  only  to  necessary  connection  where  we  had 
come  to  conceive  such  between  experiences  —  not 
where  we  hadn't,  as  I  have  already  said. 

In  Kant's  attempt,  then,  to  refute  Hume  is  in- 
volved more  than  an  attempt  to  refute  what  to  re- 
fute is  to  refute  him.  And  why  more  ?  Was  it  be- 
cause Kant  failed  to  recognize  that  it  was  only 
where  we  had  come  to  conceive  necessary  connec- 
tion between  single  experiences  that  was  involved 
in  any  reply  to  Hume,  and  not  where  we  hadn't  — 
and  that  here  again  is  illustration  of  the  bewilder- 
ment and  confusion  he  was  in?  Or  was  it  because 
he  was  at  a  loss  to  know  how  to  refute  him  but  as 
he  more  than  did  so? 

Or  was  it  again,  because  he  was  so  beside  him- 
self with  his  conviction  of  the  reason,  the  conscious 
reason  or  mind,  as  having  made  the  cosmos  that 
that,  as  covering  in  all  possible  situations,  covered 
in  any  little  trifle  such  as  what  precisely  was 
Hume's  problem  and  made,  what  precisely  it  was, 
of  no  concern  ? 

In  any  case,  whichever  it  was,  is  only  shown,  as 
time  and  time  again  before,  both  his  confusion  and 
his  error.  In  any  case,  he  over-shot  his  mark,  and 
in  over-shooting  it  missed  it  altogether. 

But,  anyway,  whether  the  last  was  the  situation 
or  not,  it  was  his  necessity  that  the  reason  "made" 
the  cosmos  or  universe  as  he  was  to  be  afforded  the 
ghost  of  a  footing  for  the  staging  of  his  a  priori 
intuition;  for  it  is  only  as  the  reason  "made"  the 
cosmos  or  universe  that  the  senses,  sensuous  experi- 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


141 


ences  and  their  deliverancies  of  space,  time,  and  the 
rest  obtain  in  conception  in  the  reason,  even  though 
but  logically,  in  advance  of  their  actual  realization, 
only  as  zvhich  they  did  could  there  be  any  a  priori 
intuition  of  them,  by  the  reason  in  advance  of  that 
actual  realization,  as  was  Kant's  contention;  only 
as  which  they  did  could  there  be  even  a  ghost  of  a 
warrant  for  Kant's  assumption  of  conception  com- 
ing before  perception,  concept  before  percept,  and 
on  which  the  percept  depended,  and  external  per- 
ception itself  prove  little  or  nothing  other  than  that 
concept  in  a  transformation  scene  of  simply  its  own 
exploitation  of  itself  externally ;  only  as  which  they 
did,  could  Kant,  think  as  he  did,  to  bundle  the  rea- 
son, divorced  of  the  senses  and  the  sensuous  ex- 
perience, under  his  arm  and  sweep  off  up  into  the 
clouds  with  it,  fancying  it  then,  in  its  isolation,  had 
but  to  be  consulted  to  reveal  a  priori  intutionally 
everything,  space  and  time  with  the  rest,  which  yet 
the  senses  and  the  sensuous  experience  wore  the  dis- 
guise of  only  themselves  originally  revealing,  or  at 
any  time  revealing. 

A  Reason  only  such  as  with  which  should  but 
coincidently  and  consistently  the  cosmos  obtain, 
would  not  answer  Kant's  necessities;  not  even  such, 
or  whatsoever,  as  might  be  the  origin  but  not  the 
maker  of  the  cosmos,  would.  Nothing  less  than  a 
Reason  that  should  be  a  "maker"  of  the  cosmos 
would  serve  Kant  in  his  extremity.  But  this  far 
from  distressed  him.  And  why,  saturate  as  he  was, 
overwhelmed  as  he  was  with  the  Christian  dualistic 
conception  of  universal  Being,  was  it  not  inevitable 


142 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


that  a  "made"  universe  should  be  not  only  the  main- 
spring to  his  any  attempt  to  answer  Hume,  but  also 
his  only  hope  of  affording  even  a  show  of  founda- 
tion for  his  a  priori  intuition. 

However,  that  it  had  to  be  a  ''niade''  universe 
that  should  serve  Kant,  only  shows  up  the  blank 
cartridge  affair  of  his  attempt  to  extinguish  Hume, 
while  at  the  same  time  betraying  "the  baseless 
fabric  of  a  vision''  that  is  the  underprop  of  his  whole 
metaphysic. 

Of  course,  it  is  something  of  excuse  for  Kant  that 
philosophy  saddled  and  ridden  to  death  by  theology 
was  his  heritage,  (and  his  handicap)  as  it  was  of 
others  of  his  generation,  from  the  generations  pre- 
ceding him.  But  it,  at  least,  is  none  for  his  modern 
disciple  who  basks  in  the  sunlight  of  a  freer  atmo- 
sphere and  a  vast  increase  of  knowledge  which 
should  emancipate  him  whether  it  does  or  not.  If 
today  nearly  every  occupant  of  the  chair  of  philoso- 
phy in  our  universities  the  world  over  is  a  theist 
or  theologian  before  a  philosopher,  it  is  not  only  to 
his  own  disgrace  but  a  standing  blight  on  all  prog- 
ress in  philosophy  and  a  damning  reflection  on  aca^ 
demic  pretensions  to  brains  and  culture.  Only 
that  once  philosophy  be  emancipated  of  its  blasting 
religious  thraldom,  and  perhaps  we  may  then  have 
a  metaphysic  which  to  entertain  we  must  not  first 
gulp  down  our  intellect  and  our  common  sense  as 
a  preliminary  to  its  possible  acceptance. 

However,  that  Kant  was  suffering  from  the 
thrall  of  his  heritage  of  a  theology  ridden  philoso- 
phy in  no  little  measure  accounts  for  the  bewilder- 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


143 


ment  and  confusion  that,  following  him,  attained 
to  its  climax  in  his  attempt  to  give  a  priori  intuition 
the  semblance  of  anything  but  the  most  ridiculous 
of  absurdities.   . 

And  now,  finally,  before  dismissing  the  matter 
altogether,  to  notice  but  briefly  two  or  three  proofs, 
proofs  as  they  are  dignified  as  being,  of  space  and 
time  as  a  priori  intuitions  of  reason. 

Thus  it  is  said,  first,  that  the  infant  tends  to 
withdraw  from  disagreeable  objects  and  to  ap- 
proach such  as  give  pleasure  is  such  proof  of  it. 
But  this,  in  truth,  is  so  far  from  being  proof  that  it 
is  not  even  the  least  evidence  of  it.  Intuition  a 
priori  like  every  other  involves  a  consciousness,  and 
a  priori  intuition,  say  of  space,  implies  and  involves 
a  consciousness  of  space.  Now  is  there  any  con- 
sciousness of  space  in  the  infant's  mind  in  that  ap- 
proach to  some  objects  and  withdrawal  from 
others?  It  is  simply  absurd  to  think  it.  Even  an 
adult's  mind  would  not  necessarily  be  conscious  of 
space  in  such  a  contingency.  And  even  again,  as 
the  infant  might  have  that  consciousness  of  space 
after  the  experience  of  approaching  or  withdraw- 
ing, it  is  the  very  height  of  the  unreasoning  to  ex- 
pect it  to  be  conscious  of  space  before;  and  yet  it  is 
vital  to  the  validity  of  Kant's  priori  that  the  infant 
be  conscious  of  space  before. 

All  of  this,  it  would  seem,  should  appear  self- 
evident  enough.  But  to  clinch  it,  cut  off  the  head 
of  a  frog,  apply  electricity  to  its  legs  and  witness 
the  withdrawal  reflex  movement  of  them.  Is  that 
frog,  with  his  head  cut  off,  exercised  with  an  a 


144  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

priori  intuition  of  space  in  that  withdrawal  move- 
ment   only  for  such  advance  knowledge  of  which 
(space)    could   it  think  to  make  that  withdrawal 
movement?     Zounds,  man!  — are  you  quite  gone 
mad  that  you  can  dream  that,  only  for  a  prion,  sense, 
consciousness,  knowledge  of,  space,  could  there  be 
attraction  or  repulsion  in  respect  of  object?  — or 
dream  that  the  frog^s  conduct  under  the  circum- 
stances afforded  any  support  to  such  a  proposition? 
But  again,  it  is  said  that  the  proof  of  a  prion 
intuition  of  space  is  in  that,  while  you  can  think 
away  things  in  space,  you  yet  can  not  by  any  man- 
ner of  effort  think  away  space  itself.       And  can  t 
you?    Well,  in  the  first  place,  call  to  mind,  if  you 
can,  one  single  thing  that  was  simply,  as  you  know, 
a  matter  of  your  thought,  and  without  objective 
reality,  and  note  if  you  could  not  in  every  instance 
think  it  away  ?    And,  as  you  find  you  can,  then  ask 
yourself  if  this   does   not  argue  that,  with  every 
probability,  you  could  think  space  away,  too,  if  that 
were  simply  a  matter  of  your  mind  or  thinking,  as 
Kant  contended  it  to  be?    Or  then,  as  you  find  you 
still  can  not  think  it  away,  is  it  not  with  every  proba- 
bility because  space  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  your 
mind,  or  thinking,  but  is  a  thing  absolute  and  out- 
side all  mind  and  thinking? 

But  what  is  even  of  more  force,  if  possible,  than 
the  above  considerations  is  that  why  we  cannot 
think  space  away  though  can  things  in  space  away, 
is  because  we  never  once  have  had  the  sensuous  ex- 
perience of  what,  to  the  vulgar  view  is  space,  being 
away;  while  why  yet  we  can  think  things  in  space 


Kanfs  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


145 


away  is  because  we  have  had  sensuous  experience 
countless  millions  of  times  of  the  absence  of  things 
from  what  to  the  vulgar  view  is  space. 

Moreover,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the 
human  mind  limited  as  it  is,  is  able  to  think,  think 
as  realizing,  anything  as  lacking  objective  reality, 
which  has  it,  even  though  it  may  think  things  as  hav- 
ing it  which  have  it  not:  we  are  without  the  least 
evidence  of  anything  as  much. 

But,  anyway,  these  aside;  the  foregoing  con- 
siderations are  quite  enough  to  more  than  make  evi- 
dent the  utter  shallowness  of  the  objection  to  space 
being  thing  absolute  that  we  can  not  think  it  away, 
while  yet  we  can  things  in  it;  quite  enough  to  ex- 
plain everything  without  recourse  to  the  hocus 
pocus  of  a  priori  intuition  in  explanation. 

And  yet,  still  again,  and  thirdly,  it  is  said  that 
it  is  mathematics  which  supplies  the  conclusive 
proof  of  a  priori  intuition  origin,  or  nature,  of  space 
and  time.  But  how  mathematics?  We  are  just  as 
dependent  on  things  in  space  and  time  for  our  real- 
ization of  space  and  time,  and,  in  general,  for  our 
any  external  perception,  as  we  are  on  the  one  thing 
itself  of  space  and  time  (speaking  of  the  two  as 
one  thing  for  the  moment)  in  which  to  realize  and 
perceive  things.  This  is  quite  overlooked  by  Kant 
and  his  echoes.  And  that  thing,  then,  in  space  and 
time  has  to  be  covered  in  by  a  priori  intuition,  or 
the  latter  proves  unavailing,  —  even  if  it  were 
availing  anyway  —  and  the  whole  scheme  of  which 
it  lies  at,  the  root,  comes  with  certainty  of  death  to 
naught. 


146 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Now  will  anyone  be  so  bold  as  to  contend  that 
the  thing  in  space  and  time  is  anything  of  a  priori 
intuition  origin  when  it  is  only  in  virtue  of  thing  in 
space  that  we  are  even  conscious  at  all,  let  alone  of 
what  conscious?  —  only  in  virtue  of  which  can  a 
priori  intuition  itself,  as  involving  consciousness, 
have  being?  Certainly,  it  is  folly,  it  is  even  silly, 
to  talk  about  that,  which  involves  consciousness,  as 
obtaining  even  logically  a  priori,  that  is  even  logi- 
cally in  advance  of  that  thing,  namely,  the  con- 
sciousness which  is  involved,  only  in  virtue  of 
which,  namely,  consciousness,  it  exists!  Kant 
himself,  even,  does  not  seem  to  have  claimed  as 
much,  and  does  not,  because  he  had  not  discernment 
enough  —  as  usual  —  to  be  aware  that  thing  in 
space  is  as  necessary  to  the  perception  of  space  as  is 
space  itself  in  which  to  perceive  that  thing. 

So  that  instead  of  mathematics  supplying  de- 
cisive proof  of  the  a  priori  intuition  origin  or  nature 
of  space,  it  affords  none  such  at  all.  And  that  con- 
sciousness is  dependent  on  things  first  in  space  for 
its  being  at  all,  only  shows  that  nothing  involving 
it,  such  as  a  priori  intuition  which  does,  can  obtain, 
even  logically,  prior  to  that  thing  and  to  the  experi- 
ence of  that  thing  only  in  virtue  of  which  con- 
sciousness obtains.  And  as  that  thing  is  what  we 
recognize  as  extension,  figure,  and  resistance,  col- 
lectively considered,  what  is  very  the  dependence  of 
mathematics  as  making  mathematics  possible,  and 
which  thing  in  turn  is  dependent  on  space,  it  fol- 
lows that  instead  of  mathematics  proving  space  to 
be  necessarily  something  of  the  mind  and  anticipat- 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


147 


ing  sensuous  experience,  it  rather  proves  space  to 
be  something  absolute,  and  as  thing  absolute,  itself 
anticipating  sensuous  experience,  and  all  intuition 
a  priori  or  any  other. 

But  now  if  these  proofs  so  called  are  so  utter  a 
failure  even  as  the  least  evidence,  to  say  nothing  of 
proof,  of  space  and  time  having  their  origin  in  a 
priori  intuition  of  the  reason,  how  is  it  Kant  should 
be  found  propounding  a  cause  depending  on  so  rot- 
ten support? 

Was  it  yet  that  back  in  his  mind  influencing 
himi — ^perhaps  all  unconsciously  —  was  the  con- 
viction that  the  manifest  universe  is  a  snap  crea- 
tion; and  again  that  what  was  aboriginal  and  pri- 
mary is  the  consciousness  or  conscious  mind?  He 
said  himself  "the  reason  made  the  cosmos";  and, 
of  course,  why,  then  should  he  not  think  space 
and  time,  with  the  rest,  had  their  beginning  in  the 
reason  and  their  ending  in  it  —  except  for  the  illu- 
sion duly  provided  for  of  their  being  made  to  ap- 
pear in  the  mind  of  man  as  not  ending  there  but  as 
obtaining  beyond  and  in  grosser  more  concrete 
form,  and  with  practically  the  historical  result  of 
concept  obtaining  before  percept,  result  of  concep- 
tion anticipating  perception? 

Or  why,  then,  again,  should  he  not  think,  as  he 
did,  that  he  had  only  to  bundle  the  reason,  divorced 
of  the  senses  and  the  sensuous  experience,  under  his 
arm  and  make  off  with  it,  and  consulting  it  in  iso- 
lation to  find  delivered  to  him  by  it,  of  a  priori  in- 
tuition^ space  and  time,  and  even  what  not  else  of 


148 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  created  universe,  universe  created  by  the  reason 
itself,  forsooth,  as  he  would  have  it. 

And  now,  if  at  last  we  might  sum  up  the  whole 
situation  not  only  as  to  Kant's  semi-delirium,  but 
as  to  the  facts  touching  space  and  time,  it  would  be 
about  this:  — 

(i)  First,  that  space  and  time  are  things  ab- 
solute, that  is,  obtain  independent  of  our  minds ; 

(2)     Second,  that  with  the  sensuous  experience 
of,  say  space,  may  obtain  (as  in  man)  the  idea  of 
space  or  of  its  experience,  two  things,  the  experi- 
ence and  the  idea,  utterly  distinct  as  flower  and  leaf ; 
but  the  distinctness  of  which  we  may  never  realize 
in  the  presence,  so  to  speak,  of  both;  the  same  as 
with  the  experience  of  the  mountain  air  and  its  ex- 
hilarating and  beneficial  effects  may  be  born  an  idea 
of  as  much,  two  things  the  experience  and  the  idea, 
utterly  distinct,  the  distinctness  of  which  we  yet 
might  never  realize  while  still  on  the  mountain-top 
in  the  presence  of  both;  and  yet  as  which  we  do  as 
we  come  down  again  into  the  valley  into  the  presence 
of  only  one,  to  wit,  the  idea,  even  so  might  we  real- 
ize the   distinctness   of  a   sensuous  experience  of 
space  from  an  idea  of  as  much  could  but  once  we  get 
away  —  which  unfortunately  we  never  can,  for  the 
sensuous  experience   of  space   is  ever  with   us  — 
from  the  presence  of  the  sensuous  experience  and 
into  that  of  only  the  idea;  and  it  is  with  the  idea 
only  with  which  the  reason  is  familiar,  and  even 
familiar  with  that  only  in  the  event  of  the  sensuous 
experience  of  space  itself ;  —  it  has  no  a  priori  in- 
tuition of  it. 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


149 


(3)  Third,  that  it  was  Kant's  ever  inability  and 
failure  —  and  so,  of  course,  of  his  modern  disciple's 
as  well,  —  to  come  to  a  realizing  sense  of  this  dis- 
tinctness; and  that  what  there  is  sensuous  experi- 
ence of  in  the  sensuous  experience  of  space,  a  notion 
or  idea  of  is  no  experience  of  at  all,  and  so  can  by 
no  possibility  be  a  contribution  to,  that  was  in  no 
small  measure  the  spring  of  his  abounding  bewil- 
derment and  foolishness  of  metaphysic. 

(4)  Fourth,  that  a  priori  intuition  is  only  a 
thing  generated  of  a  riotous  fancy;  which  thing, 
as  having  its  nesting  in  a  "made"  universe,  and 
universe  "made"  by  the  Reason,  has  itself  no  exist- 
ence only  as  the  latter  has;  which  latter  having 
none,  a  priori  intuition,  for  this  if  for  no  other  rea- 
son, has  none,  —  if  for  no  other  though  it  has  none 
for  many  another. 

(5)  Fifth,  that  not  only  is  there  not  even  the 
ghost  of  evidence  of  fact  or  of  warrant  in  reason, 
in  justification  of  such  a  notion  as  a  priori  intui- 
tion of  space  and  time  by  the  Reason,  but  none  is 
there  even  of  such  a  thing  as  simple  intuition  of 
them  by  it,  or  of  anything  fundamental  either  as 
back  of,  or  as  making  for  itself  (the  Reason)  and 
the  universe  of  things  in  general.  That  is,  that 
the  Reason  is  as  impotent  for  vision  from  a  point 
behind  itself  of  itself  and  of  what  is  behind  itself 
and  making  for  itself  and  the  vast  universe  of 
things  as  are  our  own  eyes  for  vision  from  a  point 
behind  them  for  seeing  themselves  or  what  is  be- 
hind them ;  Kant  insisting  to  the  contrary,  neverthe- 
less. 


150  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

(6)  Sixth,  that  the  bewilderment  and  error  of 
Kant's  a  priori  intuition  are  his  total  bewilderment 
and  error  at  a  climax  since,  in  nothing  more  than 
in  that  is  he  the  sport  of  his  fancy  on  a  rampage; 
in  nothing,  more  senseless;  in  nothing,  does  he 
more  flatly  and  often  contradict  himself,  which  if 
not  bewilderment  and  error  at  a  climax,  then  what 

would  be? 

This  the  situation.     And  so,  now,  in  view  of 
Kant's  frantic  and  ridiculous  agony  as  we  have 
found  it  to  be,  to  justify  his  freakish  fancy  touch- 
ing space  and  time,  I  am  constrained  to  say  again 
what  I  said  earlier,  — How  not  only  false  but  silly 
becomes  all  this  academic  chatter  about  space  and 
time  being  in  us,  and  not  we  in  space  and  time! 
How  not  only  false  but  silly  this  claim  of  Kant's 
that  space  and  time  are  either  a  priori  intuitions,  or 
things  of  a  priori  intuition,  forms  of  perception,  or 
what  not,  (which  ever  it  is,  if  Kant  knew  himself,) 
and  such  antecedent  to  all  experience,  still  that  ob- 
taining "only  because  of  experience''!     And  how 
not  so,  again,  his  claim  that  space  and  time  are  not, 
and   cannot  be   objects  of   sense,   cannot  because 
something  negative!     How  not  only  false,  I  say, 
but  utterly  silly!     And  is  it  then  any  wonder,  in- 
deed, that  Kant  at  one  stage  of  his  agony  of  exploi- 
tation of  doctrine  is  suddenly  brought  up  with  a 
round  turn,  and  is  forced  to  exclaim  — "How  is 
external  perception  in  general  possible,  namely,  that 
of  space,  in  a  thinking  subject  in  general,  possible?" 
and  then  to  confess  —  "It  is  impossible  to  answer"  ? 
Is  it  any  wonder  that  suddenly  he  realizes  that  he 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


151 


> 


is  at  the  brink  of  a  wide  and  bottomless  abyss,  and 
obliged  to  acknowledge  that,  by  dint  of  no  ingenu- 
ity of  dialectic  of  his  possible  conception,  could  his 
scheme   of   metaphysic   be   even   juggled   with   to 
bridge  it  ?    Is  it  any  wonder  indeed,  when  he  had  so 
shut  up  and   hermetically  sealed   space   and   time 
within  the  individual  mind,  or  mind  in  general,  that 
all  avenue  for  their  escape  into  the  open  and  public 
to  prove  themselves  space  and  time  in  general  was 
made   absolutely   impossible;    impossible   to   prove 
themselves  space  and  time  in  general,  only  as  which 
they  could  and  did,  would  they  be  available  for  "ex- 
ternal  perception   in   general?"      For,   how   could 
there  be  "external  perception  in  general"  except  as 
there  were  space  and  time  "in  general"  for  there  to 
be  external  perception  in  general  in?       And  how 
space  and  time  in  general  for  there  to  be  external 
perception  in  general  in,  but  as  there  were  space 
and  time  such  as  might  serve  a  plurality  of  minds  ? 
And  how  such  as  should  serve  that  plurality,  but 
as  it  were  space  and  time  in  common?      And  how 
space  and  time  in  common  but  as  it  were  space  and 
time  entirely  outside  that  plurality  of  minds,  which 
is  to  say,  space  and  time  external  to  the  mind  and 
absolute? 

One  would  suppose  that  a  mind  of  half  the  re- 
puted intelligence  of  Kant  would  have  known  that 
to  immure  space  and  time  within  the  confines  of  a 
plurality  of  minds  in  severalty,  would  make  utterly 
unavailable  any  such  for  a  plurality  of  minds  in 
common,  only  as  which  was  thus  available,  could 
there  be  "space  and  time  in  general"  for  there  to  be 


152  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

"external  perception  in  general"  in.  One  would 
suppose,  indeed,  that  it  would  be  seen  at  once  that, 
to  do  so,  would  be  to  make  the  any  knowledge,  the 
any  recognition,  of  other  minds,  as  there  might  be 
others,  absolutely  impossible ;  — vjhich,  however, 
that  we  do  recognize  other  minds  each  than  his  own 
no  one  even  thinks  to  doubt. 

Altogether  strange  then  is  it  that,  yet,  that  Kant 
has  run  up  against  the  snag  to  which  we  allude,  and 
even  confesses  that  he  has,  he  still  does  not  seem 
even  to  dream  it  any  fault  of  his  preposterous  meta- 
physic?  He  is  like  the  automobilist  in  a  smash-up 
who,  shocked  and  more  than  half  insensible  that  it 
is  the  debris  of  his  own  wrecked  machine  piled  over 
him  that  has  brought  him  to  his  dire  pass  and 
mental  confusion,  is  wondering  how  the  lamp  post, 
he  ran  into,  got  in  his  way  rather  than  how  he  him- 
self should  have  got  in  the  way  of  the  lamp  post ! 

And  still,  why  the  situation  in  which  there  is 
this  sudden  halt,  this  sudden  awakening  to,  this 
sudden  consciousness  of  having  brought  up  at,  an 
impossible  barrier?  Why  but  that  there  must  be 
space  and  time  in  general  for  there  to  be  perception 
in  general  in,  which  former  could  be,  and  so  the 
latter,  only  as  the  space  and  time  were  space  and 
time  \n  common  with  all  minds,  which  only  could 
they  be  as  were  they  altogether  outside  all  minds? 

And  why,  again,  but  that,  away  back  in  the  be- 
ginning, Kant's  inventory  of  the  primary  facts  of 
consciousness  was  fatally  short  of  being  exhaustive ; 
and  that  there  was  one  more,  one  at  least,  and  a 
sine  qua  non  working  factor,  in  any  possible  pri- 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


153 


m^ary  solution  of  problems  before  him,  than  those 
included  in  that  inventory  which  he  either  ignor- 
antly  or  wilfully  over-looked;  and  that  from  his 
neglect  of  which,  his  scheme  of  metaphysic  suffered 
from  first  to  last?  Why  but  this?  Why  but  that 
that  crucial  primary  fact  of  consciousness  which  his 
carelessness  or  his  intention  was  indifferent  to  was 
that  of  his  recognition  of  a  plurality  of  minds  with 
their  experience?  Indifference  to  that  fact  is  of 
itself  and  alone  enough  to  wreck  any  system  of 
philosophy,  let  alone  how  much  soever  more  there 
might  be  to  do  it;  and  of  course,  it  wrecks  Kant's. 

But  now  I  want  to  add  that,  indeed,  even  is  not 
needed  the  foregoing  demonstration,  or  any  other, 
of  space  and  time  as  external  to  the  mind  and  abso- 
lute that  at  least  should  be  shown  up  the  monumen- 
tal failure  Kant  proves  himself  as  a  metaphysician 
to  be  at  the  very  threshold  of  his  excursion  into 
metaphysics.  For  he  declared  there  is  an  external 
world  absolute;  and  he,  in  just  that  declaration, 
declared  there  to  be  an  out  of  the  mind,  and  an  out 
absolute  of  it;  since,  prima  facie,  for  there  to  be  a 
world  external  to  the  mind  there  must  be  an  out  of 
the  mind,  for  that  external  world  to  be  in.  And  as 
that  world  in  that  out  is,  by  the  terms  of  Kant's 
own  understanding  of  it,  a  world  absolute^  then  the 
out  in  which  that  world  is  must  be  itself  an  out  ab- 
solute.  So  that  Kant,  in  declaring  there  to  be  an 
external  world  absolute,  declared  there  to  be  not 
only  an  out  but  an  out  absolute  of  the  mind. 

But  now  what  is  that  out  absolute  but  space  ab- 
solute?   It  certainly  is  utterly  inconceivable  that  it 


154 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


should  be  anything  else.  And  what  evidence  or 
reasoning  still  is  there  that  it  is?  The  mere  dog- 
matic assumption  that  it  is  not  space  absolute  will 
not  answer.  And  it  rested  with  Kant,  having  gone 
so  far,  to  explain  how  or  why  it  is  not.  But  in- 
stead, at  this  critical  juncture,  of  doing  so,  he 
leaves  the  query  hanging  mid-air  unanswered,  and 
shies  oflf  up  into  the  clouds  and,  corralling  the  fan- 
tasy of  space  a  form  of  perception,  brings  it  down 
to  earth,  affecting  to  prove  it  the  space  we  know; 
affecting  to  prove  space  a  form  of  perception  what 
is  absolutely  unthinkable,  unthinkable  as  being  in 
consciousness  unrealizable  —  though,  of  course, 
thinko/able  enough  as  is  that  the  moon  is  made  of 
green  cheese,  while  not  true. 

Now  did  Kant  not  know  that,  in  declaring  an 
external  world  absolute,  he  was  declaring  an  out 
absolute  of  the  mind?  If  he  did  not,  then  at  once 
is  shown  up  the  wrc^tched  pretension  for  a  meta- 
physician he  was. 

Or,  then,  if  he  did  know,  yet,  still,  is  only  too 
manifest  that  wretched  failure  of  a  philosopher  he 
was  as  he  did  not  realize  that  at  least  is  absolutely 
not  thinkable,  thinkable  as  realizable,  that  that  out 
absolute  of  the  mind  is  not  space  absolute;  and  that 
in  putting  forward  space  as  a  mode  of  perception 
what  is  itself,  also,  absolutely  not  thinkable,  think- 
able as  realizable,  he  is  putting  forward  what  is  ab- 
solutely not  thinkable  as  being  space  against  what  is 
not  thinkable  as  being  anything  else  than  space,  as 
though  the  former,  for  fact  or  truth,  could  for  a 
moment  weigh  against  the  latter! 


Kant's  A  Priori  Bewilderment 


155 


h 


But  why  did  not  Kant  explain  why  or  how  an 
out  absolute  of  the  mind  is  not  space  absolute? 
Simply  because  he  couldn't.  And  he  couldn't  be- 
cause an  out  absolute  is  very  itself  space  absolute, 
and  no  explanation  is  possible  why  or  how  it  is  not. 
And  so,  right  then  and  there,  Kant  was  balked  in 
his  metaphysical  line  of  march;  right  then  and 
there,  was  he  suddenly  a  bankrupt  with  not  the 
ghost  of  a  footing  for  further  exploitation  in  meta- 
physics. And  didn't  he  know  he  was,  right  then 
and  there,  a  wreck  on  the  rocks,  but  without  the 
manliness  to  own  to  it?  Or  hadn't  he  the  wits  to 
know  that  he  was  ?  In  either  case,  is  shown  up  the 
veriest  humbug  of  a  metaphysician  he  was. 

Doubtless  it  will  be  said  that  I  fail  to  treat  Kant 
with  even  a  decent  respect.  And  I  fail  to,  indeed, 
because  I  fail  to  have  that  for  him  as  a  metaphy- 
sician; and  because  already  too  long  has  been  ac- 
corded him  what  does  not  belong  to  him.  But 
what  more  than  all  excites  my  fury  is  that  the  whole 
academic  world  with  all  its  pretensions  to  brains  and 
culture  is  not  yet  out  of  the  Kantian  woods.  And 
it  is  indeed  positively  intellectually  sickening  that, 
with  all  the  light  of  the  vast  increase  of  knowledge 
of  the  century  gone  by  to  be  thrown  upon  meta- 
physic,  that  that  world  has  not  made  a  hair's  ad- 
vance for  a  century  or  centuries,  but  is  still  at  the 
same  old  stand  beating  with  the  same  old  academic 
drum-sticks,  the  same  old  academic  tom-toms. 


7 


h 


What  is  mind?  It  is  physical  energy  or  force  at 
a  certain  stage  of  development,  which  physical  energy 
or  force  itself  is  a  mode,  a  change  of  mode  of  activity 
of  the  Primordial  Mental  as  distinguished  from  a 
mode  of  it,  a  mode  in  statu  quo,  and  which  is  recog- 
nized as  matter. 


i> 


What  is  mind,  conscious  mind?  It  is  a  decline  of 
the  Primordial  Mental  from  its  first  estate;  in  a  word, 
it  is,  in  a  sense  and  degree,  a  degenerate  form  of  the 
mental. 


vi 


What  is  mind?  It  is  that  certain  development  of 
the  simply  mental,  the  Primordial  Mental,  (that  is, 
of  its  activity)  that  is  incapable  of  consciousness  unas- 
sisted from  without;  and  is  what,  while  competent  as 
author  or  origin  of  the  mechanical  physical  is  nothing 
so  of  the  living  physical;  quite  the  contrary  of  the 
Primordial  Mental  Itself  which  is  capable  both  of 
consciousness  unassisted  from  without,  and  of  the 
origin,  though  not  of  the  authorship,  of  the  living 
physical. 


What  is  Mind  — our  Mind?  It  is  that  mental 
something  more  than  the  sum  of  the  mental  faculties 
as  they  should  be  duly  disposed  and  active  than  as 
were  they  but  indifferently  disposed  and  active;  the 
same  as  a  watch,  for  time  result  and  effectiveness, 
is  that  something  more  than  the  sum  of  its  parts  as 
duly  disposed  and  active  than  as  were  they  thrown 
together  but  differently. 


XI 

Effects  of  Impressions  of  the  Outlying  World  Abso- 
lute on  the  Mind  a  Fiction  —  Kant's  All  Other 
Phenomena  a  Fiction  —  For  What  is  Mind? 

But  now  the  next  point  is,  if  presumption,  and 
all  demonstration  are  in  the  direction  of  the  con- 
scious pane  of  glass  seeing  the  flying  brick  at  least, 
all  in  the  direction  of  the  mind  perceiving  the  ex- 
ternal world  absolute  at  least,  acting  on  it — acting  on 
it,  as  it  is  said — ^whether,  besides,  there  is  perception 
of  any  effects  or  impressions  of  that  world  on  it  or 
not ;  the  next  point  is,  I  say,  whether  yet  besides,  it 
does  not  perceive  any  possible  effects  or  impressions 
themselves  on  itself;  whether  even,  indeed,  there  are 
any  such  to  perceive,  as  Kant  contended  that  there 
are,  and  the  whole  academic  world  echoes  his  con- 
tention that  there  are?  And  the  only  answer  to  this, 
is — No,  it  perceives  none  such  besides,  whatever ;  for 
there  are  none  such  there  made  more  than  are 
wrought  on  a  glass  mirror  by  the  objects  it  reflects. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  not  one  fact  high  or 
low,  far  or  near  in  evidence  of  such  effects  or  im- 
pressions on  the  mind : 

In  the  second  place,  the  very  fact  that  if  there 
were  any  such,  they  would  obtain  within  the  mind, 


i6o 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


and  must,  as  perceived,  be  perceived,  (as  we  could 
only  in  reason  anticipate,  and  which  we  know  noth- 
ing ex  post  facto  to  contradict)  as  within  the  mind 
where  they  are;  and  yet  that  what  is  perceived  is  not 
perceived  as  within  it  hut  as  without  it,  is  to  be 
taken,  in  all  reason  as,  prima  facie,  positive  proof 
not  only  that  what  is  perceived  are  not  effects  or  im- 
pressions on  the  mind  at  all,  but,  moreover,  that 
there  exists  none  such  there  to  perceive;  since,  as 
there  were,  it  would  be  such  effects  or  impressions 
as  object  perceived  and  perceived  as  within  the  mind 
and  not  as  without.  As  before  pointed  out,  if  there 
were  such  wrought  on  the  mind,  there  would  be  two 
objects  almost  simultaneously  before  it,  and  the 
consequential  effects  or  impressions  as  objects  fol- 
lowing so  close  upon  the  heels  of  that  as  object  pro- 
ducing them  that  the  conscious  perception  of  the  lat- 
ter would  likely  be  eclipsed  by  the  perception  of  the 
former;  or,  as  it  should  not  be,  then  two  objects 
would  be  perceived ;  but  as  it  is  only  one  that  is,  and 
that  one,  as  consciously  perceived,  perceived  as  with- 
out the  mind,  it  must  be  because  the  other  is  not  per- 
ceived, and  not  perceived  because  it  does  not  exist. 

Then,  still  again,  there  are  not  to  be  supposed  any 
effects  or  impressions  made  on  the  mind  by  the  ex- 
ternal world  absolute,  either  perceived  or  to  per- 
ceive, for  the  simple  reason  that  the  mind  itself  is 
not  to  be  understood  as  of  a  nature  to  be  susceptible 
to  effects  or  impressions  from  such  source. 

For  what  is  mind,  conscious  mind,  our  conscious 
mind,  the  only  such  we  know  anything  about  ?  It  is 
little  or  nothing  better  than  a  degenerate  form  of 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


i6i 


the  mental  And  what  is  that?  It  is  a  form  of  the 
mental  incapable  of  what  the  form  of  it  in  its  first 
estate  is  capable  of.  And  what  are  the  tests  of  the 
latter  ?  First,  as  it  is  of  capacity  for  authorship,  or 
origin,  of  consciousness  unassisted  from  outside. 
Second,  as  it  is  of  capacity  for  authorship  or  origin 
of  everything  any  mental  is  of  capacity  for. 

Now,  only  the  mental  is  capable  of  conscious- 
ness ;  so  that  capacity  for  consciousness  is  a  test  of 
mentality.  As  the  Absolute  Reality,  then,  is  capa- 
ble of  authorship  or  origin  of  consciousness  it  is 
something  mental.  And  it  is  of  that  capacity,  or 
there  would  be  no  consciousness  in  existence  in  the 
universe,  which  we  know  there  is,  very  our  own 
being  in  attestation  thereof.  The  Absolute  Reality, 
then,  is  something  mental. 

Moreover,  that  mental  such  as  it  is,  is  the  mental 
capable  of  authorship,  or  origin  of  consciousness  un- 
assisted from  outside;  for,  as  would  everybody  al- 
low, it  being  the  Absolute  Reality  there  would  be 
nothing  outside  to  afford  it  assistance. 

This  is  quite  to  the  contrary  of  what  it  is  with 
conscious  mind,  our  conscious  minds  which  are  capa- 
ble of  authorship  or  origin  of  consciousness  only  as 
aided  by  the  action  on  them  by,  or  the  presence  of, 
an  outside  world. 

And  the  difference  may  be  illustrated  as  water  is 
considered.  Water  ordinarily  freezes  at  32  degrees ; 
but  it  may  be  carried  down  to  a  temperature  of  31 
degrees  or  lower,  without  its  doing  so  if  undisturbed 
from  without.  But  touch  it  with  a  finger  or  a  stick 
and  instantly  it  congeals.       Not  thus  disturbed  it 


1 


1 62 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


would  remain  liquid  forever,  for  it  has  no  power  to 
be  itself  its  own  finger  or  stick  to  disturb  itself. 

The  parallel  of  the  water  are  our  minds  which  as 
they  are  themselves  author  or  origin  of  such  con- 
sciousness as  is  ours,  are  incapable,  like  the  water,  to 
be  themselves  their  own  provocation  to  it,  but  must 
be  dependent  on  the  action  on  them  by,  or  on  the 
presence  of,  an  outlying  world  for  it.  Even  Kant 
would  have  been  glad  to  get  along  without  such  out- 
lying world  absolute,  and  would  have  done  so  only 
that  he  did  not  see  how  to  account  for  our  sensations 
but  for  the  action  of  such  world  on  the  mind.  And 
the  mind  itself,  such  as  men  have  commonly  con- 
ceived it,  would,  perhaps,  but  it  can't. 

Quite  to  the  contrary,  however,  of  this,  the 
mental  in  its  first  estate  of  integrity  and  power,  as 
being  the  Absolute  Reality,  is  capable  of  being  itself 
its  own  finger  or  stick,  so  to  speak,  to  molest  itself. 
And  this  it  does  as,  itself  primarily  unconscious,  it, 
in  its  most  primary  movement  of  itself  of  which  we 
have  any  knowledge,  projects. itself  in  the  centri- 
fugal and  returns  upon  itself  in  the  centripetal  and 
when  then,  in  the  impact  on  itself  in  that  return 
stroke  of  the  centripetal,  it  proves  itself  its  own 
finger  or  stick,  as  it  were,  to  disturb  itself  which  thus 
disturbed  it  is  with  the  event  of  consciousness. 

But  now  again,  I  have  said  that  a  second  test  of 
the  mental  in  its  first  estate  of  integrity  and  power, 
is  its  capacity  for  authorship  or  origin  of  everything 
any  mental  is  capable  of.  And  the  mental  as  the 
Absolute  Reality  which  it  is,  must  be  the  author  or 
origin  of  everything,  and  with  the  rest,  of  the  living 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


163 


physical;  the  living  physical  which  the  conscious 
mind,  however,  the  only  such  we  know  anything 
about,  was  never  known  to  be  once  the  author  or 
origin  of,  and  ever  only  of  the  mechanical  physical 
such  as  a  machine  —  a  locomotive  or  a  sewing  ma- 
chine, for  examples.  And  as  never  known  once  to  be, 
the  only  logical  inference  is  that  never,  —  while 
creating  so  multitudinous  many  of  marvelous  me- 
chanical things,  —  because  utterly  incapable  of  it. 

But  doubtless  it  will  be  thought  to  protest  that 
human  offspring  are  examples  of  the  conscious 
mind's  authorship  of  the  living  physical;  and  yet, 
indeed,  they  are  not.  You  bring  oxygen  and  hydro- 
gen together  under  certain  conditions  with  the  result 
of  water;  but  would  you  say  that  it  was  your  con- 
scious mind  that  is  the  chemical  energy  that  trans- 
forms them  into  water  ?  And  in  the  sexual  relation 
with  the  result  of  offspring  does  your  conscious 
mind  do  more  than  bring  the  germcell  and 
spermcell  together?  Is  it  your  mind  that  is  the  en- 
ergy that  unites  and  developes  them  into  offspring f 
Of  course  not.  It  is  the  mental,  then,  of  other  form 
than  that  of  conscious  mind  that  is  the  author  or 
origin  of  the  any  living  physical. 

So,  now,  I  say  again,  that  what  we  are  familiar 
with  as  the  conscious  mind  is  little  or  nothing  better 
than  a  degenerate  form  of  the  mental.  It  is  not  the 
mental  in  its  first  estate  but  a  decline  from  that,  — 
which  is  to  say  a  decline  from  the  mental  of  a  form 
void  of  consciousness  as  is  the  author  or  origin  of 
the  manifest  universe  void  of  it. 

Any  glib  talk,  I  should  add,  as  there  might  be 


164 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


about  infinite  conscious  mind  being  capable  of  what 
finite  conscious  mind  on  any  scale  is  not,  is  to  beg 
the  whole  question,  and  to  talk  utterly  foolish,  for  we 
know  absolutely  nothing  of  any  such  mind. 

If  it  is  to  be  retorted  that  it  is  but  rational  that 
even  still  conscious  mind  should  have  a  hand  in  that 
authorship  or  origin,  I  reply,  —  Nonsense.  If  the 
mental  itself  and  alone,  is  capable  of  entertaining 
consciousness  in  latency  or  embryo  and  of  develop- 
ing it  into  consciousness  in  actuality,  the  then  great- 
est and  most  marvelous  thing  we  know  of  in  the 
realm  of  manifest  Being,  Til  venture  it  is  quite  com- 
petent for  authorship  or  origin  of  everything  short 
of  it,  which  —  short  of  it  —  is  everything  of  which 
we  are  conscious. 

Besides,  my  own  body  had  origin  and  develop- 
ment independent,  so  far  as  we  know,  of  my  con- 
sciousness; and  why  not  the  manifest  universe  in 
general,  have  its  independent  of  all  consciousness? 
else  how  the  latter  the  macrocosm  to  you  and  me  the 
microcosm,  we  hear  so  much  about? 

But  now  if  such  as  in  the  foregoing  is  found 
the  mental  as  conscious  mind  to  be,  what  is  the 
mental  itself  in  all  the  aboriginality  and  power  of  it 
in  its  first  estate  and  as  void  altogether  of  conscious 

mind? 

Well,  first,  it,  as  very  it  itself  as  very  the  Abso- 
lute Reality  itself,  is  the  forever  and  forever  change- 
less. 

And  yet  again,  it  itself  as  very  the  Absolute 
Reality  itself  and  very  the  author  or  origin  of  the 
manifest  universe,  must  somehow  yet  be  forever  and 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


165 


ever  changeful  —  and  it  is.  And,  still,  not  so  in 
itself,  but  in  its  infinitely  variant  modes  of  activity 
and  in  which,  there  it  is,  and  not  immediately  in  the 
mental  itself,  that  Evolution  takes  place  and  the 
manifest  universe  obtains. 

In  the  next  place,  the  mental,  primarily  uncon- 
scious yet  that  it  is,  is  still  capable  of  becoming  con- 
scious, and  does  become  so,  if  not  with  every  impact 
of  itself  on  itself  in  the  return  stroke  of  the  centri- 
petal of  its  most  primary  movement  of  itself  of  cen- 
trifugal and  centripetal,  then  at  last  becomes  so  in 
the  impact  it  makes  on  the  congeries  of  forms,  in 
statu  quo,  of  activity  of  itself  which  we  recognize  as 
brain. 

And  to  remark  of  this  in  passing,  it  is  to  be  said 
that  as  consciousness  obtains  as  often  as  first  indi- 
cated,—  and  which  I  am  disposed  to  think  it  does 
and  as  continuous  as  that  most  primary  of  all  move- 
ments of  the  mental,  —  our  own  consciousness 
would  be  one  with  the  universal  consciousness;  and 
hrain  as  matter,  with  the  rest  of  the  matter  of  the 
universe,  would  be  organ  and  origin  of  conscious- 
ness, —  with  only  the  immediate  agents  involved 
for  content ;  —  while  matter  as  brain  would  be  the 
organ  and  origin  of  such  content  as  is  that  of  what, 
to  our  thinking,  is  exclusively  our  own  conscious- 
ness. 

Of  course,  this  cannot  be  proven.  But  at  least, 
it  is  nothing  against  it  that  I  have  no  direct  con- 
sciousness of  any  such  universal  consciousness;  as 
neither  have  I  of  your  own,  and  only  know  of  your 
own  by  physical  signs  —  even  which  we  know  may 


i66 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


167 


be  absent  and  still  you  be  conscious.  Much  less  have 
I  any  direct  consciousness  of  my  own  consciousness 
as  what  should  be  a  universal  consciousness  in  con- 
tinuity. 

And,  again,  it  is  nothing  against  it  that  it  seems 
to  warm  up,  and  I  could  almost  say  people,  the  whole 
universe  as  can  be  felt  that,  outside  our  own,  there  is 
consciousness  abroad  throughout  the  whole  realm 

of  Being. 

But  now  then,  on  the  other  hand,  as  our  con- 
sciousness, as  well  as  its  content,  obtains,  only  in  the 
event  of  brain,  then  we  have  mind  as  it  is  generally 
understood,  and  with  brain  the  organ  and  origin  not 
only  of  the  content  of  consciousness  but  of  very 
consciousness,  our  consciousness,  itself  also. 

However,  and  to  return  to  my  query  What  is  the 
mental  ?  In  either  of  the  above  cases,  whether  men- 
tality is  summed  up  as  in  the  one  where  matter  as 
brain  is  the  organ  and  origin  of  consciousness  as 
well  as  content,  or  as  in  the  other  where  brain  as 
matter,  with  the  rest  of  the  matter  of  the  universe, 
is  alone  organ  and  origin  of  consciousness,  and  brain 
alone  of  content  such  as  that  of  ours,  mentality  is  an 
energy  or  dynamic  force;  and  an  energy  or  dynamic 
force  not  to  be  distinguished,  by  any  conclusive  test, 
from  what  we  recognize  as  physical  energy  or  dy- 
namic force;  and  so,  therefore,  not  any  more  to  be 
acted  on,  or  impressions  made  on,  than  is  that.  True 
enough,  only  the  mental  is  capable  of  consciousness. 
But  true  again,  that  not  only  as  the  mental  is  con- 
scious is  it  mental.  So  that  only  as  it  might  be 
shown  that  physical  energy  is  incapable  of  con- 


sciousness, have  we  any  grounds,  solid  or  even  su- 
perficial, for  distinction  of  one  from  the  other;  of 
one,  at  the  worst,  from  some  allotropic  state  of  the 
other. 

Neither  is  it  any  objection  to  the  notion  of  mind 
as  being  physical  force  that  mind  is  not  amenable  to 
physical  tests  (of  scalpel,  crucible,  or  microscope) 
as  affording  any  evidence  of  capacity  for  conscious- 
ness; since  neither  is  the  constitution  of  crude  carbon 
amenable  to  such  as  affording  any  evidence  of  its 
identity  with  what  should  glitter  in  light;  and  yet 
isn't  diamond  carbon,  and  doesn't  diamond  glitter 
in  the  light? 

Neither,  again,  is  it  any  objection  to  the  notion 
of  conscious  mind  as  physical  force  that  you  cannot 
state  consciousness  itself  in  terms  of  that  force. 
And  can  you  not,  indeed?  Well,  you  cannot  state 
the  glitter  of  a  diamond  in  terms  of  carbon  either; 
but  diamond  is  carbon  all  the  same.  So,  you  can- 
not state  the  consciousness  of  conscious  mind  in 
terms  of  physical  force;  but  mind  is  physical  force, 
all  the  same.  Diamond  is  only  a  form  of  carbon 
having  capacity  for  glitter;  so  mind  is  only  a  form 
of  physical  force  having  capacity  for  consciousness. 
The  glitter  of  a  diamond  is  contingent  on  something 
alien  to  itself,  namely,  light;  so,  again,  conscious- 
ness, our  consciousness  at  least,  is  contingent  pri- 
marily on  something  alien  to  the  mind  itself,  namely, 
objects  in  presentation  before  it. 

Altogether,  the  objection  that  mind  is  not  physi- 
cal force  because  consciousness  cannot  be  stated  in 
terms  of  it,  miscarries  like  every  other. 


1 68  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

But  the  physical  activity  or  force  as  the  mental 
and  mind,  no  more  than  any  other,  chemical  or 
what  you  will,  can  be  made  an  impression  on.  You 
may  arrest,  or  possibly  accelerate  that  between  oxy- 
gen and  hydrogen  in  the  formation  of  water;  but 
you  can  make  no  impression  on  the  chemical  reaction 
itself  while  it  lasts  as  in  any  way  altering  it ;  its  statu 
quo  any  moment  is  its  statu  quo  every  moment  so 
long  as  it  obtains  at  all.  And  no  more  can  you  affect 
the  activity,  physiologiccnchemical,  or  what  you 
will,  going  on  in  the  event  of  mind  so  long  as  that 
physical  activity  identified  with  mind  persists. 

Of  course,  that  all  mind  is  of  one  form,  or  even 
of  one  grade  of  physical  force,  w^ould  be  a  mistake 

to  suppose. 

But  all  this  is  much  as  to  say  that  mind  in  its 
every  form  or  grade,  is  a  constant,  and  itself  unaf- 
fected by  external  objects  coming  before  it  as  is  a 
glass  mirror  a  constant,  and  itself  unaffected  by  ob- 
jects coming  before  that;  the  mind  simply  taking 
cognizance  of  them  as  does  the  glass  mirror  take, 
as  it  were,  cognizance  of  objects  coming  before  it. 

Nor  are  the  reflections  that  have  already  had  our 
attention  on  the  mirror-like  nature  of  conscious  mind 
as  affording  suggestion  of  the  absence  of  all  such  as 
effects  or  impressions  direct  of  the  outlying  world 
absolute  on  the  mind,  all  that  may  be  noted ;  for  the 
parallel  between  the  mind  and  consciousness  on  the 
one  hand,  and  a  mirror  and  reflection  on  the  other  is 
manifold  and  variously  most  striking,  to  say  the 
least  of  it.  Even  to  remark  it  only  a  little  further, 
which  I  might  much  further,  we  find  that  as  reflec- 


Kanfs  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


169 


tion  in  a  physical  mirror,  say  one  of  glass,  is  no 
property  or  attribute  of  the  glass  mirror,  so  is  con- 
sciousness itself  none  of  the  mind.  Or,  as  I  might 
have  said,  for  it  is  true,  as  it  is  only  latent  capacity 
for  reflection  that  is  an  attribute  of  the  former,  not 
reflection  itself  that  is ;  so  it  is  only  a  latent  capacity 
for  consciousness  that  is  an  attribute  of  the  latter, 
not  consciousness  itself  that  is  such  attribute. 

Besides,  consciousness  is  not  a  factor  or  constitu- 
ent of  the  mind  for  the  reason  additional  to  any 
wherefore  reflection  in  a  glass  mirror  is  not,  the  rea- 
son, namely,  that  it  is  a  development;  or  rather  in 
strictness  the  mind  to  which  consciousness  is  a  pos- 
sibility is  itself  a  development,  as  I  had  occasion  to 
insist  before ;  which,  the  mind,  it  being  a  living,  ac- 
tive, positive  thing,  could  be,  but  which  such  as  a 
glass  mirror,  that  being  a  thing  lifeless,  inert,  and 
passive,  could  not  be :  and  a  development  is  not  an 
attribute  of  that  of  which  it  is  a  development,  of 

course. 

Then  again,  as  the  actual  event  of  reflection  in  a 
mirror,  say  a  mirror  of  glass,  obtains  only  as  objects 
come  before  it,  so  the  actual  event  of  the  realiza- 
tion of  consciousness  occurs,  primarily,  only  as  ob- 
jects first  come  before  the  mind  —  so  far  as  we 
know.  And  contrawise,  of  course,  as  physical  objects 
are  withdrawn  from  before  a  mirror,  is  reflection 
snuffed  out,  so,  as  all  like  objects  are  withdrawn 
from  before  the  mind,  is  consciousness  extinguished : 
or,  as  still  continuing,  doing  so  only  as  ghosts  of 
former  such  objects,  or  as  objects  of  the  mind's 
more  or  less  independent  conjuring,  pass  before  it. 


170 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


I  say  as  ghosts  of  former  objects;  and  even  here, 
again,  still  is  the  parallel  maintained  between  a  glass 
mirror  and  the  conscious  mind.  For,  as  the  ex- 
ternal object  as  reflected  in  the  former  is  only  a  tran- 
scription of  the  form,  merely,  of  an  object,  not  of 
its  substance,  and  is  but  an  unsubstantial  shadow, 
but  a  ghost  as  it  were,  beside  the  external  object  it- 
self, so,  is  the  any  idea  of  the  object,  the  idea  as 
only  being  thought,  beside  the  same  idea  as  obtain- 
ing in  the  concrete  and  as  unthought  and  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  absolute.  That  is,  the  idea  as  only 
being  thought  is  but  an  unsubstantial  shadow,  a 
ghost  as  it  were,  beside  the  outlying  absolute  reality, 
and  unbeing-thought,  thought  in  the  concrete,  it- 
self ;  and  doubly  so  as  it  should  be  but  an  idea,  by 
the  aid  of  memory,  recalled. 

However,  not  to  follow  further  the  parallel  in 
other  points,  others  which  there  are  as  impressive, 
if  not  more  so,  than  those  already  noticed,  quite 
enough  has  been  said  that  could  not  be  thought  im- 
possible, and  might  with  no  little  reason  be  thought 
highly  probable,  the  mirror-like  nature  of  conscious 
mind.  And,  of  course,  the  more  mirror-like  the 
nature  of  it  the  more  certain  is  it  that  whatsoever 
of  the  external  world  absolute  comes  before  it,  as 
little  acts  on  it  with  effects  or  impressions  as  do  ob- 
jects brought  before  a  physical  mirror,  say  one  of 
glass,  act  on  that. 

Indeed,  so  far  as  any  essential  difference  with 
consequences  are  concerned,  between  them  that  can 
be  shown,  I  myself  at  least  know  of  none,  except 
such  as  must  follow  from  the  difference  between  an 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


171 


organic,  live,  active,  and  positive  mirror  such  as  the 
conscious  mind  is,  and  an  inorganic,  lifeless,  inert, 
and  passive  one  such  as  is  one  of  glass. 

And  perhaps,  too,  it  is  just  this  difference,  and 
nothing  more:,  which  may  explain  why  the  mind, 
still  that  mirror-like,  may  take  cognizance  of  that 
of  which  form  is  the  form,  take  cognizance,  that  is, 
of  substance  or  body  of  an  object  of  the  external 
world  absolute,  when  such  as  a  glass  mirror  can  not ; 
why  it  may  take  cognizance  of  resistance,  the  pre- 
eminent sensuous  suggestion  of  substance  or  body, 
while  a  mirror  of  glass  is  limited  to  form  as  only  of 
which  it  may  take  cognizance  as  it  were. 

And  the  same  is  to  be  said,  if,  instead  of  the 
statico-mechanical  as  form  or  body,  it  is  the  dy- 
namico-mechanical  as  motion  that  comes  before  the 
mind;  the  same  even  as,  as  in  the  like  of  the  per- 
ception of  light,  it  should  be  a  head-on  collision  of 
the  dynamo-mechanical  or  motion,  as  in  light 
perception  itself,  and  the  impact  of  ether  vibrations 
on  eye  and  brain.  The  presumption  here  again,  is 
that  the  mind  conducts  itself  mirror-like  still,  as  ever 
it  has  done  so  at  all ;  and  so,  as  before,  without  ef- 
fects or  impressions  on  itself. 

So  much  as  to  the  nature  of  conscious  mind  itself. 
Now  note  that  the  mind's  immediate  deliverance 
is  that  the  visual  light  it  sees  it  sees  as  outside  itself; 
and  outside  is  just  where  empirical  or  scientific  ob- 
servation attests  that  the  ether  vibrations  make  their 
impact ;  attests  that  on  the  eye  and  brain,  the  substra- 
tum to  mind,  they  make  their  impact;  and  where 
(outside  the  mind)  the  resultant  of  that  impact  must 


172  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

be,  as  are  the  parties  to  it,  namely,  the  ether  vibra- 
tions and  the  eye  and  brain.  Meanwhile  there  is  not 
a  scrap  of  evidence  going  to  show  that  that  impact 
strikes  any  further,  any  deeper,  than  the  brain  itself. 
What  is  it,  then,  but  out  of  all  reason  to  presume 
it  does  strike  further  and  deeper  ?  What  but  pure 
unwarranted  assumption  that  it  does?  And  if  the 
blow  reaches  no  further,  no  deeper,  then,  surely, 
there  are  evidently  no  effects,  no  impressions  made 
by  the  ether  vibrations  on  the  mind  itself.  And  yet 
the  mind  itself  may  take,  as  it  were,  wireless  cogni- 
zance of  those  effects  or  impressions  on  its  own  sub- 
stratum of  eye  and  brain. 

But  still,  if  outside  and  nothing  of  mind  or  con- 
sciousness, nor  anything  of  their  offspring,  how  yet, 
it  will  be  queried,  should  visual  light  be  cognizable  ? 
How  ?  Why,  cognizable  because  the  outcome  of  the 
action  of  ether  vibrations  on  the  mental,  namely,  the 
brain,  itself  something  at  least,  of  the  mental,  mental 
still  that  nothing  of  mind  of  consciousness,  as  I  am 
later  to  explain. 

The  brain  itself  must  be  something  mental,  as  it 
is  absolutely  unthinkable  that  that  that  should  be 
correlated  with  mind  should  not  be  itself,  as  well  as 
the  mind,  something  mental,  mental  at  least,  even  if 
yet  nothing  of  mind  or  of  consciousness. 

It  is  as  unthinkable  as  that  that  should  not  be 
wood  out  of  which  was  evolved  a  wooden  wagon. 

Moreover,  it  is  absolutely  unthinkable,  again, 
that  the  mind's  or  the  mind's  substratum's  any  off- 
spring, should  not  prove  cognizable  as  ever  mind  it- 
self was ;  or  even  indeed  might,  as  mind  might  not 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


173 


be,  much  as  water  as  a  gas  is  visually  hardly  so, 
though  as  a  solid  altogether  so. 

Moreover,  still  again,  as  may  be  noted  in  pass- 
ing, visual  light  being  something  altogether  mental, 
yet  that  nothing  of  conscious  mind,  or  its  offspring 
so  far  as  what  is  seen  is  concerned,  that  seen  being 
entirely  extraneous  to  such,  is  nothing,  positively  at 
least,  properly  subjective  as  is  the  stock  academic 
claim  for  it.  It  is,  at  most,  but  something  negatively 
such. 

It  is  nothing  positively  subjective,  which  is  to 
say,  it  is  nothing  the  work  and  outcome  of  the  mind 
as  positively  active  constructively,  any  more  than 
in  the  ring  formed  as  a  cube  of  anything,  say  of 
wood,  is  tied  to  a  string,  and  whirled  swiftly  round 
and  round  is  the  ring  anything  such  outcome;  any 
more  than  seeing  what  one  sees  from  seeing  less  of 
a  thing,  one  so  sees  —  that  is,  any  more  than  when 
what  at  a  distance  I  may  see  as  a  horse  from  my 
failure  to  see  the  horns  of  what  is  really  a  cow,  my 
failure  to  see  the  cow  as  a  cow,  is  due  to  my  seeing 
positively  constructively  rather  than  to  my  failure 
to  see  altogether,  failure  to  see  the  cow's  horns. 
Any  talk,  then,  about  visual  light  being  altogether 
something  properly  subjective  is  to  talk  beside  the 
mark. 

Indeed,  the  relation  of  my  mind  to  visual  light, 
and  to  all  effects  or  impressions  of  the  outlying 
world  absolute  on  the  mind  as  it  would  be  said  to  be, 
but  really,  as  it  is,  on  the  substratum  (the  brain)  to 
mind,  is  much  that  of  a  distant  telegraph  operator 
to  his  own  telegraphic  instrument,  and  to  my  any 


1 74  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

effects  wrought  on  it  through  the  agency  of  the  elec- 
trical current  worked  from  my  end  of  the  hne. 
Thus,  I  operate  at  my  end,  but  the  electricity  acts, 
not  on  the  distant  telegraph  operator,  but  on  his  in- 
strument, the  click  of  which,  and  the  message  being 
conveyed,  he  simply  takes  cognizance  of  —  a  sort 
of  wireless  cognizance  of  —  but  is  himself  no  party 
to     The  only  important  difference  in  the  situation 
in  the  two  instances  is  that,  in  that  of  mind  and 
visual  light,  the  substratum  to  mind  which  is  brain, 
(and  nervous  tissue)  answering  to  the  telegraph  in- 
strument of  the  distant  telegraph  operator,  is  a  part 
of  the  man  himself;  the  man,  as  telegraph  operator 
himself,  as  a  man  being  understood  to  be  constituted 
not  simply  of  his  mental  as  conscious  mind,  but  of 
that  together  with  his   mental  short  of  conscious 
mind,  namely,  his  brain  and  etc.    The  man,  who  is 
both,  simply  cognizes  with  his  mental  as  conscious 
mind  what  happens  within  the  field  of  the  mental 
itself  short  of  conscious  mind.    And  still,  action  on 
the  one,  the  mental  short  of  mind,  is  no  more  action 
on  the  other,  the  mental  that  is  mind,  than  is  my  in- 
duced electrical  action  on  the  distant  telegrapher  s 
telegraph  instrument,  electrical  action  on  the  teleg- 

rapher  himself. 

And  as  for  external  objects  seen  —  themselves 
seen  as  would  appear  — m  visual  light,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  they  themselves  are  never  seen,  at 
least  never  perceived.  Only  their  forms  are  seen, 
seen  in  the  light  as  in  a  mirror,  the  light  itself  the 
mirror.  Only  the  forms,  which,  themselves  as  seen 
are  only  tracings  in  light  and  shade  of  those  forms, 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


175 


could  not  themselves  be  understood  as  working  any 
effects  or  impressions  on  the  mind  if  light  itself 
wrought  none;  and  we  have  just  determined  that 
the  light  itself  wrought  none;  and  so  therefore 
neither  forms  nor  objects  work  any. 

Altogether  then,  from  the  very  nature  of  mind, 
as  we  must  understand  it,  we  can  no  more  regard 
the  mind  as  susceptible  to  effects  or  impressions 
wrought  on  it  by  the  action  of  the  external  world 
absolute  impinging  on  it,  or  coming  before  it,  than 
we  can  a  glass  mirror  in  respect  of  whatsoever 
comes  before  that  and  is  reflected  in  it. 

But  now,  while  there  is  all  this  to  be  said  as  dis- 
crediting the  notion  of  the  mind's  susceptibility  to 
effects  and  impressions  on  it  of  the  outlying  world, 
and  of  any  such  being  wrought  on  it,  there  is  noth- 
ing of  any  validity  to  be  said  to  discredit  that  dis- 
crediting. That  there  may  be  an  aftermath  of  per- 
ception of  object  once  held  steadily  before  the  eyes 
and  then  suddenly  withdrawn,  is  not,  as  hereafter 
to  be  considered,  of  the  slightest  force  as  arguing 
any  such  effect. 

On  the  other  hand,  what  has  not  already  been 
urged  as  most  positively  calculated  to  undermine 
any  such  notion  is  this :  —  The  very  fact  that  I  can- 
not be  directly  conscious  of  your  mind,  nor  of  your 
thought,  and  still,  in  external  perception,  am  directly 
conscious  of  something  is,  prima  facie,  proof  that  I 
am  directly  conscious  of  somewhat  more  and  other 
than  mind  or  thought  (thought  at  least  as  being 
thought)  except,  of  course,  as  that  something  were 
of  my  own  mind  or  thought.    For,  if  that  something 


in 


176 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


were  anything  of  mind  or  thought,  thought  as  being 
thought,  except  it  were  my  own  mind  or  thought, 
I  should  be  as  blind  to  it  as  I  am  to  your  mmd  or 
thought.    However,  as  it  were  of  my  own,  it  must 
be  and  would  be,  within  my  own  mind,  and  as  per- 
ceived  perceived,  unless  my  consciousness  stupend- 
ously falsified,  where  it  is,  namely,  within  my  own 
mind,  but  which  as  not  perceived  within  it,  but  as 
outside  it,  utterly  discredits  the  notion  of  the  sus- 
ceptibility of  the  mind  to  effects  or  impressions  of 
an  outlying  world  absolute  on  it.     That  the  con- 
sciousness is  so  gay  a  Munchausen  in  the  matter  as 
to  completely  reverse  the  truth  thereof  is  not  for  a 
moment,  in  reason,  to  be  entertained.    All  presump- 
tion is  against  it.     Neither  the  plain-man,  nor  the 
man  of  science  acts  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  any 
such.     If  they  did  they  would  hardly  know  where 
they  were  with  any  waking  moment.    It  is  reserved 
for  the  academic  metaphysical  prestidigitator  to  set 
up  that  it  is  thus  susceptible;  yet  not  even  he  pro- 
ceeding in  his  daily  rounds  as  had  he  any  faith  in 
his  own  sceptical  and  fantastic  speculations  in  the 
matter     For  as  he  had,  he  would  be  moving  about 
momentarily  in  a  shiver  of  dread  lest  his  next  step 
land  him  in  abysmal  nothingness. 

Moreover,  such  as  he  forgets,  that  any  explana- 
tion as  I  have  before  noted,  no  matter  what,  or  how 
true,  of  an  apparent  inveracity  of  consciousness 
does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  consciousness  is  still 
every  whit  the  falsifier  — if  it  really  be  such  — as 
were  no  explanation  afforded,  or  to  be  afforded. 
However,  as  we  recognize  the  validity  of  the 


Kant's  Phenomena  a  Fiction 


177 


primary  deliverances  of  consciousness,  the  forego- 
ing consideration,  of  itself  and  alone  even,  should 
be  convincing  that  there  are  no  effects  or  impres- 
sions wrought  on  the  mind  by  the  external  world 
absolute.  And  yet  there  are  such  wrought,  as  would 
appear,  on  something  by  that  world,  and  made  on 
ivhatf  Why,  as  I  long  ago  said,  on  the  body  and 
brain,  to  be  sure,  what  are  the  substratum  to  mind 
and  outside  it,  as  who  will  say  that  these  themselves 
are  the  mind  itself?  But  they  yet  are  the  substratum 
to  it;  and  on  this  the  effects  or  impressions  being 
wrought  by  the  external  world  absolute,  the  mind 
itself,  being  as  it  were  but  in  wireless  communica- 
tion therewith,  only  functions  to  take  cognizance  of 
them. 

This  is  all  to  say,  in  a  word,  that  the  mind  in- 
volved in  external  perception,  is  wholly  cognitive 
and  not  constructive  at  all ;  not  constructive  as  being 
positively  so  as  generally  assumed ;  and  that  any  ef- 
fects or  impressions  as  wrought  on  it  itself  are  only 
action;  and  as  only  fiction,  the  underprop  to  Kant's 
phenomena  is  knocked  utterly  from  under  them,  and 
his  whole  metaphysic  a  hurst  bubble. 


iiM 


i\\ 


If  space  and  time  are  a  priori  intuitions  or  forms 
of  perception  —  whatever  may  be  the  difference  — 
then  these  are  themselves  their  own  object,  or  they 
are  without  object.  If  Kant  assumed  them  without, 
then  how  ridiculous  he  makes  himself  appear  in  look- 
ing for  and  being  disappointed  in  not  finding  in  the 
sensations  what  he  assumed  had  no  existence!  On 
the  other  hand,  if  he  assumed  them  to  be  with  object, 
then  the  latter  is  in  the  sensations,  and  it  was  only  his 
own  fault  and  want  of  sense  and  sight  that  he  could 
not  find  them  there. 


We  know  with  most  absolute  certainty,  that  mind 
obtains-  but  the  mind  we  know  with  most  absolute 
certainty  obtains  is  human  mind  —  the  only  mind  we 
know  anything  about.     And  human  mind  was  never 
known  to  be  the  conscious  author  of  anything  but  the 
mechanical  physical,  such  as  a  lo^P^^otive  or  a  sewing 
machine;    never   once   of   the   Itvtng  physical.     Most 
gratuitous   then,   most   utterly  without,  warrant    the 
assumption  that  the  any  conscious  mind  which  we 
know  nothing  about  is  the  author  of  such  Itvin^  physical. 
Uo7t  gratuitous,  for  there  is  absolutely,  no  logical  con- 
nection whatever  between  the  consciousness  or  con- 
scious mind  which  we  know  something  about  itself  ut- 
terly impotent  consciously  to  produce  the  first  thing 
of  physical  life,   and  the   any  consciousness   or  con- 
scious mind  which  we  know  nothing  about  itself  c^w- 
petent  consciously  to  produce  thmgs  of  physical  life  - 
no  logical  connection  whatever. 


XII 

Demonstration  That  What  ONLY  in  External  Per- 
ception We  Perceive  is  the  External  World  Ab- 
solute Save  Only  the  Illusion  Springing 
Primarily  of  Not  Perceiving  It  Ex- 
haustively Mechanically. 

But  now,  if  in  external  perception,  there  is  no 
perception  of  effects  or  impression  wrought  directly 
by  the  external  world  absolute  on  the  mind,  nor  even 
any  thus  wrought  there  to  perceive,  then  not  only  do 
we  perceive  the  external  world  absolute,  something 
of  it,  very  it  itself,  but  what  only  we  perceive  is  that 
world,  save  only  what,  as  illusion,  we  perceive,  as 
springs,  primarily,  of  our  failing  to  perceive  it  ex- 
haustively mechanically.  Which  is  to  say  that,  only 
as  it  is  mechanical  do  we  perceive  it  with  illusion, 
and  so  perceive  it  only  as  we  fail  to  perceive  it  me- 
chanically exhaustively;  and  to  say,  again,  that  in 
external  perception,  there  is  nothing,  by  the  mind, 
of  constructive  perception  as  positively  constructive, 
and  is  only  that  at  the  most  as  negatively  so,  as  such 
might  be  said  to  be  constructive  at  all,  and  where- 
fore we  perceive  the  external  world  such  as  we  do, 
—  what  is  quite  the  contrary  of  what  Kant  would 
have  it ;  as  quite  so,  too,  of  what  the  whole  academic 
world  is  of  the  settled  conviction  is  the  case. 

And  to  exploit  this  proposition  in  a  demonstra- 


i 


182  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

tion  if  we  may,  let  us  take  a  cube  of  anything,  say 
one  of  wood,  and,  tying  a  string  to  it,  whirl  it  swiftly 
round  and  round  —  it  will  look  to  be  a  ring.    What 
was  all  right-lines  and  corners  and  no  curves  is  now 
all  curves  and  no  right-lines  or  corners  —  a  trans- 
formation complete.     And  yet,  all  that  is  seen,  in 
seeing  the  ring,  is  what  would  be  seen  —  except  of 
course  the  motion  —  as  might  the  cube  be  at  rest, 
or  comparatively  at  rest.     Simply  the  motion,  for 
its  swiftness,  has  cut  off  perception  of  the  right-lines 
and  corners,  and  of  the  motion  as  motion;  but  there 
is  no  evidence  of  more  being  done.    That  the  resi- 
due of  the  cube  perceived,  as  the  ring  is  perceived, 
is  not  still  intact  but  affected  by  the  motion,  there  is 
neither  the  evidence  of  fact  nor  the  warrant  of  reason 
to  show.    There  are  only  such  as  to  assure  us  that 
it  is  not  affected.     And  with  no  evidence  of  more 
seen,  or  to  be  seen,  than  the  original  cube,  plus  mo- 
tion of  course,  and  only  evidence  of  still  the  cube, 
only  less  of  it,  seen  or  to  be  seen  than  in  the  absence 
of  motion,  then  why,  with  any  reason  assume  that, 
in  perceiving  the  ring,  there  is  more  or  other  and 
different  perceived  or  to  perceive?    Why  when  what 
you  see  is  exactly  what  you  do  as  you  simply  see 
less?    Why,  when  the  illusion  of  seeing  what  would 
seem  to  be  more  is  easily  accounted  for  in  simply 
seeing  that  less'^    What  is  it  but  the  rankest,  most 
unreasoning  and  dogmatic  assumption  as  is  assumed 
there  is  more  or  other  and  different?  The  truth  is, 
that  you  simply  see  less  without  knowing  that  it  is 
simply  less  than  you  see. 

But  now  then,  if  in  perceiving  the  illusion  of  the 


Only  External  World  Absolute  Perceived   183 

ring,  we  still  perceive  only  the  cube,  only  less  of  it, 
it  is  to  say  that  we  still  perceive  the  cube,  only  per- 
ceive it  less  exhaustively.  And  as  what  we  perceive 
less  are  features  mechanical,  then  by  less  exhaus- 
tively is  meant  less  exhaustively  mechanically.  But 
even  as  the  less  perceived  is,  as  simply  less,  itself 
something  mechanical,  then  by  less  exhaustively,  is 
doubly  meant  less  exhaustively  mechanically.  So 
that  it  comes  to  this  that,  in  the  illusion  of  the  ring, 
what  still  only,  we  see,  only  less  of  it,  and  see  that 
less  from  seeing  the  cube  less  exhaustively,  and  less 
exhaustively  as  less  exhaustively  mechanically,  is  the 
cube,  something  of  it,  plus,  of  course  the  motion. 
In  the  ring  we  don't  see  the  cube  as  a  cube  but  we 
see  it,  something  of  it;  and  we  don't  the  motion  as 
motion,  but  we  still  see  the  motion,  or  we  shouldn't 
see  the  ring.  But  we  fail,  as  I  have  said,  to  see  in 
the  ring  the  cube  as  such,  the  cube  such  as  it  is  in 
itself  so  far  as  it  is  a  mechanical  thing,  because  we 
fail  to  see  it  exhaustively  as  failing  to  see  it  mechani- 
cally exhaustively. 

What,  now,  I  have  said  of  the  cube  of  wood  and 
the  illusion  of  the  ring,  applies  to  the  external  world 
of  our  perception  in  general ;  that  world  is  an  illusion 
only  as  it  is  mechanically  such;  and  what  only  we 
ever  perceive  is  the  Absolute  Reality,  save  only  what 
besides  as  illusion  we  perceive  from  not  perceiving 
that  Reality,  as  it  is  mechanical,  with  mechanical  ex- 
haustion, as  was  the  case  with  the  ring  and  cube. 
As  there  is  involved  no  motion  —  none  that  we 
know  —  that  world  so  far  at  least  as  the  primal 
principles  of  the  mechanical  are  concerned,  is  per- 


1 84  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

ceived  for  such  as  it  is  in  itself,  save  only  as  we  fail 
to  perceive  it  exhaustively  mechanically.    Extension, 
figure,  and  resistance,  and  even  motion  itself,  relat- 
ing, as  they  do,  only  to  mass  or  masses,  involve  no 
motion  — none  so  far  as  we  know;  the  resistance 
may,  as  known  to  science,  obtain  in  the  absence  of 
all  sensible  matter,  yet  not,  so  far  as  is  known,  as 
due  to  motion.    They,  therefore,  one  and  all,  as  per- 
ceived for  what  they  are,  are  perceived  for  what  ex- 
haustively they  are ;  and  so,  perceived  for  what  they 
are  in  themselves  —  extension  for  such  as  it  is  in 
itself,  namely,  extension,  and  so  with  figure,  resist- 
ance and  even  motion ;  which  is  to  say  they  are  re- 
spectively no  disguise  of  something  else,  but  are  the 
veritable  realities  absolute  of  the  veritable  external 
world  absolute  they  would  appear  to  be. 

Even  should  the  accidents  of  these  such  as  the 
extent  of  the  extension,  or  the  form  of  the  figure  not 
be  true  to  the  outlying  reality,  still  extension  and 
figure,  as  such  would  yet  themselves  be  true;  and 
what  would  appear,  would  still  be  what  these  are  in 
themselves  just  the  same.    They  still  would  afford 
no  illusion.     It  would  be  only  their  accidents  that 
would,  and  even  these  doing  so  only  as  not  exhaus- 
tively perceived  mechanically.     Thus  a  hoop  held 
edgewise  before  the  eyes  looks  to  be  a  right-line  or 
a  straight  stick;  held  semi-edgewise  it  looks  to  be 
elliptical  in  form ;  held  at  right-angles  to  the  line  of 
vision  it  looks  to  be  circular  which  it  is  in  fact.    But 
only  could  it  when  held  edgewise  or  semi-edgewise 
be  seen  exhaustively  mechanically,  which  it  could  be, 
could  only  it  be  seen  simultaneously  as  from  every 


Only  External  World  Absolute  Perceived    185 

point  within  the  concavity  of  a  sphere,  it  would  be 
seen  to  be  circular  in  form  which  it  is,  and  seen  only 
of  that  form. 

Or,  then  again,  even  as  motion  is  involved,  we 
fail  to  perceive  the  external  world  absolute,  so  far 
as  it  is  mechanical,  for  such  as  it  is  in  itself,  save 
only  as  we  perceive  motion  itself,  and  perceive  it  as 
motion  which  when  motion  of  something  of  that 
world,  is  itself,  (the  motion)  something  of  that 
world,  and  which  itself,  what  it  appears,  being  such 
as  it  is  in  itself,  is  itself,  at  least,  something  of  that 
world  as  the  latter  is  mechanical,  still  perceived  for 
such  as  it  is  in  itself,  spite  of  motion,  even  motion 
itself  perceived  as  motion  spite  of  itself. 

But,  otherwise,  as  we  do  not  perceive  the  motion, 
and  for  such  as  it  is  per  se,  we  fail  to  perceive  that 
world  so  far  as  it  is  mechanical,  for  such  as  it  is  in 
itself;  and  fail  because,  as  before,  not  perceiving  it 
exhaustively  mechanically;  because,  in  other  words, 
there  is  ever  something  mechanical  beyond  the  reach 
of  perception.  Such  as  light,  for  example,  involves 
motion,  the  motion  involved  in  ether  vibrations  and 
in  agitations,  vibratory  or  other,  of  brain.  And  it 
is  an  illusion  because,  as  perceived,  it  is  not  perceived 
to  mechanical  exhaustion.  Indeed,  paradoxical  as  it 
may  seem,  light  perceived  to  that  extent  could  not 
be  perceived  at  all,  for  it  (subjective  light)  would 
not  then  exist  at  all. 

To  urge  this  matter  of  illusion  still  further. 

Suppose  you  are  observing  the  white  light  of  the 
sun,  when  suddenly  are  withdrawn  the  ether  vibra- 
tions represented  in  red  and  blue,  and  that  in  conse- 


1 86  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

quence  you  see  the  color  green  only.  Is  the 
perception  of  that  color,  green,  instead  of  white  light 
due  to  the  mind's  positively  constructive  action?  Is 
to  see  one  thing  as  simply  another  is  withdrawn 
from  before  it  seeing  with  a  positively  constructive 
sight  that  another?  ,    . 

But  you  say  that,  even  as  it  were  not,  still  it  is, 
at  least,  as  green  is  seen  rather  than  the  ether  vibra- 
tions represented  in  it.    But  no  it  isn't ;  and  is  not 
for  the  one  reason  among  others  because  that  the 
ether  vibrations  are  understood  to  be  something 
physical ;  and  it  is  an  article  of  the  academic  creed 
at  least  that  mind  can  have  cognition  only  of  the 
mental;  and  are  ether  vibrations  anything  of  the 
mental,  anything  of  mind  or  consciousness  what  is 
the  academic  imderstanding  as  the  mental?    If  not, 
how  can  the  mind  act  positively  constructively  with 
respect  to  what  it  has  no  cognition  of  ?    How  could 
you  build  a  house  of  wood  when  you  had  no  percep- 
tion of  the  wood  ?    No  more  could  the  mind  evoke 
light  or  color  out  of  ether  vibration  of  which  it  had 
no  cognition.     It  must  have  cognition  out  of  con- 
sciousness at  least,  if  not  tw,  as  oxygen  is  supposed 
to  have,  in  a  way,  of  hydrogen  in  the  formation  of 
water.    But  whether  in,  or  out,  it  is  cognition  still ; 
and  the  academic  creed  runs,  no  cc^ition. 

Of  course,  the  contents  of  consciousness  it  is 
conceivable,  might  be  made  passively  to  assume  the 
form  ether  vibrations  might  impose  on  them.  But 
would  you  say  the  hole,  made  in  mud  by  a  bullet 
dropped  into  it,  was  made  by  the  mud  acting  con- 
structively? 


n 


Only  External  World  Absolute  Perceived    187 

Besides,  there  is  not  a  scintilla  of  logical  connec- 
tion between  your  perception  of  green  and  the  any 
positively  constructive  exercise  of  the  mind,  where- 
fore you  perceive  that  color.  Nothing  of  the  sort 
do  we  know  anything  about.  We  don't  know  that 
ether  vibrations  act  on  the  mind,  or  come  near  the 
mind;  nor  do  we  know,  in  the  event  such  happens, 
that,  in  external  perception,  the  mind  reacts  positively 
and  constructively.  But  what  we  do  know  is  that 
those  vibrations  act  on  eye  and  brain.  But  is  the  brain 
the  mind?  You,  the  reader,  doubtless  would  be  the 
last  to  concede  as  much.  But  the  brain,  something  of 
it,  may  still  be  mental,  the  primordial  mental,  yet  that 
nothing  of  mind  of  consciousness  as  I  have  dis- 
cust  in  a  previous  chapter,  and  that  be  acted  on  of 
ether  vibrations. 

Well,  then,  with  the  ether  vibrations  acting  on 
the  brain,  not  on  the  mind,  and  with  the  brain,  some- 
thing of  it,  understood  as  mental,  the  whole  situa- 
tion becomes  luminously  clarified  and  explicable. 
The  physical  as  brain  is  then  understood  as  the  pri- 
mordial mental  in  disguise;  and  which,  the  brain, 
cognizable,  as  we  know  it  to  be,  is  to  the  effect  of  the 
primordial  mental  itself  cognisable,  even  though  the 
mental  as  mind  or  consciousness  (other  than  each 
man  his  own),  is  not,  as  we  know  it  is  not;  is  the 
primordial  mental  cognizable  even  though  the  mental 
as  mind  or  consciousness  is  not ;  the  same  as  water  as 
ice  is  visible,  yet  that  as  a  gas,  invisible.  But  as 
cognizable,  it  is  what  as  outside  the  mind,  is  so,  as 
the  brain,  as  cognizable,  is  outside.  Moreover,  this 
primordial  mental  as  provoked,  as  the  brain  is,  of 


1 88  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

the  impact  on  it  of  ether  vibrations,  yields,  for  prod- 
uct or  resultant,  light  itself  something  of  the  mental 
of  course,  as  is  the  brain  its  source  somethmg  of  it, 
and  something  outside  the  mind  as  is  the  bram,  as 
also,  as  perceived,  perceived  as  outside. 

All  this  being  so,  let  us  observe  in  passmg,  that 
light,  as  mental,  yet  that  nothing  of  mind  or  con- 
sciousness,  nor  yet  anything  of  ether  vibrations, 
proves  to  be  itself  in  the  border  country  between 
mind  and  matter  and  must,  itself  and  sight  together, 
hold  in  their  embrace,  did  man  but  know  it,  the  solu- 
tion of  the  long  vexed  problem  of  the  relation  of  the 
former  to  the  latter.    They  are  the  bridge  to  take 
us  over  from  the  unequivocally  mental  to  the  am- 
biguously physical,  —  as  would  be  discovered,  would 
but  some  master  mind  in  philosophy  exploit  them  to 
exhaustion.     Most  certainly  a  wealth  of  revelation 
in  this  direction  is  in  store,  at  the  present  moment 
little  dreamed  of.    And  here  is  to  note  again,  what 
has    been    incidentally    noted    before,    that    visual 
light  as  thus  an  event  purely  of  the  brain,  eye,  and 
ether  vibrations,  and  one  as  outside  the  mind  as  the 
brain  is,  and  though  mental,  yet  nothing  of  mind  or 
consciousness,  is  nothing  subjective  as  is  the  academ- 
ic claim  that  it  is;  and  it  is  but  fooling  with  words 
and  worse  than  foolishness  as  is  assumed  as  much. 
If  it  were  really  something  subjective,  it  would 
obtain  within  the  mind,  and  as  entertained  in  con- 
sciousness, entertained  as  within  it.     But  it  is  not 
so  entertained,  but  is  perceived  as  out  of  it ;  and  no 
human  mind  is  superhuman  enough  to  realize  any 
logical  connection  between  a  thing  within  the  mind 


1 1 


\ 


1^ 


'V* 


Only  External  World  Absolute  Perceived    189 

and  its  being  perceived  as  out  of  it.  It  is  simply 
a  rank  assumption  as  is  alleged  there  is  any.  I  re- 
peat that  any  such  is  absolutely  not  thinkable,  think- 
able as  realizable. 

And  yet  that  light  is  nothing  subjective,  nothing 
of  the  mind,  or  of  the  mind's  constructive  action  as 
positively  constructive,  it,  still  as  of  the  brain,  is 
something  mental  and  to  be  cognized  by  the  mind 
as  still  may  be  reflected  objects  in  a  mirror,  yet  that 
the  mirror  had  nothing  to  do  with  their  origin  or 
nature. 

And  this  is  exactly  the  situation.  The  mind 
Sstill  has  cognition  of  light  yet,  that  it  is  nothing 
within  the  mind,  nor  of  origin  or  nature  with  which 
the  mind  had  anything  to  do ;  and  has  cognition  of 
because  something  mental,  mental  yet  that  nothing 
of  mind  or  consciousness.  And  it  is  light  an  illusion 
that  the  mind  has  cognition  of,  and  an  illusion  be- 
cause what  is  the  mechanical  involved  is  not  per- 
ceived exhaustively. 

And  what  I  have  said  of  light  is  true,  of  course, 
of  the  color  green  which,  in  a  way,  is  a  form  of 
light.  Green  is  no  more  due  to  the  any  constructive 
action  of  the  mind  than  is  white  light,  and  for  the 
same  reasons ;  as,  for  the  same  also  is  it  cognizable 
and  an  illusion.  In  one  case  as  in  the  other,  it  is 
from  failing  to  perceive  rather  than  from  positively 
constructively  perceiving  that  there  is  illusion.  It  is 
from  failure  of  action  on  the  brain  of  the  ether  vibra- 
tions involved  in  red  and  blue  that  green  is  seen  in- 
stead  of  white  light ;  and  again  it  is  only  from  fail- 
ure of  perception  of  the  ether  vibrations  involved  in 


190 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  color  green  that  ever  green  itself  is  seen.  And, 
finally,  it  is  only  as  there  is  such  failure  all  along 
the  line  to  perceive  the  mechanical  exhaustively,  and 
motion  as  motion,  that  not  what  only  in  external 
perception  is  ever  perceived  is  the  external  world 
absolute. 

So  now,  it  only  remains  to  repeat,  what  was  said 
at  the  beginning,  that  what  only  in  external  percep- 
tion we  perceive  is  the  external  world  absolute, 
something  of  it,  save  only  as  the  any  illusion  besides, 
we  may  perceive  from  not  perceiving  that  world 
exhaustively  as  it  is  mechanical,  —  all  of  which  is 
luminously  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  cube  and 
the  ring. 


In  external  perception,  everything  we  perceive  we 
perceive  without  illusion,  everything  except  what  are 
but  accidents  of  what  we  must  perceive  to  perceive 
anything  at  all,  must  to  perceive  at  all.  Thus  ex- 
tension, figure  and  so  on  are  perceived  for  such  as 
they  are  in  themselves  and  as  positive  attributes  of 
the  outlying  world  absolute  —  which  they  are;  but  the 
accidents  of  these,  nuch  as  the  extent  of  the  extension 
or  the  figure  of  the  figure,  these,  together  with  motion, 
are  often  not  perceived  for  such  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, and  are  the  spring  of  all  external  illusion. 


We  know  the  external  world  absolute  immediately 
for  such  as  it  is  in  itself  so  far  as  it  is  extrinsically 
mechanical  —  save  only  the  accidents  of  that  mechanical, 
and  even  these  we  may  know,  at  least  mediately  and 
ultimately;  so  that  there  needs  be,  at  last,  no  delusion, 
even  if  always  and  ever  illusion.  So  that,  in  any 
large  perspective,  the  consciousness  may  be  said  to 
deliver  truly  even  if  but  truly  at  last. 


That  because  something  absolute  is  not  perceived 
for  what  it  is  per  se,  therefore  is  it  not  perceived 
at  all!  that  because  I  cannot  determine  whether  the 
object  of  my  vision  be  horse  or  cow,  therefore  I  do 
not  perceive  the  object  at  all!  — this  is  Kantian  logic 
and  doctrine  — and  could  anything  be  more  utterly 
senseless? 


XIII 

Persistence  of  Perception  by  the  Mind  vs.  Persist- 
ence of  Impression  on  It 

But  now,  to  come  back  to  the  primary  demon- 
stration, and  aside  from  all  corollary  demonstrations 
under  it  which  we  have  indicated,  the  primary  one, 
namely,  that  every  instant  that  we  perceive  the  cube, 
or  whatever  else  of  the  world  of  our  external  per- 
ception, we  have  perception  of  such,  primarily  at 
least,  only  as  we  have  perception  of  the  external 
world  absolute,  something  of  it,  very  it  itself  —  to 
come  back  to  that,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  it  will, 
of  course,  be  said  in  criticism  and  objection  that  it 
is  the  scientific  fact  and  explanation  that  only  as 
what  we  recognize  as  the  cube  of  our  recent  illus- 
tration is  but  an  impression  made  on  the  mind  by 
the  outlying  world  absolute,  and  that  impression 
understood  to  persist  and  to  be  perceived  in  the  in- 
terims between  the  cube  being  once  at  any  point  in 
its  circuit,  and  its  being  at  the  same  point  again, 
could  there  possibly  be  either  the  illusion  of  the  ring 
or  any  explanation  of  it. 

But  wait.  May  not  this  scientific  fact,  as  it  is 
said  to  be,  and  explanation  of  it,  be  grave  scientific 
error  ?    To  begin  with,  that  there  is  ever  an  impres- 


194  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

sion  directly  made  on  the  mind  by  the  outlying 
world  absolute,  more  than  on  a  mirror  by  the  objects 
it  reflects  —  and  here  by  external  world  absolute  I 
am  meaning  world  external  to  man,  to  man  as  body 
and  brain  as  well  as  mind  —  is  pure  brazen  assump- 
tion as  in  preceeding  chapters  I  have  sought  to  make 
evident ;  it  is  nothing  better.    It  has  not  one  fact  nor 
one  warrant  in  reason,  in  its  support  — not  one. 
Or  then  again,  as  there  might  be  that  impression, 
but  made  indirectly  as  made  first  on  the  substratum 
to  mind,  the  substratum  to  mind  of  body  and  brain 
—  where  and  only  where,  is  ever  impression  directly 
made  by  the  external  world  absolute  —  and  then  on 
the  mind,  that  it  is  even  thus  at  last  an  impression 
made  on  the  mind  by  the  external  world  absolute,  is 
but  stark  naked  assumption,  still.       Or  then,  yet 
again,  and  anyway,  as  there  might  be  that  impres- 
sion made  either  directly  or  indirectly  on  the  mind 
by  the  external  world  absolute,  that  it  is  that  impres- 
sion   that    obtains    first,    and      only    afterwards 
perception,  and  the  perception  only  perception  of 
that  impression,  instead  of  the  reverse  and  that  it  is 
perception  that  first  obtains,  and  the  any  impression 
itself  that  is  aftermath,  is,  too,  a  claim  without  a 
shadow  of  warrant. 

And  then,  that  is  necessary  to  the  momentary 
persistence  of  perception  of  an  object  as  the  latter 
is  suddenly  withdrawn;  that  is  necessary,  for  ex- 
ample, to  the  ring  of  our  recent  illustration,  and  to 
the  explanation  of  it,  momentary  persistence  of  an 
impression  rather  than  of  perception,  persistence  of 
perception  of  its  own  inertia  as  it  were,  independent 


Persistence  of  Perception 


195 


of  any  antecedent  impression  in  the  matter,  is  quite 
stark  naked  assumption,  indeed,  at  its  climax. 
These  all  are  but  postulates  meant  to  be  taken  as 
truths,  of  course,  yet  that  they  are  groundless,  every 
one  of  them. 

Now,  to  the  contrary  of  them  all,  what,  and  what 
alone,  as  I  have  hinted,  is  necessary  to  the  momen- 
tary and  waning-to-extinction  persistence  of  percep- 
tion of  an  object  as  that  is  suddenly  withdrawn,  is 
the  momentary  persistence  of  perception  itself  in- 
dependent of  any  antecedent  impression ;  momentary 
perception  persisting  of  its  own  inertia  as  it  were; 
and  this  you  have  anyway,  whether  persistence  of 
impression,  or  not.  That,  even  as  there  might  be, 
and  must  be,  and  is,  of  very  truth,  persistence  of  im- 
pression on  mind  or  brain,  it  yet  is  not,  in  any  case, 
to  it  that  is  due  momentary  persistence  of  percep- 
tion of  an  object,  as  suddenly  the  latter  is  with- 
drawn. This  much  is  evidenced  and  proven,  prima 
facie,  in  this :  —  If  it  was  an  impression  of  an  ob- 
ject, say  of  a  horse,  once  seen  that  momentarily 
persisted,  yet  quickly  fading  completely  out,  like  a 
snuffed  candle,  as  suddenly  he  was  withdrawn  from 
view,  then  there  would  be  no  memory  of  the  object, 
no  memory  of  the  horse,  for  memory  of  the  horse 
is  impression  of  him,  either  on  mind  or  brain,  re- 
tained; and  impression  not  persisting,  then  no 
memory;  and  no  memory,  then  no  reminiscence,  for 
there  can  be  no  recall  where  there  is  nothing  to  re- 
call ;  and  there  can  be  again  entertained  in  conscious- 
ness the  object  and  horse,  only  as  again  the  actual 
object  and  horse  is  brought  objectively  before  the 


196 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


mind.  However,  we  know  from  experience  that 
having  once  seen  an  object,  a  horse  for  example,  that 
we  do  have  a  memory  of  it,  and  can  recall  it  — 
which  only  proves  that  the  impression  was  retained; 
and  that  it  was  not  it  that,  though  momentarily  per- 
sisting, quickly  faded  away,  but  that,  as  the  only 
alternative,  it  was  the  perception,  and  the  perception 
only,  that  momentarily  persisted  and  then  quickly 
passed  into  nothingness. 

Then,  besides,  as  I  have  said,  momentary  persis- 
tence of  perception  of  object  or  impression  you  have, 
anyway,  whether  of  impression,  or  not.     For  per- 
ception   is    mental   activity;    and,    like    any    other 
activity,  takes  time,  once  excited,  to  subside.    There 
is  no  mere  dogmatic  assumption  about  this  as  there 
is  about  the  mind  being  acted  on  and  impressed  by 
the  external  world  absolute;  nor  as  there  is,  again, 
about    the    persistence    of    such    impression   being 
necessary  either  to  existence  of  an  aftermath  of 
momentary  persistence  of  perception  of  the  object, 
or  to  the  explanation  of  it,  in  respect  of  both  of 
which,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  there  is  only  the  rankest 
assumption.  There  is  none  as  to  its  being  persistence 
of  perception,  for,  as  everyone  knows,  there  is  no 
activity  under  the  sun,  of  which  we  have  knowledge, 
but  which,  as  I  have  said,  takes  time  to  subside.    A 
pendulum,  disturbed  from  the  vertical,  takes  time 
to  recover  that  vertical.     The  glassy  surface  of  a 
body  of  water,  ruffled  by  a  pebble  thrown  on  it,  takes 
time  to  resume  its  original  condition.    A  ball,  shot 
from  a  rifle,  comes  to  a  standstill,  again,  only  with 
the  lapse  of  time. 


Persistence  of  Perception 


197 


And  so  mental  activity,  once  set  up  by  the  per- 
ception of  the  outlying  world  absolute  takes,  itself, 
too,  time  to  come  to  a  rest.  If  it  did  not,  it  would 
be  an  exception,  and  the  only  one  in  all  Nature. 
And  indeed,  not  unlikely,  as  the  ball,  shot  from  the 
gun,  would  go  on  forever  but  for  the  resistance  of 
the  air,  so  that  particular  mental  activity  once  set 
up  in  the  perception  of  an  object  might  go  on  for- 
ever, might  the  mind  endure  forever,  but  for  the 
resistance  of  other  objects  pressing  for  recognition. 

When,  then,  we  consider  that  there  is  not  one 
single  fact  in  unequivocal  evidence,  nor  one  unques- 
tionable warrant  in  reason  to  sustain  the  doctrine  of 
direct  action  of  the  external  world  absolute  on  the 
mind,  and  of  impression  made  thereon  by  it;  con- 
sider, indeed,  that  all  fact  and  reason,  rather  are 
positively  against  such  doctrine,  and  even  to  the  ef- 
fect that  what  is  first  in  historical  order  is  p>erception 
of  that  world,  and  then  impressions  on  the  mind, 
as  there  are  any  at  all,  following  what  is  first  that 
perception;  and  consider  that  an  aftermath  of  but 
momentary  persistence  of  perception  of  object  as  the 
latter  is  suddenly  withdrawn,  cannot  possibly  be  due 
to  persistence  of  impression,  both  since  only  as  im- 
pression is  indefinitely  persistent  is  memory  and 
reminiscence  possible,  and  since,  again,  momentary 
persistence,  at  least,  of  perception,  a  mental  activity, 
must,  barring  extrinsic  interference  of  course,  be 
regarded,  like  any  other  activity,  inevitable,  or  it 
would  be  an  exception  to  all  other  activity  once  set 
up ;  —  when  we  consider  all  this,  the  utter  want  of 
force,  or  of  reason,  to  the  criticism  and  objection 


198 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


in  question,   is  only  too  apparent  that  the  latter 
should  be  for  a  moment  entertained. 

As  a  closing  remark,  perhaps  it  should  be  said 
that  nothing  of  the  foregoing  disputes  that  what  is 
perceived  makes  impression  on  the  mind,  makes 
such  by  reflexive  action  on  it ;  but  what  is  disputed 
is  that  it  is  impression  on  the  mind  by  the  external 
world  absolute  that  first  comes  before  perception  of 
it.  It  is  only  because  the  mirror  is  insensitive,  while 
the  mind  is  sensitive,  that  no  impression  is  made  on 
the  mirror  after  reflecting  or,  so  to  speak,  cognizing 
an  object,  while  on  the  mind,  after  cognizing  an  ob- 
ject is  made  an  impression. 


Don't  forget  for  a  moment,  that,  once  the  fact,  or 
the  establishment  of  the  fact,  of  space  absolute,  with 
that  instant  is  forestalled  and  blasted  all  opportunity 
for  the  disporting  of  itself,  on  the  stage  of  actual 
performance,  of  Kant's  contention  that,  there  is  a 
very  important  "class  of  ideas  or  forms  which  do  not 
come  by  experience  but  through  which  experience  is  ac- 
quired"; don't  forget  that  with  that  instant,  the  above 
contention,  if  not  shot  into  oblivion,  is  at  least  pre- 
cipitated onto  the  junk-heap  of  old  and  exploded  silly 
philosophical  ideas. 


i ! 


it 


Let  there  be  no  mistake;  and  I  remark  right  here 
and  now  that  to  insist  on  space  absolute  is  not  neces- 
sarily to  insist  on  space  absolute  as  outside  the 
mental  altogether,  but  only  as  outside  everything  a 
development  of  the  mental,  as  outside  mind,  outside 
conscious  mind,  outside  all  human  mind. 


XIV 

The  Sensibility  No  Passive  Faculty  of  the  Mind, 

and  Neither  That  nor  Memory  Any  Faculty 

of  the  Mind  At  All 

But  may  someone  ask,  —  If  there  are  no  effects 
or  impressions  wrought  on  the  mind  by  the  external 
world  absolute,  what  has  become  of  the  mind's 
faculty  of  the  "sensibility"  ?  Well,  had  it  ever  once 
existed,  it  might  be  in  order  to  inquire  what  has  be- 
come of  it;  but,  as  it  is,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that 
it  is  non  est.  When  anything  of  the  external  world 
absolute  at  any  moment  impinges  on  the  body  or 
brain,  themselves  a  part  of  that  world,  with  the 
result  of  a  response  accompanied  by  consciousness, 
the  reflective  intellect,  particularly  the  peculiar  re- 
flective intellect  of  such  men  as  Kant  and  the  aca- 
demic philosopher  in  general,  construes  it  as  the 
passive  receptivity  of  a  department  of  the  mind,  and 
dubs  the  department  "the  sensibility."  But  there  is 
no  evidence,  in  fact  or  in  reason,  in  support  of  the 
notion  of  any  such  faculty  of  conscious  mind.  That 
there  is,  was  Kant's,  as  it  is  the  academic  philosopher 
in  general's  pure  assumption  —  nothing  better. 

But  then,  even  supposing  there  were  something 
such  faculty  of  the  mind,  what  business  had  Kant 
to  afiirm  it  a  passive  one?  Assuming  any  one 
faculty  active,  the  only  consistent  further  assump- 
tion for  him  was  that  all  others  were:  and  as,  anv 


202 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


thereafter  might  be  conjectured  passive,  assume  it 
so  only  as  proven  to  be  such. 

But,  again,  even  supposing  it  receptive,  what 
grounds  had  he  for  understanding  it  to  have  only 
the  dead  receptivity  —  and,  so,  passive  receptivity  — 
of  so  much  putty,  or  of  a  mirror  of  inorganic  con- 
stitution, such  as  a  glass  mirror,  rather  than  to  have 
an  active  passivity  —  particularly  when  it  is  in  alli- 
ance at  least  with  what,  the  brain,  has  an  organic 
and  active  constitution?  What  business,  I  ask 
again  ? 

Even  if  its  receptivity  might  be  much  that  of  a 
mirror,  yet  the  very  fact  that  that  receptivity  was  in 
alliance  with  what  had  an  organic  and  living  consti- 
tution must  argue  that  it  conducted  itself  somehow 
differently  from  what,  mirror-like,  had  only  an  in- 
organic and  lifeless  constitution;  and  how,  differ- 
ently, if  not  in  affording  an  active  rather  than  a  pas- 
sive receptivity,  even  if  still  a  receptivity  much  that 
of  a  mirror  ?  So,  what  business  I  ask,  even  yet  once 
more,  had  Kant,  then,  to  affirm  the  sensibility  to  be 
a  passive  faculty  with  only  the  receptivity  of  so 
much  putty,  or  of  a  mirror  of  glass?  What 
grounds  had  he  for  so  raw  an  assumption?  Why, 
indeed,  only  such  as  furnished  him  by  his  inability 
to  find  space  and  time  in  the  sensations ;  and,  again, 
by  his  perfect  babel  of  confusion  touching  a  priori 
intuition. 

But  now,  in  the  next  place,  as  to  there  being, 
after  all,  even  any  such  faculty  of  mind,  answering 
to  the  sensibility,  —  this  is  to  be  more  than  doubted, 
as  I  have  already  hinted.     And,  in  truth,  there  is 


Sensihilty  Nor  Memory  Faculty  of  Mind   203 

not  the  least  substantial  thing  in  evidence  to  justify 
the  proposition  that  there  is.  None,  any  more  than 
there  is  of  the  susceptibility  to  effects  or  impressions 
of  a  glass  mirror  to  the  action  on  it  of  objects  com- 
ing before  it  as  they  are  reflected  by  it. 

This  is  to  say,  that  it  would  be  as  rational  to 
assume  that  objects  acted  on  the  glass  mirror  be- 
cause it  cognizes  them  as  it  were,  as  evidenced  in  its 
reflection  of  them,  as  to  say  that  the  external  world 
absolute  acted  on  the  mind  with  effects  or  impres- 
sions on  it  because  the  mind  cognizes  that  world.  The 
latter  acts  on  the  body  and  brain  with  effects  or  im- 
pressions —  of  course  it  does ;  and  there  is  the  sensi- 
bility, if  it  is  to  be  called  such.  But  the  substratum 
to  the  mind  is  not  the  mind  itself  —  is  it  ?  —  that  is 
to  say,  the  body  and  brain  are  not  —  are  they  ?  Will 
anyone  contend  that  they  are  ? 

And  again,  because  a  telegraphic  instrument  a 
thousand  miles  away  responds  with  a  click  to  the 
electricity  acting  on  it,  would  you  attribute  sensi- 
bility to  that  telegraphic  instrument?  Why  more 
to  brain  and  body  because  they  thus  respond  ?  Or, 
why  more,  at  least,  unless,  unless,  brain  is  some- 
thing mental,  and  the  primordial  mental,  mental  yet 
that  nothing  of  mind  or  consciousness,  while  the 
telegraphic  instrument  is  understood  to  be  nothing 
mental  at  all  in  any  form  ?  But,  even  then,  as  sensi- 
bility was  to  be  accredited  to  the  brain  what  is 
mental,  the  primordial  mental,  it  still  would  not  be 
faculty  of  the  mind,  since  the  simply  mental,  the  pri- 
mordial mental,  is  nothing  of  mind  or  consciousness 
—  nothing,  at  least  in  actuality. 


M. 


204  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

No,  the  sensibility  is  no  faculty  of  the  mind  and 
is  but  an  attribute  of  the  brain,  as  neither  is  memory 
any  faculty  of  the  mind  but,  in  a  way,  of  the  bram 

again. 

Reminiscence  —  that  is  a  mental  power.       but 
memory  is  no  more  such  than  is  the  registration  by 
an  Edison  electric  phonographic  cylinder  of  your 
voice  and  words  such.     To  revive  anything  of  the 
memory  or  registration  in  the  brain,  you  call  mto 
exercise  the  mental  power  of  reminiscence.    To  re- 
vive anything  of  the  registration  on  the  cylinder,  a 
crank,  or  the  like,  must  be  turned.    They  both  are 
simple  events  of  recall  of  what  are  registrations  tn 
matter,  nothing  more.    And  yet  in  every  text  book 
of  mental  philosophy  the  world  over  you  will  find 
both  sensibility  and  memory  rated  as  attributes  and 
powers  of  the  mind!  — will,  so  utterly  shallow  in 
fundamentals  is  the  academic  mental  philosophy  uni- 
versally dispensed  in  school  and  university. 

What  you  gather  from  a  statue  of  Beethoven 
to  suggest  to  you  Beethoven,  you  gather  from 
an  impression  on  matter;  you  do  not  pretend 
that  there  is  any  mentality  an  actual  entity  there  in 
that  impression  and  identified  with  it  as  the  source 
of  what  you  gather  from  the  statue  to  suggest  to 
your  mind  Beethoven ;  rather  you  would  say  that  that 
suggestion  to  you  of  Beethoven  was  what  your  own 
mentality  and  mind  constructively  put  on  the  im- 
pression, a  purely  mechanical  thing,  made  on  (or  in) 
the  marble  or  whatever  material  worked  by  the 

sculptor. 

Just  so,  what  you  now  gather  from  an  impres- 


Sensibilty  Nor  Memory  Faculty  of  Mind   205 

sion  made  on  your  brain  by  some  event  of  yesterday 
then  coming  within  your  cognition,  as  you  in  con- 
sciousness recover  that  event,  you  gather  from  an  im- 
pression  on  matter  again,  namely,  your  brain;  and 
no  more  should  you  pretend  that  there  is  any  mind 
an    actual    entity    there,  —  and    which    you    call 
memory,  —  in  that  impression  and  identified  with  it 
and  the  source  of  your  possible  recall  of  that  event, 
than  you  do  in  the  above  case  of  the  statue  of 
Beethoven;  but  rather  should  you,  as  in  the  above 
case  of  the  statue,  assume  that  that  suggestion  to 
you  of  memory  was  what  your  own  mentality  and 
mind  constructively  invest  the  impression  with.    The 
two  cases  are  perfectly  parallel,  with  the  exception 
that  in  one  the  impression  is  made  on  matter  ex- 
ternal to  the  brain,  and,  in  the  other,  on  matter  that 
is  the  brain  itself.    They  both  are  purely  impressions 
made  on  matter  —  nothing  more;  and  the  impres- 
sions themselves  purely  mechanical.       Alike  their 
common  denominator,  so  to  speak,  is  matter,  and  to 
be  stated  in  terms  of  matter;  and  their  numerators 
the  mechanical,  and  to  be  stated  in  terms  of  mechan- 
ics.   In  a  word,  there  is  no  more  mind  about  memory 
than  there  is  about  a  statue  —  not  a  whit. 


The  Primordial  Mental,  what  is  the  mental  in  Its 
first  estate  and  void  of  conscious  mind,  may  be 
understood  to  be  as  definitely  defined,  the  Soul,  which 
we  hear  so  much  about  but  never  before  with  any  pre- 
cision defined. 


"The  understanding  does  not  derive  its  laws  from 
Nature,  but  prescribes  them  to  Nature."    (Kant) 

And  here  you  have  it  again  — the  inevitable  notion 
running  through  all  the  Kantian  doctrine,  and  all  the 
critical  literature  of  Kant's  apologists  and  critics, 
notion  of  the  absolute  divorce  of  man  and  Nature, 
mind  and  matter,  the  spiritual  and  the  material.  The 
understanding  does  not  derive  its  laws  from  Nature, 
truly  enough,  for  its  laws  are  the  laws  of  Nature,  itself 
(the  understanding),  a  part  of  Nature.  But  if  its  laws 
are  the  laws  of  Nature,  itself  a  part  of  Nature,  then 
it  does  not,  of  course,  prescribe  them  to  Nature. 


We  do  not  know  everything,  not  primarily  because 
finite,  but  primarily  because  consciousness  is  but  a 
development  and  an  aftermath;  and,  wherefore,  noth- 
ing ktwws  everything,  and  only  something  does  every- 
thing without  knowing  that  it  does  anything,— the 
childish  and  silly  academic  overevaluation  of  the  im- 
portance of  consciousness  to  the  contrary,  neverthe- 
less. 


XV 

Demonstration  of  Kant's  Categoricals  or  the  Sort 
of  Nothing  the  Origin  Primarily  He  Assumed 

for  Them. 

Now  what  is  a  categorical?  Or,  first,  what  is 
the  function  primarily,  if  not  indeed  altogether,  of 
the  understanding?  Speaking  loosely,  it  is  to  enter- 
tain as  such,  or  as  in  the  abstract  what  is  an  idea  in 
the  concrete.  More  strictly,  it  is  to  entertain  as  being 
thought  what,  or  the  idea  of  what,  as  not  being 
thought  is  still  sensuously  experienced,  realized,  and 
perceived.  Thus  a  bird  has  sensuous  experience, 
realization,  and  perception  of  space,  but  has  no  idea 
of  space  as  such;  has  no  capacity  to  stand  it  off  as 
it  were,  and  holding  it  in  perspective,  entertain  it  in 
the  abstract,  entertain  it  as  being  thought  which  pre- 
cisely, as  I  said  above,  is  the  function  primarily  at 
least,  of  the  understanding,  but  v^hich  the  bird  is 
without.  Such  function  is  discharged  by  some 
faculty  as  it  is  very  the  sine  qua  non  desideratum  of 
all  possibility  of  higher  mental  activity;  it  is  the 
Rubicon  to  be  crossed,  or  the  activity  of  the  reason 
is  impossible.  It  is  not  by  the  "sensibility''  dis- 
charged, which  is  why  Kant  could  not  find  certain 
things  "given"  in  the  sensations.  And  by  what 
faculty,  then,  is  it  performed  if  not  by  that  one  ac- 
credited the  next  higher,  namely,  the  understanding? 


2IO 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


And,  indeed,  this  may  be  presumed  even  the  latter's 
sole  function  —  in  any  event,  its  primary  one.  But 
even  as  its  sole  one,  it  is  a  function  of  credit  enough 
for  any  faculty,  one  of  all  the  distinctness  and 
dignity  as  attaches  to  any ;  and  its  having  any  other 
is  extremely  doubtful.  It  is  very  difficult  to  see  how 
anything  of  a  synthetic,  at  least  of  a  conscious  syn- 
thetic, judgment  is  involved;  and  it  must  be  ac- 
counted pure  assumption  as  is  claimed  that  any  is; 
for  it  is  no  hard  and  fast  line  that  can  be  easily 
drawn  between  the  understanding  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  imagination  and  the  reason  on  the  other ;  so 
that  to  what  extent  anything  like  synthetic  judgment 
may  not  fall  to  the  office  of  the  latter,  it  is  impossible 
to  say,  —  Kant's  and  the  every  academic  philosopher 
the  world  over's  confidence  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. 

But  be  that  as  it  may,  the  primary  function  at 
least,  of  the  understanding,  as  is  not  to  be  disputed, 
is  to  negotiate  the  abyss  between  the  unbeing  thought 
and  the  being  thought,  and  much  in  effect,  to  convert 
the  former  into  the  latter ;  is  to  entertain  as  such,  or 
in  the  abstract,  anything,  or  an  idea  of  anything 
whatsoever  that  is  matter  of  sensuous  experience, 
realization,  and  perception. 

This,  then,  being  the  office,  the  primary  office  at 
least,  of  the  understanding,  what  is  a  categorical, 
or  the  sort?  A  categorical  is  properly,  a  genus  or 
form  of  the  mental,  a  species  of  which  is  necessary 
to  sensuous  experience  such  as  is  ours;  and  the 
genus  itself  necessary  to  all  possibility  of  higher  or 
rationalistic  thought.    It  is  the  species,  what  is  noth- 


Kant's  Categoricals 


211 


ing  of  the  being  thought,  that,  under  the  spell  of  the 
understanding,  —  spell  of  the  a  priori  intuition  of 
the  understanding  if  you  choose,  —  is  stood  off  and, 
as  held  in  perspective,  suffers  a  lightning  change 
into  the  genus,  what  is  the  being  thought,  and  the 
abstract. 

Thus  quality  is  such  a  genus  of  form  of  the 
mental,  of  which  resistance  a  quality  is  a  species, 
itself  necessary  altogether  to  such  as  is  our  sensuous 
experience,  at  the  same  time  that  the  genus  quality, 
itself  is  necessary  to  all  possibility  of  subsequent  and 
higher  or  rationalistic  thinking. 

Or  again,  quantity  is  such  a  genus,  of  which  dif- 
ferent measures  of  resistance  each  a  quantity  is  a 
species,  and  the  differing  measures  of  it  so  many  dif- 
fering species,  as  it  were,  necessary  to  sensuous  ex- 
perience such  as  is  ours,  at  the  same  time  that  the 
genus  itself  of  quantity  is  necessary  to  all  possibility 
of  subsequent  and  higher  or  rationalistic  thinking. 

This  is  to  say  that  it  is  rather  much  something 
only  connoted  by  what  is  matter  of  sensuous  experi- 
ence than  what  precisely  is  matter  of  sensuous  ex- 
perience itself  that,  entertained  as  such,  or  as  an  ab- 
straction, is  a  categorical. 

Moreover,  as  thus  defined,  the  categorical  claims 
space  and  time  as  of  its  kith  and  kin,  —  and  why 
not?  Why  should  not  anything  and  everything 
functioning  as  a  categorical  be  understood  to  be 
such  ?  What  is  to  debar  that  we  consider  space  and 
time  each  respectively  as  at  once  genus  and  species, 
each  as  at  once  species  of  itself  its  own  genus?  Why 
are  not  they  within  the  fold  when  they,  just  as  much 


212 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


as  their  any  content,  are  the  unbeing  thought,  and 
matter  of  sensuous  experience  such  as  is  ours,  and 
necessary  to  all  possibility  of  subsequent  and  higher 
or  rationalistic  thought  ?  True,  space  and  time  can- 
not, because  pure  negatives,  positively  connote  any- 
thing beyond  themselves,  while  their  contents  of 
extension,  figure,  resistance  and  motion  are  things 
positive  and  can.  But  it  so  happens  that  it  is  not  as 
space  and  time  are  genera,  which  are  things  beiiig 
thought,  that  they  are  matter  of  sensuous  experience 
as  nobody  doubts  that  they  are,  but  as  they  are 
things  unbeing-thought  —  which  is  why  Kant  could 
not  find  them  in  the  sensations  —  and,  in  effect, 
species  that  they  are  matter  of  sensuous  experience 
So  that  as  they,  respectively,  function,  in  effect,  each 
both  as  genus  and  species,  why  are  they  not  as  much 
categoricals  as  their  any  content  thus  functioning 
but  doing  so  in  technical  form  more  literally  as 
species  and  genus  ?    And  this  they  are. 

But  however  properly  space  and  time  should  be 
classed  as  categoricds,  still  Kant  did  not  so  class 
them ;  and  as  he  did  not,  I  might  have  let  it  pass,  as 
it  is  not  vital  to  anything  for  which  we  are  contend- 
ing —  but  I  would  not. 

But  now  with  the  relation  between  the  categori- 
cal and  what  is  matter  of  sensuous  experience  being 
such  as  I  have  indicated,  and  with  that  between 
species  and  genus  that  of  the  latter  a  development 
out  of  the  former,  is  it  anything  better  than  madness 
to  think  to  wedge  in  and  drive  home,  as  Kant 
thought  to  do,  and  as  his  disciples  after  him  think  to 
do,  a  complete  rupture  of  the  inviolable  continuity 


Kanfs  Categoricals 


213 


between  the  two,  and  an  utter  repudiation  of  all  de- 
pendence of  whatsoever  categorical  on  sensuous  ex- 
perience? For  this  precisely,  is  of  Kant's  doing  as 
he,  through  the  agency  of  his  conjured  up  fantastic 
a  priori  intuition,  springs  upon  the  scene,  as  obtain- 
ing independent  of  sensuous  experience,  and  actually, 
indeed,  in  advance  of  such  experience,  a  genus  what, 
in  truth,  obtains  as  genus  only  as  first  both  in  logical 
and  in  historical  order  obtains  its  species;  springs 
upon  the  scene  a  genus,  say  a  genus  quality,  what  is 
quality  a  genus  only  as  first,  in  logical  and  historical 
order,  obtains  its  species  a  quality;  and  this,  at  the 
same  time  assuming  the  genus  to  obtain  in  condition 
of  absolute  divorce  from  the  species  of  that  genus, 
say  the  genus  quality  from  its  species  a  quality,  such 
as  resistance,  which  in  reality  itself  the  species,  first 
exists  in  the  consciousness  only  as  first  it  is  experi- 
enced. 

Nor  does  it  argue  anything  adversely  that  there 
should  be  nothing  of  the  being-thought,  which  the 
categorical  is,  in  the  sensuous  experience  which  itself 
is  the  unbeing-thought ;  and  there  is  nothing  of  such 
in  actuality  there,  more  than  there  is  of  the  plant  in 
the  seed,  wherefore,  still,  there  should  not  be  every 
dependence  of  categoricals  such  as  quality,  quantity, 
time,  space,  or  any  other,  on  the  sensuous  experi- 
ence; yet  which,  as  there  is,  those  categoricals  can- 
not possibly  have  their  primary  origin  of  a  priori 
intuition  independent  of  such  experience,  as  that 
they  may  have  and  do  have  was  Kant's  contention. 

There  may  be  nothing,  there  is  nothing,  of  the 
house,  as  such,  in  the  wood  of  which  the  house  is 


214  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

built,  which  there  is  not,  in  fact,  no  more  after  the 
house  IS  buih  than  before;  and  still  only  for  the 
wood  could  there  once  be  the  wooden  house ;  it  could 
have  no  existence  independent  of  the  wood.  More 
than  this,  it  is  even  absolutely  impossible  that  there 
should  be  anything  of  whatsoever  categorical  or  the 
sort  in  the  sensuous  experience;  and  still  is  it  only 
impossible,  again,  that  the  former  should  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  latter  which,  itself  as  the  fact,  only 
makes  so  in  turn  that  any  such  categorical  should 
spring  of  a  priori  intuition  independent  of  sensuous 
experience. 

And  now,  finally,  as  was  said  in  regard  of  Kant's 
chimerical  notion  of  space  and  time,  so  now  I  say 
of  his  similar  notion  in  respect  of  quantity,  quality, 
and  so  on,  —  How  not  only  false  but  silly  any  such 
doctrine  as  the  possible  rupture  of  continuity  be- 
tween the  senses  and  the  understanding  such  that, 
as  was  found  even  in  flower  in  the  understanding  or 
the  reason,  whatsoever,  that  yet  the  stem  and  root 
thereof  did  not  reach  back  into  the  sensuous  experi- 
ence for  life  and  support  at  least,  if  not  for  origin 
altogether! 

And  again,  how  not  only  false  but  silly  the 
notion  that  "the  categories  are  the  a  priori  conditions 
of  possible  experience"  as  Kant  would  have  it,  when 
they  are  only  the  conditions  of  *' transcendental  or 
the  higher  than"  sensuous  experience,  and  nothing 
the  conditions  of  the  sensuous  experience  itself 
at  all. 


The  mystery  of  mysteries  is  how  anything  came  to 
be,  how  anything  either  mind  or  matter  came  to  be, 
not  hovf  a  universe  and  such  as  ours  came  first  to 
have  being.  This  the  one  mystery  before  and  over 
all.  But  "No  man  shall  see  my  face  and  live/'  readeth 
the  Hebrew  scripture;  and  how  anything  came  to  be 
—  that  is  the  face  no  man  shall  see  and  live. 

And  yet  Kant  assumed  to  have  seen  it  and  to  rec- 
ognize it  as  conscious  mind  identifying  that  with  Su- 
preme Being  as  author  both  of  Himself  and  of  the 
manifest  universe — yes,  assumed,  did  Kant,  to  have 
seen  that  face  yet  that,  thereafter,  still  he  lived! 


Zounds !  man  —  Do  you  think  you  can  reason  back 
from  the  conscious  mind  to  comprehpndmg  the  form 
it  assumes  in  the  primordial  mental?  Well,  you  might 
as  soon  think  you  could  reason  back  from  the  chicken 
full-fledged  to  comprehending  the  form  it  assumes 
in  the  germ-cell;  or  reason  back  from  the  plant  to 
comprehending  the  form  that  assumes  in  the  seed;  or 
even  reason  back  from  the  disposition  of  the  men  on 
the  chess-board,  at  the  close  of  a  game  of  chess,  to 
realizing  what  were  the  earliest  moves  in  it:  it  simply 
can't  be  done.  The  *'form"  the  mental  manifest  as 
conscious  mind  or  reason  assumes  m  the  primordial 
mental  is  absolutely  as  inscrutable  to  us,  as  is  the 
form  the  physical  chick  assumes  in  the  germ-cell,  or 
as  the  plant  assumes  in  the  seed. 

So  that  it  is  nothing  to  the  prejudice  of  the  mental 
assuming  a  more  primordial  form  than  the  human 
Reason  that  it  should  be  absolutely  inscrutable  to  us 
what  definitively  that  form  is. 


XVI 

The  Primordial  Mental  the  Intrinsic  Nature  of  the 

External  World  Absolute 

But  now,  I  am  even  yet  ill  content  but  as  I  go 
one  notch  still  further,  and  contend  that  not  only  do 
we  know,  know  as  perceiving  is  knowing,  the 
mechanicality  of  the  outlying  physical  world  abso- 
lute, and  thus  know  something  of  its  extrinsic 
nature,  but  that  also  do  we  know,  know  as  rationally 
knowing,  something  of  its  intrinsic  nature  even  be- 
yond knowing  body,  as  such,  to  it  as  connoted  by 
resistance. 

And  to  begin  with,  we  will  ask,  —  Must  we  not 
know  what  the  nature  of  that  world  could  not  pos- 
sibly be,  and  that  it  could  not  possibly  be  anything  of 
mind  or  consciousness,  since  each  and  every  man  is 
immediately  and  directly  conscious  only  of  his  own 
mind  and  consciousness,  and  nothing  of  that  of  his 
any  neighbor,  while  of  the  world  of  his  external  per- 
ception, whatever  it  is,  he  is  directly  and  immediately 
conscious  ?  And  again,  must  we  not  know,  too,  even 
that  it  could  not,  by  any  possibility,  be  anything  of 
the  contents  of  mind  or  consciousness,  our  mind  or 
consciousness,  since,  then  such  would  be  something 
contingent,  contingent  on  mind  or  consciousness, 
and  it  is  a  world  understood  to  be  a  world  absolute 
that  is  in  question? 


2l8 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


And  yet  again,  and  next,  what  must  we  not  think 
it  positively  to  be,  only  what  yet  could  it  possibly  be, 
but  still  something  mental,  if  only  of  the  mental,  the 
mind,  as  it  is  said,  can  take  cognizance,  and  of  noth- 
ing so  radically  and  totally  different  as  is  what  we 
recognize  as  the  physical  vulgarly  conceived,  to  be  ? 
What  even  do  we  not  know  it  to  be,  and  know  it  to 
be  mental,  since  it  is  absolutely  unthinkable  that  that 
should  not  be  mental  that  was  author  or  origin  of 
consciousness  itself  the  mental,  and  of  which  we 
know  the  Absolute  Reality  —  which  is  one  with  the 
external  world  absolute  —  to  be  the  author  or  origin 
of,  or  that  would  not  obtain  in  the  universe  which  we 
know  that  does  as  very  your  own  and  my  own  con- 
sciousness are  in  attestation  thereof;  what  but  the 
mental,  still  that  we  had  no  realization,  realization 
sensuous  or  transcendental,  of  it  as  such  mental? 
And  why  not,  indeed,  still  something  mental,  yet  that 
nothing  of  mind  of  consciousness?  We  can  have 
the  wood  without  the  wagon  of  which  the  wagon 
is  made ;  or  have  the  iron  without  the  locomotive  of 
which  the  locomotive  is  made ;  and  why  not  have  the 
something  mental  without  having  such  as  thinks,  or 
such  as  is  being  thought,  but  out  of  which  these  are 
wrought  or  evolved  ?    Why  must  we  not,  indeed  ? 

Certainly,  when  we  can  have  no  direct  conscious- 
ness, no  direct  cognition  of  one  another's  mind  or 
consciousness,  to  then  still  insist  that  what  we  have 
direct  consciousness  of,  direct  cognition  of,  as  we 
have,  of  something  of  the  external  absolute,  is  yet 
mind  or  mind's  offspring  absolute,  as  an  eminent 


The  Primordial  Mental 


219 


philosopher  of  the  17th  century  maintained,  and 
even  maintained  that  that  mind,  or  its  offspring,  was 
very  that  of  the  Being  of  God,  —  is  certainly  grossly 
illogical  to  the  last  degree,  to  say  the  least  of  it. 

However,  if  it  cannot  be  mind,  or  thought, 
thought  as  being  thought,  it  can,  as  I  have  said,  still 
at  least  be,  with  no  logical  inconsistency,  that  the 
source  of  these  and  which  then  must  be  understood 
as  primordial  mental. 

But  do  you,  the  reader,  exclaim  that,  logical  in- 
consistency aside,  it  is  positively  out  of  all  reason, 
and  utterly  incredible  that  conscious  mind  and  what 
we  recognize  as  the  physical  should  be  of  one  and 
the  same  stuff  or  origin  ?  But  with  what  grace,  this 
objection?  Are  you  not  reiterating  and  reiterating, 
until  it  is  positively  nauseating,  the  hackneyed  as- 
surances that  the  universe  of  Being  is  infinite,  and 
we  but  finite?  And  how,  pray,  could  the  universe 
be  infinite,  but  as  there  were  infinite  extremes  of 
form  or  modes  of  existence  of  the  one  identical  es- 
sence or  Being?  And  are  the  extremes  of  form  or 
mode  of  its  existence,  the  extreme  of  consciousness 
on  the  one  hand  and  of  the  physical  on  the  other, 
more  than  infinite  ?  Or,  if  not,  and  are  but  infinite, 
though  all  of  that,  how  should  you,  yourself  but 
finite,  even  then  expect  ever  to  realise  those  ex- 
tremes as  extremes  of  but  the  one  stuff  ?  Either  they 
would  not  be  infinite  extremes,  or  you  would  not  be 
but  finite,  as  you  did.  Besides,  why  should  you  balk 
at  affecting  to  realise  the  identity  of  stuff  of  mind  at 
least,  if  not  of  consciousness,  and  the  physical  when 
there  are  scores  of  other  things  you  are  exercised 


220 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


with  never  a  doubt  that  you  realize,  still  that  in  fact 
you  never  do,  you  mistaking  repeated  observation 
of  events  for  realization  of  them. 

Besides,  again,  when  you  have  reduced  matter 
from  the  grossness  of  the  vulgar  sense  of  it  to  elec- 
trons in  the  scientific  sense  of  it,  you  have  made  so 
tremendous  an  approach  to  reducing  it  to  something 
of  very  the  airiness  of  mind  itself  that  any  affected 
shock,  or  disgust,  at  their  having  a  common  origin, 
or  being  hut  diverse  forms  or  aspects  of  one  and  the 
same  thing,  or  the  like,  comes  to  being  not  only  out 
of  all  reason,  but  near  to  being  positively  silly. 

So,  I  say  again,  that  if  that  of  the  external  world 
absolute  of  which  mechanicality,  which  is  to  say  of 
which  form  and  body,  are  attributes,  is  not  mind,  or 
consciousness,  it  still  may,  with  no  logical  inconsist- 
ency,  and  indeed  may  not  save  only  with  the  most 
positive  logical  inconsistency  be  that  out  of  which 
these  may  be  evolved  or  developed,  and  be  the  simply 
mental  in  the  primordial  form  of  it. 

And  then  what,  besides,  is  at  least  negative  proof, 
if  not  proof  altogether,  of  as  much  is  that  the  con- . 
scious  mind,  the  only  conscious  mind  we  know  any- 
thing about,  namely,  our  own,  was  never  once  known 
to  be  the  conscious  author  of  anything  of  the  physical 
but  the  mechanical  physical,  never  once  of  the  living 
physical,  —  never,  still  that  we  are  encompassed  by 
infinitely  diversified  forms  of  such ;  and  that  there  is 
absolutely  no  logical  connection,  whatever  between 
the  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  which  we  know 
something  about,  itself  utterly  impotent  to  produce 
the  first  thing  of  the  living  physical,  and  the  any 


The  Primordial  Mental 


221 


other  and  fancied  consciousness  or  conscious  mind, 
finite  or  infinite,  which  we  know  nothing  about  itself 
competent  to  produce  the  living  physical  —  no  logi- 
cal connection  whatever,  as  I  have  before  pointed 
out. 

It  is  at  least  negative  proof,  for  it  argues  nega- 
tively at  least  that  some  other  mental,  if  the  mental 
at  all,  than  the  mental  as  conscious  mind,  is  the  au- 
thor of  the  living  physical ;  and  if  other  mental,  then 
who  shall  say  it  is  not  what  may  be  understood  as  the 
primordial  mental  since  that  is  the  only  other  form 
of  the  mental  than  such  as  conscious  mind  of  which 
we  can  have  any  conception  ? 

That  it  is  not  the  mental  of  the  form  of  conscious 
mind  that  is  the  author  of  the  living  physical  does 
not  debar  that  it  should  still  be  the  mental  that 
should  be;  for  that  the  mental  obtains  only  of  the 
form  with  which  we  are  familiar,  it  would  be  only 
arrogantly  and  stupidly  dogmatic  to  assume.  And  a 
primordial  mental  is  at  least  one  such  other  and 
which  is  even  conceivable  by  us,  even  though  only 
in  a  very  general  and  limited  way,  and  which,  as  the 
only  form  that  is,  is  the  one  that  in  all  logical  consist- 
ency we  are  bound  to  recognize  as  the  author  or 
origin  of  the  living  physical  as  we  are  to  recognize 
any  mental  as  being  such,  which  we  must  since  we 
can  think  of  nothing  else  in  reason  as  being.  And 
for  other  reasons  already  stated  we  must. 

But  a  primordial  mental,  as  void  of  conscious 
mind,  cannot  be  to  conscious  mind  itself,  that  is,  such 
as  cosmic  or  infinite  mental  can  not  be  to  human  or 
finite  mental,  simply  as  greater  stream  to  lesser,  as 


222 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


has  been  the  time  immemorial  dogma  not  only  of 
the  theologian  but  of  the  academic  metaphysician  or 
philosopher  as  well.  Rather  is  it  as  stream  to  eddy 
of  the  stream,  involving  a  vastly  greater  difference 
than  as  were  it  simply  larger  stream  to  lesser  and 
little  stream,  and  but  a  magnification  of  the  conscious 
mind  —  as  were  a  stream  itself  but  a  magnification 
of  the  eddy,  which  it  would  be  as  impossible  as  ab- 
surd to  think  it  was. 

Moreover,  what  only,  though,  perhaps,  but  nega- 
tively flatly  contradicts  that  such  as  the  primordial 
mental  to  such  mental  as  our  conscious  mind  is  but 
as  greater  stream  to  lesser,  is  that  the  conscious  mind 
the  only  mind  we  know  anything  about  was  never 
once  known  to  be  the  conscious  author  of  the  living 
physical,  and  that  between  the  only  conscious  mind 
we  know  any  thing  about  itself  utterly  impotent  to 
originate  the  living  physical  and  the  any  fancied 
cosmic  or  infinite  mind  we  know  nothing  about  itself 
competent  to  originate  such  physical  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  logical  connection  whatever.  The  mental, 
then,  that  is  author  or  origin  of  the  living  physical 
must  be  something  very  diflferent. 

Besides,  still  further,  as  our  conscious  mind  as  a 
development  is  but  one  of  infinite  many  forms  of 
manifest  existence,  why  should  it  not  be  as  impossi- 
ble, —  except  in  a  general  way  such  as  that  there  is 
a  primordial  mental  —  to  reason  from  them  what 
precisely  is  the  form  of  unmanifest  Being,  or  Being 
void  of  all  form  behind  them,  as  it  is  to  reason  from 
the  many  forms,  such  as  light,  heat  and  electricity, 
of  physical  energy  what  precisely  is  the  form  of  en- 


The  Primordial  Mental 


223 


ergy  or  the  energy  wanting  all  form,  behind  them. 
The  latter,  the  scientist,  does  not  attempt  to  do,  nor 
think  to  do ;  and  doutbless  because  he  anticipates  the 
vanity  of  it;  and  anticipates  as  much,  doubtless 
again,  because  his  is  a  level  head  which  usually  the 
academic  philosopher's  is  not.  That  the  any  other 
more  final  form  of  the  mental  than  conscious  mind 
should,  in  the  consciousness  of  the  latter,  assume 
what  is  no  other  form  at  all  but  only  another  meas- 
ure, perhaps  an  infinite  measure,  of  the  same  form, 
is  clearly  to  be  ascribed  to  his  utter  want  of  sense  of 
the   requirements  of  the  situation,   and   of  sound 

logic  as  well. 

The  truth  is,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  argue 
directly  back  from  the  circular  movement  of  the 
eddy  to  the  linear  movement  of  the  stream ;  for  there 
is  absolutely  no  necessary  logical  connection  between 
them,  and  is  none  simply  because  other  influences 
are  tributary  to  the  circular  movement  of  the  eddy, 
and  might  be  even  altogether  its  cause.  And,  in- 
deed, so  much  is  the  equivalent  of  this  so  as  it  applies 
to  the  conscious  mind  and  the  mental  out  of  which 
that  is  a  development,  that  arguing  directly  back 
from  it  to  the  former  is  much  like  arguing  back  from 
a  degenerate  form  of  the  mental  which  the  conscious 
mind  a  development  must  be  understood  in  a  sense 
to  be,  to  the  mental  in  all  its  integrity  and  prime  as 
is  to  be  understood  of  the  primordial  mental.  It 
cannot  be  done.  Only  as  there  is  something  like  col- 
lateral suggestion  to  appeal  to,  can  be  established  a 
high  probability  of  a  more  and  the  more  final  form 
of  the  mental. 


224 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


But  if  the  conscious  mind  from  being  but  a  de- 
velopment, and  consequently  little  better  than  a 
degenerate  form  of  the  primordial  mental,  can  view 
the  universe  but  as  from  an  angle  or  point  out  of 
focus,  as  it  were,  and  not  from  all  angles,  or  point 
altogether  in  focus,  as  might  it  be  as  viewed  from 
the  vantage  point  of  the  aboriginal  or  primordial 
mental,  it  still  is  nothing  to  debar  contemplating  the 
universe,  so  far  as  it  was  contemplated  at  all,  with 
all  the  integrity  and  serviceability  for  practical  pur- 
poses as  were  the  point  of  view  that  of  the  aboriginal 
or  primordial  mental  itself.  Thus,  to  illustrate,  a 
circular  hoop,  seen  at  an  acute  angle  with  the  line  of 
vision  looks  to  be  elliptical  in  form.  Now  the  ellipse 
which  the  circular  hoop  looks  to  be  is  just  as  genu- 
inely an  ellipse  as  were  the  hoop  itself  one;  and  is 
just  as  serviceable  for  all  purposes  of  mathematical 
calculations  as  if  it  were.  And  so  with  the  cosmos 
or  universe  as  contemplated  by  the  conscious  mind, 
though  not  entertained  exhaustively,  may  yet,  so  far 
as  entertained  at  all,  be  contemplated  with  every 
principle  within  the  purview  of  such  mind  in  har- 
mony with  that  mind.  So  that  that  the  cosmos  is  in 
harmony  with  the  reason  is  not  to  be  cited  as  proof, 
or  even  evidence,  that  the  conscious  reason  is  the 
final  form  of  the  mental. 

This,  then,  what  is  the  mental  but  in  its  primary 
stage  of  being  is  what  we  can  but  understand  is  that 
more  than  simply  the  mechanical,  more  than  simply 
the  form  and  body  of  the  external  world  absolute, 
which  we  may  know  of  it,  know  as  rationally  con- 
ceiving that  more,  though  not  as  sensuously  and 


The  Primordial  Mental 


22S 


perceptually  realising  it  as  that.  And  as  it  should  be 
that,  it  is  the  primordial  mental  that  is  the  concrete 
of  every  idea  in  the  concrete,  whether  of  the  idea  of 
the  mechanical  or  any  other ;  that  is  that  which  dis- 
tinguishes an  idea  in  the  concrete  from  what  is  only 
the  same  idea  in  the  abstract,  distinguishes  an  idea 
as  unheing  thought  and  informed  of  what  we  recog- 
nize as  the  physical  and  recognizable  by  all  men  in 
common,  from  one  only  being  thought  and  recog- 
nizable only  by  the  man  who  thinks  it ;  and  that  is 
that  wherefore  the  external  world  of  the  unbeing- 
thought  thought  as  informed  of  what  we  recognize 
as  the  physical,  endures  from  everlasting  to  ever- 
lasting,   while   what   is   only   being   thought,    and 
even  the  thinker  or  thinkers  of  what  is  only  being 
thought,  which  and  who  are  only  developments  out 
of  it,  come  and  go  like  flecks  of  foam  on  the  crests 
of  the  waves  of  the  sea. 

And,  indeed,  the  Primordial  Mental  understood 
as  the  Absolute  Reality  must  well  answer  even  to 
what  is  very  the  Soul  —  the  Soul,  which  we  hear  so 
much  about,  but  which,  yet,  nobody  has  been  quite 
able  to  define.    Yes,  the  Soul. 

It  is  this  what,  as  the  primordial  mental,  and 
very  the  Soul  and  nothing  of  mind,  or  thought  as 
being  thought,  that  is  in  the  inventor's  new  idea  and 
fresh  invention  as  outwrought,  and  wherefore  it 
survives  him,  and  all  men  have  cognition  of  it  still, 
even  though  the  inventor  himself  passes  away ;  while 
had  it  remained  in  his  head  an  idea  and  invention, 
as  what  was  only  being  thought,  he  himself  perish- 
ing, perish  with  him  would  the  new  idea  and  fresh 


226 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


invention.  But  it  survives  him,  and  all  men  have 
cognition  of  it  still,  because  what  it  is  invested  with, 
what  embodied  of,  is  what  as  the  primordial  mental 
and  Soul  is  one  with  the  one  Absolute  Reality  which 
"was  before  ever  the  world  was"  and  will  be  when 
the  "world  is  no  more";  is  one  with  that  Reality 
which  is  Itself  what  is  unbeing-thought  thought  and 
in  the  concrete,  and  Itself  the  unthinking,  and  void 
of  everything  of  the  being  thought.  And  it,  is,  in- 
deed, very  that  Absolute  Reality  Itself,  very  Itself, 
and  in  virtue  of  the  most  primary  movement  itself 
of  which,  of  centrifugal  and  centripetal,  worlds  re- 
volve about  suns,  and  suns  about  suns ;  and  in  virtue, 
again,  of  the  return  stroke  of  the  centripetal  of 
which  and  the  resulting  impact  of  that  Reality  on  It- 
self, life,  mind  and  consciousness  in  ascending  order 
ensue,  what  are  as  much  the  triune  spectrum  of  the 
primary  contingent  realities  of  that  Absolute  Real- 
ity and  Primordial  Mental  as  are  red,  green,  and 
blue  the  triune  spectrum  of  the  primary  colors  of 
visual  light. 

In  short,  the  primordial  mental  is  what  we,  as 
rationally  knowing  something  of  the  outlying  Abso- 
lute Reality,  may  know  it  to  be,  though  unable  to 
sensuously  realize  and  perceive  it  to  be;  what  we 
may,  with  every  reason,  be  said  to  know  even  as 
knowing  something  intrinsic  of  the  outlying  world 
absolute,  and  even  something  intrinsic  beyond  body 
(as  revealed  in  resistance)  as  well  as  know  some- 
thing extrinsic  as  in  sensuously  realizing  and  per- 
ceiving its  mechanicality. 

And  if  this  be  so,  then  by  so  much  still  further 


The  Primordial  Mental 


227 


was  Kant  wandering  like  a  mad  man  as  he  declared 
knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute  to  be  impos- 
sible, and  that,  with  the  rest,  we  know  nothing  of  the 
external  world  absolute,  nor  even  of  our  own  exist- 
ence. 


What  stupidity  it  is  for  one  to  deny  there  is  any- 
thing beyond  the  senses  and  sensuous  experience  when 
only  is  he  enabled  to  deny  there  is  any  thing  beyond 
as  he  has  that  itself  beyond  the  senses  and  sensuous 
experience  with  which  to  make  the  denial!  But  it  is 
not  one  whit  more  rational  to  contend  that  on  what 
is  beyond,  the  senses  or  sensuous  experience  is  de- 
pendent. 


Synonymous  with  the  Absolute  Reality  and  Prim- 
ordial Mental  may  be  understood  the  Soul  to  be;  and 
to  be,  as  is  that,  the  origin,  origin  and  not  the 
"maker,"  of  the  manifest  universe;  and  to  be  again, 
as  is  that,  unconscious  until  it  first  comes  into  collision, 
or  face  to  face  with  itself  when  then  is  it  first  con- 
scious,— Kant,  and  even  the  whole  academic  world 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 


"The  Soul  knows  no  persons,"  says  Emerson.  And 
the  Primordial  Mental,  being  unconscious,  Itself 
"knows"  no  persons.  So  that  seer  and  philosopher  in 
this  fundamental  matter  are  in  perfect  accord. 


XVII 

The  Mind  of  Kant's  Exploitation  a  Sheer  Abstrac- 
tion, a  Phantom  of  His  Riotous  Fancy. 

It  comes,  indeed,  to  this,  that  the  mind  of  Kant's 
exploitation  was  a  sheer  abstraction  and  thing  of  his 
fancy ;  it  was  nothing  such  as  that,  a  multiplicity  of 
examples  of  which  in  the  concrete,  we  are  familiar 
with.  And  it  was  as  such,  mind  a  manufacture,  not 
mind  a  thing  evolved  by  a  force  operating  from 
zvithin  at  all.  It  was  the  finite  mind  m^de  finite,  not 
finite  necessarily  because  an  evolution  and  a  develop- 
ment. In  fact,  how  could  it  well  help  being  nothing 
better  ?  For  it  must  be  remembered  that  Kant  was 
a  theist  in  the  true-blue  orthodox  sense;  and  that 
with  every  theist  in  his  day,  the  manifest  universe 
was  a  snap  creation,  of  a  Creator  operating  from 
outside;  as  much  outside  as  a  house  builder  of  the 
house  he  builds.  With  every  then  theist,  everything 
of  earth,  sea,  and  air,  man  and  his  mind  with  the 
rest,  had  their  origin  with  an  author  Himself  outside 
his  work.  It  is  only  of  late  years,  that  theists  driven 
to  bay  by  evolutionists,  or  by  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion itself,  have  immured  their  Being  of  God  within 
the  confines  of  the  manifest  universe,  and  as  there 
working  from  within  outwards.  Of  course,  then, 
Kant,  with  his  view  of  the  universe,  man's  mind 
with  the  rest,  as  being  much  a  piece  of  carpentry, 


232 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


would  naturally  treat  the  mind  of  man  —  as  he  af- 
fected it  was  it  he  was  treating,  and  not  something 
purely  of  his  fancying  —  as  a  bit  of  carpentry; 
would  analyze  it,  pull  it  to  pieces  and  put  it  together 
again  as  might  a  carpenter  take  down  a  house  of  his 
erection,  and  then  reerect  it. 

And  what  Kant  naturally  would  do  is  precisely 
what  he  did  do.  His  man's  mind  man  was  a  manu- 
factured article,  as  he  believed ;  and  how  else,  in  any 
consistency,  in  his  exposition  of  it,  could  he  treat  it 
than  as  an  article  of  manufacture?  And  not  only 
was  it  a  made  mind,  and  finite  as  made  finite,  but  it 
was  an  adult  mind  with  which  Kant  dealt,  as  another 
has  pointed  out  before  me.  But  this  does  not  half 
state  it ;  for  it  was  an  adult  human  mind  that  he  con- 
templated and  exploited.  That  is,  to  Kant's  think- 
ing, the  mind  of  a  polype  was  nothing  less  than  an 
adult  human  mind  in  miniature ;  —  which  indeed  it 
is  with  every  Kantian  academic  professor  of  philoso- 
phy, the  world  over,  this  minute.  The  only  differ- 
ence between  a  polype's  mind  and  an  adult  human 
one,  in  other  words,  was  with  Kant  and  is  with 
every  Kantian,  mostly  that  between  a  small  house 
and  a  large  one,  or  a  twenty-ton  locomotive  and 
fifty-ton  one  —  a  difference  of  mere  bulk  and 
capacity.  It  is  a  difference  implied  in  mere  growth 
in  the  sense  of  increase  of  volume  with  proportionate 
augmentation  of  power,  and  nothing  of  evolution  or 
development  as  these  are  of  any  meaning  distinct 
from  mere  growth  in  the  above  sense  —  which  dis- 
tinct meaning,  however,  they  surely  have.  And  it 
is  so  with  every  Kantian  academic  at  this  late  day 


The  Mind  of  Kant's  Bxploitation         2^^ 

because  he  has  .yet  to  emancipate  himself  from  the 
thraldom  of  the  idea  of  the  universe  an  arbitrarily 
made  universe ;  has  yet  to  be  philosophically  "born 
again,"  and  into  a  knowledge,  or,  more,  into  a  real- 
isation, of  the  truth  as  it  is  in  the  doctrine  of  the  uni- 
verse an  evolution;  and  because  has  not,  as  a 
consequence,  rid  himself  of  the  inane  and  mischiev- 
ous notion  of  the  primacy  and  transcendency  of  con- 
sciousness and  the  conscious  mind. 

But  anyone  who,  in  this  day  and  generation,  es- 
says the  role  of  metaphysician,  and  yet  accepts  not 
robustly,  but  gingerly  that  doctrine  as  might  it 
scorch  him,  his  prejudices,  or  his  theories,  had  better 
never  been  born  —  the  world  has  no  use  for  him. 


All  this  talk  about  the  reason  obtaining  even  logi- 
cally a  priori,  involves  the  reason  as  at  least  logically 
the  "Maker"  of  the  manifest  universe.  And  so  Kant 
said  "the  reason  made  the  universe,"  —  "marf^"  the 
universe!  No  man  nowadays  of  any  breadth 
of  mind  worth  the  mentioning  discourses  deliberately 
on  a  "made"  universe.  There  is  that,  the  primordial 
mental  or  whatsoever,  that  is  the  origin  of  the  mani- 
fest universe  as  the  egg  is  the  origin  of  the  chick.  But 
as  who  would  say  the  egg  "made"  the  chick,  so  who 
should  more  say  the  primordial  mental,  or  whatsoever, 
''made''  the  cosmos  or  manifest  universe? 


I  : 


Synonymous  with  the  Primordial  Mental  may  be  un- 
derstood the  Soul  to  be ;  and  it  is  the  Primordial  Men- 
tal, or  the  Soul  that  is  the  origin,  the  origin  and  not 
the  "Maker,"  of  the  manifest  universe;  not  the  Maker, 
as  nothing  is  the  "Maker  of  it  — Kant  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding:  and  it  is  that  Primordial  Mental 
or  the  Soul  and  Absolute  Reality,  unconscious,  that 
is  that  origin,  that  Reality  unconscious  until  It  has 
first  made  impact  on  Itself ,  — Kant,  again,  and  the 
whole  academic  world,  to  the  contrary,  nevertheless. 


XVIII 

The  Academic  Legend  of  Mind  Knowing  Only 
Mind  Only  Academic  Nonsense 

But  now  it  is  not  to  be  passed  over  without 
further  and  final  remark  that,  of  course,   Kant's 
doctrine  of  "phenomena,"  phenomena  understood  to 
be  the  mind's  offspring  which  they  are,  and  only 
which  he  maintains  we  can  and  do  perceive  in  ex- 
ternal perception,  is  but  over  again,  only  in  other 
words,  the  hoary  old  academic  legend  "that  mind 
knows  only  mind."    But,  surely,  what  force  is  there 
to  that  proposition  when  no  one  mind  knows  directly 
even  mind  save  only  each  man  his  own  mind,  and 
only  with  some  doubt  of  his  knowing  even  that ;  and 
knows,  even  indirectly,  any  other,  only  in  virtue  of 
the  agency  of  an  outlying  world  absolute  which, 
Kant  pretended,  we  didn't  know,  at  all,  didn't  know 
even  that  it  existed,  still,  too,  that  he  had  the  hardi- 
hood to  afifirm  the  existence  of  what  he  said  we 
couldn't  know  to  exist.    I  say,  it  may  be  a  question 
whether  any  mind  even  knows  mind  and  its  own 
mind;  whether  knows  more  than  the  thoughts  and 
feelings  of  mind. 

Here  is  a  shelled  pecan  nut,  a  nut  perhaps  the 
most  difficult  of  any  from  which  to  extract  the 


/ 


238 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


kernel  unbroken,  which  yet  is  before  me  in  that  con- 
dition, and  my  wonder;  but  which  still  affords  me 
not  the  slighest  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  machine 
that  accomplished  the  feat  of  its  liberation.  I  con- 
fess I  can  not  even  infer  whether  it  was  a  cutting, 
or  a  crushing,  instrument  that  was  involved.  Why 
more  should  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  mind 
afford  us  the  slighest  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  mind 
of  which  they  are  the  yield  as  is  the  shelled  pecan 
the  yield  of  the  machine?  And  yet,  the  world  over, 
the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  mind  are,  and  have 
from  time  immemorial,  been  taken  to  indicate  the 
mind  itself. 

To  say  that  they  signify  intellect  and  sensibility 
means  no  more  than  to  say  that  shelled  pecans  indi- 
cate a  machine  —  which  they  may  not  after  all,  as 
something  like  a  frost  may  have  shocked  them ;  and 
even  if  they  must  mean  a  machine,  nothing  is  re- 
vealed of  the  nature  of  it. 

However,  this  point  aside.  And  even  then  a 
queer  situation  it  is  altogether  for  the  boast  of  the 
mind's  knowing  only  mind,  still  that  it  alike  was 
Kant's,  and  is  at  his  moment,  the  world  over,  the 
academic  philosopher's  gleeful  assurance  all  the 
same. 

For  what  business  had  Kant,  or  has  any  one,  to 
assume,  in  effect,  that  there  may  not  be  the  mental, 
the  mental  but  not  as  mind  or  consciousness,  and  of 
which  these  are  a  development,  which  we  may,  as 
perceiving,  know,  must  know,  as  ever  we  know 
mind,  as  we  may  know,  must  know,  the  wood  of 
which  the  wagon  is  made,  and  even  may  know  in- 


The  Mind  Knowing  Only  Mind  239 

dependently  of  knowing  anything  of  the  wagon,  as 
ever  we  may  know  the  wagon  ?  —  yes,  and  even  may 
know  the  mental,  yet  knowing  nothing  of  mind  or 
consciousness  as  we  —  to  change  the  figure  —  may 
know,  that  is,  visually  perceive  or  cognize,  water  as 
ice,  it  then  being  visually  cognizable,  but  may  not  as 
it  is  a  gas,  it  then  being  invisible?  What  business, 
I  insist,  had  Kant  to  assume  that  there  may  not  yet 
be  this  mental,  even  which  should  be  the  primordial 
mental,  which  we  may  know  even  as  ever  we  directly 
knew  mind,  or  even  as  ever  we  did  not  ? 

Nor  is  this  situation  and  illustration  altogether 
a  fantastic  one  either ;  as,  for  reasons  already  given, 
much  earlier  in  this  writing,  it  is  more  than  likely 
that  it  is  precisely  the  one  that  obtains.  Assuming 
that  we  actually  perceive  very  the  outlying  world 
absolute  itself,  then  that  its  substance  is  somehow 
mental  of  a  sort,  is  absolutely  unavoidable  and  in- 
disputable as  is  to  be  understood  that  the  mental 
can  take  cognizance  only  of  the  mental,  and  of  noth- 
ing so  radically  and  altogether  different  as  the  physi- 
cal is  vulgarly  supposed  to  be.  That  the  mental  may 
have  cognition  only  of  the  mental  may  still  be  a 
question  not  to  all  eternity  to  be  decided.  And,  yet, 
that  two  well-nigh  infinitely  distinct  and  different 
Absolute  Realities  should  obtain,  the  mental  and 
something  else,  would  seem,  if  not  impossible,  then 
at  least  improbable  beyond  measure.  But,  anyway, 
as  there  should  not  be,  the  sole  possible  alternative 
is  that  what  would  appear  as  the  substance  of  the 
world  of  our  external  perception  must  be  something 
mental,  and  mental  of  a  sort  more  primary  than 


240 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


mind  and  consciousness,  and  of  which  these  are  a 
development  —  a  view,  by  the  way,  which  alone, 
consists  with  the  doctrine  of  evolution. 

With  the  probabilities  immensely  to  the  effect 
of  such  primordial  mental,  mental  yet  that  nothing 
of  mind  or  consciousness,  what  shall  we  say  of  the 
brazen  front  that  still  assumes  that  mind  knows,  has 
cognition  of,  only  mind  ?  At  the  least,  anything  but 
rational  is  that  academic  as  well  as  Kantian  assump- 
tion that  "mind  knows  only  mind/' 

Doubtless,  but  for  the  vicious  and  inane  doctrine 
of  the  primacy  and  transcendency  of  the  conscious- 
ness, or  conscious  mind,  which  both  reigned  and 
ruled  in  Kant's  day,  and  does,  in  good  degree,  to 
this  hour,  the  proposition  would  not  have  com- 
manded the  complacent  credence  it  has;  nor  more, 
Kant's  metaphysic  itself. 

But,  anyway,  spite  of  all  one  might  know  that  I 
have  been  saying,  you  have  yet  only  to  ask  —  What 
do  we,  in  external  perception,  really  know  ?  and  goes 
up  the  shout  from  every  university  chair  of  philoso- 
phy the  world  over  —  "Know?  why,  know  only 
mind !"  Or,  "Know  ?  why,  know  only  states  of  con- 
sciousness !"  as  some  would  put  it  —  as  were  that  to 
ring  a  change  for  the  better  on  "mind  knows  only 
mind."  Better?  But  how  better?  How  more  illu- 
minating, or  more  true? 

If  by  states  of  consciousness  is  meant,  —  which, 
of  course,  is  —  different  states  of  it,  then  if  all  we 
know  is  states  of  consciousness  we  don't  know  much 
of  anything  at  all,  and  never  will.  For  what  intelli- 
gent meaning  has  the  phrase,  anyhow?    None;  or 


The  Mind  Knowing  Only  Mind  241 

then  as  it  has  any,  only  at  the  most,  but  an  elusive 
and  illusory  one. 

"States  of  consciousness" !  —  why,  there  are  no 
such  things.  Consciousness  is  one  state,  it  is  not 
many.  You  might  as  well  talk  about  states  of  a 
mirror  as  it  reflects  one  object  and  another.  The 
mirror  as  a  mirror  is  one,  one  state,  if  you  please; 
it  is  a  constant,  no  matter  how  many  or  diverse  the 
objects  reflected  in  it.  And  so  is  consciousness  one 
or  a  constant,  no  matter  how  many  the  objects  or 
subjects  successively,  or  simultaneously  occupy  it. 

On  the  contrary,  then,  of  our  knowing  only 
states  of  it,  what  only,  in  external  perception,  we 
know,  is  the  one  state  of  consciousness  with  diversity 
of  content;  and  which  one  state  of  it  even,  we  should 
not  know  of  save  only  for  content,  any  more  than 
should  we  anything  of  reflection  in  a  mirror  but  for 
the  objects  in  reflection  in  it. 

But  what  is  that  content?  Why,  something 
more  still*  than  mind  or  consciousness.  It  must  be 
for  reasons  already  given.  So  that  the  phrase, 
"Know  only  states  of  consciousness"  has  no  advan- 
tage over  "Know  only  mind." 

Kant  even  asks  —  "How  can  the  mind  know 
noumenon  [reality]?"  as  though  our  possible  ina- 
bility to  know  how,  was  anything  in  disparagement 
of  our  knowing  the  fact,  and  knowing  more  than 
mind,  as  noumenon  or  reality  was  more.  But  there 
are  a  thousand  and  one  things  we  know  nothing  the 
how  of,  which  yet  the  fact  of  we  know  even  without 
a  misgiving.  But  the  primary  question  is,  not  how 
can  we,  but,  do  we  know  "noumena." 


242 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


As  to  the  query  —  How  can  the  mind  know 
noumena?  —  it  needs  only  to  be  met  by  the  per 
contra  one  of  —  How  must  it  not? 

However,  once  more  and  to  start  again.  I  want 
to  ask  what  business  had  Kant,  or  has  any  one  dog- 
matically to  affirm  we  know  only  mind,  or  states  of 
consciousness,  when  for  aught  anything  we  know, 
there  is  such,  for  example,  as  the  property  of  hard- 
ness outlying  the  mind,  and  property  of  the  external 
world  absolute,  whose  effects  or  impression,  still,  on 
the  "sensibility,"  in  the  any  event  of  its  action  there- 
on, must,  and  again  for  aught  anything  we  know 
to  the  contrary,  he  hardness;  and  when  as  there  is, 
our  any  experience,  consciousness,  or  knowledge  of 
hardness,  must  be  experience,  consciousness  or 
knowledge  not  only  of  the  effects  or  impression  pro- 
duced hut,  also,  of  the  outlying  hardness  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  ahsolute  producing  the  effects  or  im- 
pression of  hardness,  as  well?  In  other  words,  how 
should  that,  which  should  have  for  its  effects  or  im- 
pression on  the  mind  that  of  hardness,  debar  that, 
producing  the  hardness,  being  itself  hardness,  and 
our  knowledge  of  hardness  being  knowledge  of  that 
hardness  at  once  that  we  have  knowledge  of  hard- 
ness an  effect  or  impression? .  And  who  knows  there 
is  not  that  hardness  outlying  and  absolute?  And 
until  we  know  there  is  not,  we  do  not  know  that,  in 
knowing  the  hardness  we  feel,  we  do  not  know  more 
and  know  the  hardness  outlying,  as  well.  If  we  don't 
know  beyond  knowing  states  of  consciousness,  we  at 
least  don't  know  we  don't  know  beyond  states  of 
'consciousness;  and  until  we  do,  it  is  but  an  unwar- 


Thc  Mind  Knowing  Only  Mind  243 

ranted  do^rmatic  assumption  that  we  "know  only 
States  of  consciousness,"  "that  we  know  only  mmd. 

In  fact,  the  run  of  the  logic  —  heavens !  logic, 
must  we  call  it  ?  —  would  seem  to  be  about  this :  — 
we  don't  know,  as  knoztnng  that  we  know,  hardness 
as  more  than  a  state  of  consciousness;  ergo,  what 
only  we  know  is  hardness  a  state  of  consciousness! 
Think  of  that  for  applied  academic  dialectics !  Isn't 
it  almost  enough  to  give  one  the  "horrors"  ?  And 
yet  it  is  just  such  as  this  for  coherent  thought  be- 
hind the  academic  dictum  that  what  only  we  know 
are  "states  of  consciousness." 

And,  by  the  way,  and  indeed,  do  we  know  only  as 
we  know  we  know?  Does  the  oyster  know  it 
knows?  And  even  yet,  does  it  know  nothing?  Does 
the  squirrel  know  it  knows  ?  And  still,  does  not  the 
squirrel  know  something  ? 

We  may  know  only  states  of  consciousness ;  but, 
as  I  have  said,  we  don't  know  zve  don't  know  only 
such,  and  until  we  do,  a  decently  modest  metaphysic 
should  bar  us  from  the  precipitous  dogmatism  that 
only  such  we  know. 

We  may  know  only  states  of  consciousness;  but 
not  only  most  arbitrary  is  the  inference  that  only 
such  we  do;  but  worse  than  this,  the  dictum  is  posi- 
tively silly,  an  academic  classic  though  it  be. 

Besides,  after  all  and  over  all,  the  probabilities 
are  immense  that  we  do  indeed  know  more ;  and  as 
we  do,  the  stupendous  error  of  Kant's  doctrine  that 
we  know,  as  perceiving  is  knowing,  only  "phenome- 
na" is  indisputably  in  evidence.  The  probabilities 
are  immense  that  we  do,  indeed,  know  more  —  if  we 


244 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


may  be  said  to  know  short  of  knowing  that  we  know. 
But  how  foolish  to  talk  about  the  squirrel  knowing 
nothing  because  it  doesn't  know  it  knows ! 

But  one  consideration  further.  Is  visual  light 
a  state  of  consciousness,  and  but  such  ?  And  as  cog- 
nizing visual  light,  do  we,  as  cognizing  is  knowing, 
know  only  a  state  of  consciousness,  know  only 
mind?  If  visual  light  is  a  state  of  consciousness, 
then  it  is  something  mental,  and  we  have  to  account 
for  how  should  something  mental  be  the  product  or 
resultant  of  what,  ether  vibrations  and  eye  and  brain, 
are  only  physical,  —  the  accounting  for  which,  as 
the  mental  and  the  physical  are  to  be  understood  to 
be  wholly  distinct  and  different  from  each  other,  is 
simply  an  absolute  impossibility. 

Besides,  as  something  mental,  mental  as  sc^ne- 
thing  of  mind  or  consciousness,  or  the  offspring 
thereof,  how  should  there  be  direct  consciousness  of 
it,  when  of  the  thousand  and  one  such  about  us  we 
have  no  direct  consciousness  whatever?  Or,  then, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  visual  light  is  something  physi- 
cal then  the  mind  as  having  cognition  of  it,  may,  as 
cognizing  is  knowing,  know  more  than  mind  and 
know  the  physical  as  that  more.  Take  either  horn 
of  the  dilemma  you  please.  However,  if  visual  light 
be  something  physical,  then  it  is  nothing  subjective, 
as  is  the  stock  scientific  and  academic  claim  for  it, 
more  than  are  ether  vibrations  themselves,  or  than 
is  eye  or  brain  itself;  and  you  might  with  as  much 
reason,  talk  about  subjective  iron  and  objective  iron 
as  about  subjective  light  and  objective  light. 

Indeed,  such  discourse  as  that  mind  knows  only 


The  Mind  Knowing  Only  Mind  245 

mind,  or  only  states  of  consciousness,  is  but  a  shuf- 
fling of  words,  with  a  glamour  of  intelligence  cover- 
ing the  densest  ignorance  of  the  situation. 

What  is  the  fact  of  the  matter  is,  that  visual  light 
is,  as  is  also  the  physical  itself,  something  of  the 
mental  yet  that  nothing  of  mind  or  consciousness, 
or  of  offspring  of  the  same;  and  that  both  are  cog- 
nizable by  the  mind  simply  because  both  are  some- 
thing of  the  mental;  and  visual  light,  as  something 
of  the  mental  yet  that  nothing  of  mind  or  conscious- 
ness, but  of  which  still  the  mind  has  cognition,  is 
something  more  than  such  mind  or  consciousness, 
or  a  state  of  consciousness,  of  which  the  mind  has 
cognition  and  which  the  mind,  as  cognizing  is  know- 
ing, knows  more  than  mind,  or  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Altogether,  then,  so  utterly  groundless,  puerile, 
and  dogmatic  the  academic  legend  under  discussion, 
that  only  that  it  was  Kant's  dictum,  and  from  one 
point  of  view,  very  the  backbone  of  his  philosophical 
extravaganza,  and  besides  is  backed  up  withal  by 
about  the  whole  academic  philosophical  world, 
would  I  ever  have  returned  to  the  subject  again  in 
this  particular  form  at  this  last  moment. 


Only  as  there  is  something  sensuously  realizable  in 
a  proposition  is  there  anything  realizable  in  it  at  all; 
and  the  sensuously  realizable  is  only  such  as  it  is 
realization  of  what  is  external  and  absolute.  Neither 
is  there  conviction  of  the  truth,  or  of  the  right,  of  a 
proposition  but  as  there  is  something  in  it  of  the 
sensuously  realizable  of  the  external  and  absolute,  and 
of  the  mechanical  of  the  external  and  absolute. 


fzcih^y 


Let  us  not  forget  that  matter  in  the  scientific  sense 
of  it  as  reduced  to  the  airiness  of  electrons  is  an  im- 
mense stride  towards  obliterating  the  assumed  im- 
passable chasm  between  mind  and  matter.  And  let  us 
not  forget  that  we  do  not,  in  consciousness,  in  any 
comprehending  and  realizing  sense,  bridge  the  gap 
even  between  oxygen  and  hydrogen  on  the  one  side 
and  water  on  the  other  with  any  so  great  feJteity  that 
we  should  go  into  hysterics  over  the  seeming  non- 
intercommensurability  of  the  physical  and  the  mental. 


XIX 

Original  Versus  A  Priori  Intuition 

But  now  while  there  is  no  a  priori  intuition  ex- 
cept, as  has  been  explained,  in  so  qualified  and 
meagre  a  sense  as  practically  to  make  it,  in  any  gen- 
eral statement,  a  negligible  quantity,  there  yet  ob- 
tains original  intuition,  and  as  independent  of  sensu- 
ous experience  as  was  assumed  by  Kant  of  his  a  prio- 
ri intuition.  But  it  is  nothing  a  priori  as  obtaining  in 
actuality  even  logically,  much  less  historically,  prior 
to  sensuous  experience,  and  on  which  the  latter  is 
dependent,  more  than  is  a  flower  a  thing  obtaining  a 
priori  as  obtaining  in  actuality  prior  to  the  leaf  and 
on  which  the  leaf  is  dependent.  It  is  what,  if  not 
independent  of  sensuous  experience  for  its  life,  is  yet 
so  altogether  for  its  character,  as  is  a  flower  in  re- 
spect to  a  leaf.  It  is  such  that  in  virtue  of  it,  as  ex- 
pressed through  the  understanding,  is  entertained 
in  consciousness,  for  example,  an  idea  of  space  as  an 
idea,  and  of  space  as  such,  space  as  space,  space  as 
an  abstraction.  It  is  such,  again,  that  in  virtue  of  it, 
the  various  ideas,  notions,  or  abstractions  as  they 
emerge  from  the  understanding,  are  taken  up,  shuf- 
fled, and  orderly  disposed,  and  from  them  evolved 
the  innumerable  dicta  of  the  reason.  There  is  this 
original  intuition,  original  as  distinct  from  the  pri- 
mary one  in  virtue  of  which  latter  the  senses  afford 


250 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


their  revelations  of  an  external  world  absolute.  And 
it  obtains  in  actuality,  even  logically,  only  subse- 
quently, and  with  racial  animal  life,  only  ages  subse- 
quently to  the  primary  intuition;  and  so  could  no 
more  have  a  hand  in  the  authorship  of  the  senses  or 
their  functionings,  than  can  or  does  a  flower  a  hand 
in  the  authorship  of  the  leaves  of  a  plant,  or  their 
functioning. 

Such  intuition  as  that  we  are  considering  is  a 
spontaneity  with  a  start  at  the  level  where  sensuous 
experience  leaves  off;  a  start  not  a  whit  below,  nor 
earlier  than  that.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  function 
functioning  from  a  depth  reaching  down  to  the  ele- 
mentaries  of  space  and  time  and  their  necessary  con- 
tents, necessary  as  necessary  to  the  realization  and 
perception  of  space  and  time  themselves,  and  to  all 
thinking;  but  not  to  a  depth  as  including  these,  as 
Kant  contended  in  respect  of  his  a  priori  intuition. 
It  implies  faculty  a  fisherman  as  it  were,  that  fishes 
down  to  the  bottom  of  the  pond,  but  fishes  up  noth- 
ing of  the  bottom  of  the  pond  itself,  as  Kant  would 
have  it,  that  his  a  priori  intuition  does. 

And  indeed,  such  would  seem  the  constitution  of 
things  that  only  as  these  elementaries  underlying  and 
constituting  life  and  mind  are  first  brought  round 
and  thrust  objectively  before  the  latter,  like  objects 
before  a  mirror  —  or  only  as  such  as  they  are  —  is 
possible  even  consciousness  itself  at  all;  much  less 
any  consciousness  of  the  elementaries  themselves, 
and  a  first  knowledge  of  them  even  through  sensu- 
ous experience  of  them. 

A  man  may  see  from  the  point  of  his  eyes  for- 


Original  Intuition 


251 


ward,  but  he  cannot  from  one  behind  them,  and  see 
what  is  behind  them,  and  see  the  back  of  his  head. 
He  cannot  even  see  his  own  eyes  with  which  he  sees 
all  before  him,  —  but  yet  which,  in  effect,  Kant 
overworked  his  fancy,  and  strained  his  every  nerve 
to  do,  and  which  every  philosopher  before  him  and 
since  has  striven  to  do.  For  have  they  not,  as  they 
fancied,  explored  mind,  and  attempted  to  realize  and 
define  it,  as  men  of  science  have  sought  to  define 
life?  And  with  what  better  success  one  than  the 
other?  Has  the  latter  done  more  than  to  name  the 
conditions  of  life?  But  is  but  to  name  the  conditions 
of  life  to  define  life  itself?  And  has  the  metaphysi- 
ician  as  to  mind  succeeded  any  better  ?  Is  the  multi- 
plicity and  perfect  Babel  of  contradicting  systems 
of  metaphysics  any  evidence  of  it,  forsooth ! 

On  the  contrary,  no  better  than  can  a  man  see 
the  back  of  his  head,  or  his  own  eyes  with  which  he 
sees  all  before  him,  can  he  know,  as  conceptionally 
knowing  what  is  behind  mind,  or  even  know  mind 
itself  with  which  he  knows,  or  may  know,  all  com- 
ing after  it  in  evolutional  and  developmental  order. 
Is  to  know  of  the  fruit  of  a  tree  to  know  of  the  tree 
itself,  except  as  you  might  have  been  helped  to  it  by 
some  collateral  knowledge  such  as  having  seen  or 
known  of  trees  before  ?  But  if  not  conceptionally  to 
know  even  of  life  and  mind  themselves,  then  of 
course,  not  thus  to  know  of  what  comes  before  them ; 
and  there  is  that  antecedent  to  them,  antecedent  to 
our  life  and  mind  at  least  and  to  the  manifest  uni- 
verse generally,  or  they  are  not  one  and  all  an  evolu- 
tion and  a  development,  which  we  know  they  are. 


252 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


However,  at  least  what  obtains,  or  may  possibly 
obtain  subsequent  to  whatsoever  elementals,  the 
mind  can  come  into  conceptual  knowledge  of  and 
do  so  in  virtue  of  original  intuition  active  through 
the  imagination,  the  understanding  and  the  reason. 

But  such  original  intuition  of  the  origin  and  limi- 
tations to  which  I  have  confined  it,  and  as  running 
only  down  to,  or  welling  only  up  from  the  depth  of 
the  ending  of  the  sensuous  experience,  realization 
and  perception,  is  in  strong  contrast  with  Kant's  our 
a  priori  intuition  which  he  fancied  ran  down  to,  or 
welled  up  from,  all  the  depth  there  is! 

Moreover,  it  is  only  because  that  such  as  the 
former  obtains  as  active  through  the  imagination, 
or  the  understanding,  or  through  both  jointly,  as 
you  please,  that  the  notion  or  idea  of  whatsoever 
that  is  matter  of  sensuous  experience  though  nothing 
of  the  being  thought,  is  ever  once  entertained  in  con- 
sciousness as  the  being  thought,  and  thought  the 
thing  it  is  —  an  idea  of  space  as  space,  for  example. 
It  is  only  because  of  it  that  whatsoever,  such  as  an 
idea  of  space,  is  stood  off  as  it  were,  and  as  held  in 
perspective  as  something  as  being  thought,  is  ren- 
dered in  consciousness  in  terms  of  space  as  such, 
terms  of  space  as  space. 

But  now  it  is  only  because  of  it,  again,  that 
what  may  not  be  a  matter  of  sensuous  experience 
but  is  what  is  an  idea  only  suggested  by  what  is 
matter  of  such  experience,  is  in  the  same  way  enter- 
tained as  such,  or  as  the  idea  it  is,  as  when,  for  ex- 
ample, the  idea  of  uniformity  of  succession  of  an- 
tecedent and  consequent  of  a  single  class  of  phe- 


Original  Intuition 


253 


nomena  is  suggested  by  what  is  even  not  a  uni- 
formity of  succession  within  that  class  as  is  the  case 
as  the  idea  of  it  is  suggested  to  a  horse  which  has 
once  been  lashed  by  a  whip,  and  which  thereafter, 
inevitably  with  the  upraised  whip,  expects  to  be 
lashed  again,  yet  that  he  not  always  is.  It  is  only 
because  of  it  that  an  idea  only  thus  suggested  may 
be  entertained  as  such  idea,  may  by  man  but  may 
not  by  the  horse  which  has  not  original  intuition  in 
the  form  of  the  understanding  as  man  has.  And 
still  again,  it  is  only  because  of  this  intuition  active 
through  faculty  of  the  reason  that  such  as  an  idea 
entertained  as  an  idea,  (that  is,  as  an  idea  as  being 
thought,)  that  such  as  the  idea  for  example,  of  uni- 
formity of  succession  within  a  class  of  phenomena, 
be  given  another  lift  and  be  entertained  with  refer- 
ence to  all  classes  of  phenomena,  which  then  would 
be  what,  as  entertained,  would  be  law  entertained. 

And,  in  general,  it  is,  only  because  of  such  in- 
tuition, still  of  the  limited  nature  and  scope  as  I 
have  defined  it,  but  as  active  through  the  reason, 
that  whatsoever  once  having  gone  into  the  hopper 
of  the  "understanding"  —  or  imagination  —  and 
reissuing  only  to  be  understood  as  ideas  or  con- 
cepts as  such,  is,  by  the  reason  itself  exploited  after 
the  manner  and  with  results  such  as  becomes  that 
faculty  and  are  familiar  to  us. 

In  all  this  disporting  of  original  intuition  of  itself 
there  is  experience  only  of  an  idea  of  a  thing,  as 
the  thing  is  as  fundamental,  or  more  so,  than  what 
we  have  experience  of  in  sensuous  experience; 
there  is  no  experience  of  such  anything  itself  of 


254  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

which  the  idea  is  an  idea;  no  experience  of  funda- 
mental absolute  reality;  no  experience  of  anything 
such  obtaining  independent  of  being  thought  of,  or 
thought.  There  is,  for  example,  primarily  experi- 
ence, what  is  sensuous  experience,  of  space  itself, 
something  fundamental  obtaining  independent  of 
being  thought,  which  afterward  in  logical  and  his- 
torical order,  and  in  virtue  of  original  intuition, 
only  an  idea  of  is  entertained  or  had  experience  of 
as  being  thought  of  or  thought,  but  nothing  of  ex- 
perience of  space  itself  had,  which  is  to  say  nothing 
of  sensuous  experience  of  that,  space  itself,  at  all 
of  the  idea  of  which  there  is  thought  or  transcen- 
dental experience. 

But  on  the  other  hand,  for  example,  again,  there 
is  no  experience  of  law  itself,  that  is  to  say  no  sen- 
suous experience  of  it  even  possible,  but  only  in 
virtue  of  original  intuition  an  experience  of  an 
idea  of  law  what  is  to  say,  only  a  transcendental 
experience  of  it  possible.  For  there  to  be  experience 
of  law  itself  there  must  be  sensuous  experience  of 
the  uniformity  of  succession  not  only  of  phenome- 
na within  the  classes  falling  to  our  experience,  but 
also,  of  such  as  obtains  among  all  classes  that  make 
up  the  manifest  universe;  —  which  could  be  possi- 
ble, of  course,  only  with  all  those  classes,  likely  in- 
finite in  number,  falling  within  our  sensuous  ex- 
perience, what,  truly,  enough,  is  impossible;  and  so 
the  experience  of  law  itself  impossible.  And  the 
same  as  said  of  law  is  to  be  said  of  causality,  in- 
finity and  the  like. 

So  that  original  intuition  as  to  anything  of  ex- 


Original  Intuition 


255 


ternal  perception  is  of  avail  as  affording  experience 
only  of  ideas  of  it,  and  of  ideas  as  ideas,  together 
with  their  exploitation ;  but  not  as  affording  experi- 
ence of  that  absolute  whatsoever  itself  of  which  the 
ideas  are  ideas,  as  affording  which  it  would  be  only 
sensuous  experience  that  afforded  it.  And  man 
himself,  with  all  his  original  intuition,  is  no  better 
off  in  this  respect  than  the  lower  animal,  the  horse 
say.  Even  the  horse,  and  then  only  in  virtue  of 
memory  too,  has  experience  of  an  idea,  —  though 
not  of  an  idea  as  an  idea  —  of  uniformity  of  suc- 
cession of  phenomena,  but  no  experience  of  that 
uniformity  of  succession  itself,  which  the  man  has 
no  more  than  he,  and  which  must  be  had  to  have 
experience  of  law  itself.  But  what  the  man  can  do, 
and  can  in  virtue  of  original  intuition  as  active 
through  the  imagination  or  "understanding,"  which 
the  horse  (generally  speaking)  not  having  cannot, 
is  to  entertain  an  idea  as  an  idea ;  and  also  to  think 
of  the  application  of  the  idea  of  the  uniformity  of 
succession  as  obtaining  with  all  classes  of  phenome- 
na as  obtains  with  the  comparatively  few  falling 
within  his  experience;  to  think  of  the  application 
of  the  idea,  still  that  not  experiencing  the  applica- 
tion any  beter  than  the  horse.  But  to  think  of  it  is 
not  to  think,  think  as  realizing  it,  but  rather  is  an 
infinite  remove  from  so  doing. 

However,  even  only  to  think  of  it  —  which  is 
done  only  in  virtue  of  faculty  of  original  intuition 
—  is  nothing  less  than  a  fresh  and  original  mental 
event  enough  to  afford  faculty  all  the  function  to 
distinguish  it  as  faculty  independent,  in  a  way,  of 


256 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


such  as  is  involved  in  sensuous  experience,  even 
though  it  fail  of  function  of  the  scope  of  thinking, 
thinking  as  realizing,  the  universality  of  the  appli- 
cation—  v^hich  it  ever  does,  Kant  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding. 

But  now  note  that  original  intuition  affords  the 
simple  thought  of  a  thing,  and  carries,  in  conscious- 
ness, nothing  with  it  of  authoritative  assurance  as 
it  were,  of  its  objective  reality  absolute,  as  were 
that  being  thought  of,  that  itself  as  being  realized. 
Two  and  two  as  being  five,  can  be  thought  of;  but 
that  carries,  in  the  consciousness,  in  the  moment, 
nothing  of  evidence  or  proof  or  force  of  conviction 
of  it  as  absolute  mathematical  reality  which  —  such 
reality  —  we  know  it  is  not.  And  so,  only  as  em- 
pirical evidence  at  least,  or  proof  ab  extra  of  some 
sort  is  afforded,  can  anything,  simply  thought  of, 
rank  as  knowledge  of  that  thing,  knowledge  of  it 
as  objective  truth  absolute.  Such  evidence  or  proof 
is  not  forthcoming  either  as  to  two  and  two  being 
five,  nor  more  as  to  such  as  law,  or  cause,  or  in- 
finity, being  objective  realities  absolute. 

Moreover,  if  the  merely  being  thought  of  has 
no  carrying  force  of  conviction  of  truth  or  right, 
then  what  has?  Why,  the  being  thought,  thought 
as  being  realized.  And  how  this?  Why,  as  the 
being  thought  of  is  accompanied  by  the  not  being 
thought  but  experienced,  as  is  the  situation  in  sen- 
suous experience,  and  when  there  is  exj>erience  — 
and  in  which,  reahzation  and  perception  —  of 
something  external  and  absolute,  and  that  some- 
thing the  mechanical  external  and  absolute. 


Original  Intuition 


257 


So  that  it  is  the  mechanical  external  and  abso- 
lute that  is  the  exciting  cause,  and  the  sensuous  ex- 
perience of  it  the  anal  source,  of  all  conviction 
either  of  truth  or  of  right ;  and  with  which  our  any 
thought  of  this  or  that,  in  virtue  of  any  original  in- 
tuition, reason,  or  what  you  will,  is  accompanied, 
and  wherefore  we  have  thought,  thought  as  real- 
izing anything  whatsoever. 

Mind,  I  do  not  say  the  mechanical  is  the  excit- 
ing cause,  or  the  source  of  truth  or  of  right  them- 
selves, but  of  our  conviction  of  them  as  such.  Doubt 
it?  But  observe  that  even  when  I  see  visual  light 
I  have  no  sense  of  it  as  anything  mechanical  that  I 
see,  and  which,  in  fact,  it,  consciously  at  least,  is 
not;  nor  sense,  again,  as  I  see  it,  that  it  is  the  me- 
chanical that  is  the  cause,  the  exciting  cause,  and 
the  sensuous  experience  of  which  the  source,^  of 
what  I  see,  yet  that  both  of  which  it  is.  So  in  just 
the  same  way  when  I  have  even  a  moral,  to  say 
nothing  of  an  intellectual,  conviction,  I  have  no 
sense  of  it  as  anything  mechanical  that  I  am  aware 
of,  and  which,  most  assuredly,  it  consciously  is  not ; 
nor  sense  again  as  I  have  the  conviction,  that  it  is 
the  mechanical  that  is  the  cause,  the  exciting  cause, 
and  the  sensuous  experience  of  which,  is  the  source, 
of  my  moral  conviction,  yet  that  both  of  which  is 

the  case. 

Indeed,  every  faculty  whose  function  is  not  the 
sensuous  experience  of  something  of  the  absolute 
external  mechanical  itself  is  faculty  a  "mount  of 
transfiguration"  of  something  of  it  — and  it  may 
be  both.     Thus,  the  eye  and  a  certain  area  of  the 


238 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


brain  is  the  seat  of  faculty  that  is  faculty  a  mount 
of  transfiguration  for  the  conversion  of  certain 
ether  vibrations,  themselves  something  of  the  me- 
chanical, into  visual  light;  at  the  same  time  it  is 
faculty  for  experiencing  the  mechanical  external 
and  absolute  itself  both  as  motion,  and  as  exten- 
sion and  figure,  if  not  of  resistance. 

What  has  now  been  said  is  all  to  say  that  orig- 
inal intuition  is  faculty  only  for  suggestion;  but 
that  all  our  most  unwavering  conviction  of  two  and 
two  being  four,  or  of  things  equal  to  the  same  thing 
being  equal  to  each  other,  or  of  any  logical  step  in- 
volved in  the  solution  of  a  problem  of  the  higher 
matRematics,  or  of  any  dictum,  even,  as  attending 
a  quesion  in  ethics,  is  due  inevitably  in  every  in- 
stance in  some  indispensable  part,  or  altogether,  to 
a  sensuous  experience  of  an  element  in  them  —  and 
that  element  something  of  the  mechanical  absolute — 
to  be  met  with  in  the  sensuous  experience  which  the 
sensuous  experience  of  affords  all,  the  conviction  of 
the  truth  of  right  felt  in  them  respectively  as  they 
are  entertained.  And  it  is  just  because  there  is 
nothing  of  the  mechanical  in  the  distinctive  sine 
qua  hon  element  of  law,  the  element,  namely,  of 
universality,  falling  within  the  sensuous  experience 
that,  in  the  primary  onset  of  consciousness  in  the 
matter,  we  are  not  as  flush  with  an  unquestioning 
awareness  of  the  veritable  being  of  law  absolute 
that  we  are  of  our  own  being,  or  of  that  of  space 
and  time  and  their  contents  of  extension,  figure,  re- 
sistance and  motion. 

It  crosses  nobody's  mind,  primarily,  to  have  the 


Original  Intuition 


259 


least  misgiving  as  to  the  veritable  being  of  these 
latter;  and  simply  because  they  are  things  them- 
selves of  absolute  existence  and  things  themselves 
experienced,  sensuously  experienced,  not  merely 
ideas  of  them  that  are,  only  ideas  of  which  original 
intuition  can  supply. 

It  is  only  as  the  academic  dips  an  oar  into  the 
tranquil  surface  of  the  ixx)l  to  disturb  it,  that  one 
thinks  to  doubt  where  he  is  at,  whether  in  space  and 
time,  or  himself  nowhere,  and  they  themselves  in 
him  rather  than  he  in  them. 

So  no  one  would  think  to  question  law,  which 
original  intuition  suggests,  as  an  objective  verity 
absolute,  widespread  as  the  universe,  either  only 
could  he  sensuously  experience  (which  would  be  to 
experience  something  of  the  mechanical)  uniform- 
ity of  succession  that  wide-spread  —  which  he 
might,  could  only  he  sensuously,  as  already  pointed 
out,  experience  all  instances  of  it  throughout  the 
universe ;  or  as  an  alternative,  did  only  the  element 
of  universality  itself  the  distinctive  one  of  law,  have 
something  of  the  mechanical  in  it  and  that  fall  with- 
in his  sensuous  experience.  But  as  it  is,  with 
neither  event  coming  within  his  happening,  he,  in 
virtue  of  original  intuition,  can  only  think  of  the 
verity  of  the  fact,  and  believe  it,  but  does  not  feel 
it  as  unquestioningly  realizing  it  as  he  does  space 

ani^  time. 

Observe,  it  is  not  what  is  the  mathematical  prob- 
lem, nor  what  the  logical  step  in  its  solution,  nor 
what  the  moral  matter  in  question,  involved,  that  is 
in  point;  but  it  is  the  conviction  that  is;  and  that, 


26o 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


as  that  obtains,  reaches  back,  every  time,  into  the 
sensuous  experience,  and  the  sensuous  experience 
of  the  external  mechanical  absolute. 

Of  course,  this  rather  startHng  doctrine  of 
every  intellectual  and  moral  conviction  being,  as  it 
is  a  conviction,  due  to  sensuous  experience  and  the 
sensuous  experience  of  the  mechanical  is  not  only 
what  Kant's  transcendental  aesthetic  is  in  flat  con- 
tradiction of,  but  what  every  academic  transcenden- 
tal sky-flyer  will  reject  with  disgust,  and  every 
moral  rhapsodist  will  treat,  if  not  with  riotous  de- 
rision, then  with  unutterable  scorn.  But  there  is  no 
possible  escape  from  the  truth  of  the  doctrine,  all 
the  same. 

But  now  in  spite  of  all  this,  Kant  in  effect  tells 
us  he  will  seize  the  reason,  or  a  priori  intuition  if 
you  will,  and  walk  off  with  it  shuffled  of  its  mortal 
coil  of  the  senses,  and  see  what  it  can  afford  us  of 
truth  independent  of  that  vulgar  association  of 
these  same  senses,  vulgar  as  he  rated  them  com- 
pared with  faculty  of  a  priori  intuition,  the  reason, 
or  whatsoever  other !  —  tells  us  this,  as  though 
such  faculty  were  like  a  ball  shot  from  a  gun 
which,  once  it  gets  its  start,  thereafter  continues  to 
move  of  its  own  momentum  independent  of  the 
original  force  being  still  applied;  that  is,  as  though 
the  reason,  once  its  activity  gets  a  jog  from  the 
sensuous  experience,  may  of  its  own  force  there- 
after be  active  and  effective  independent  of  every- 
thing of  the  sensuous  experience  as  still  a  factor 
having  a  hand  in  results;  tells  us  this,  so  utterly 
complete  the  possible  'divorce,  as  he  viewed  it,  of 


Original  Intuition 


261 


the  activity  of  the  faculty  of  a  priori  intuition,  or  of 
the  reason,  or  of  whatever  other  higher  faculty  than 
the  senses  that  you  will,  from  the  senses  themselves 
and  from  sensuous  experience  itself. 

But  was  there  ever  a  proposition  more  ground- 
less,  more  impossible   of  achievement,   more   stu- 
pendously false  ?  —  and  this,  too,  yet  that  about  the 
whole  world  of  academic  conjurors  in  metaphysi- 
cal philosophy  has  been  of  one  mind  as  to  its  pro- 
fundity and  validity,  and  as  to  the  immensity  of 
mind  that  could  conceive  it !    For  is  it  not  their  own 
words  that  "metaphysic  is  the  occupation  of  the 
reason  with  itself"?     And  then  again,  is  not  that 
world  this  minute  on  its  knees  in  adoration  of  the 
immensity  of  mind  of  Immanuel  Kant?    For  is  it 
not,  I  say,  their  own  words  that  "metaphysic  is 
the  occupation  of  the  reason  with  itself"  ?  —  not  the 
occupation,  the  reader  will  note,  of  the  whole  mind 
with  itself,  but  of  only  a  part  of  itself,  namely,  the 
reason,  with  itself;  and  to  determine  what,  in  the 
absence  of  continuity  of  that  part  with  the  rest  of 
the  mind,  that  part  may  function  to  deliver  of  truth 
or  of  right  ?    And  what  is  that  but  an  implied  pos- 
sibility of  divorce  of  higher  or  highest  faculty  from 
the  senses  and  sensuous  experience,  and  that  higher 
or  highest  to  retain  still  its  integrity,  spite  of  that 
divorce,  as  also  to  function  of  itself  of  its  own  force 
independent  of  the  senses  and  sensuous  experience? 
What  is  it  but  this,  and  right  in  the  face,  too,  of 
the  fact,  fact  well  known  to  every  intelligent  mind, 
that  while,  in  the  absence  of  the  higher  faculty,  may 
obtain  intact  and  unimpaired  the  senses  and  sensu- 


262 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


ous  experience,  still  with  missing  the  latter  is  in- 
evitably absent  altogether  every  trace,  as  might  be, 
of  the  higher  (?)  faculty,  —  so  utterly  dependent 
is  every  other  power  of  mind  on  the  malodorous 
lower  ?  What  is  it  but  this  ?  —  yes,  and  wherefore, 
precisely,  that  academic  metaphysic  has  been  the 
conspicuous  failure  that  it  has  been ;  that  the  meta- 
physician has  brought  upon  himself  the  ridicule  that 
he  has;  and  that  the  jargon  of  the  conflicting  meta- 
physical schools  has  been  the  scourge  of  philosophy, 
and  philosophy  itself,  been  the  jest  of  all  intelligent 

mankind. 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  such  assumed  pos- 
sible absolute  break  of  higher  faculty  (higher  as  it 
is  called,  as  though  faculty  that  could  only  think 
of  life  was  higher  than  faculty  that  could  con- 
sciously experience  and  realize  it!)  with  lower 
(which  is  only  a  piece  with  the  view  of  that  abso- 
lute divorce  of  mind  and  matter)  had  its  origin  with 
the  childhood  of  real  knowledge  in  the  ages  when 
theology  was  in  the  saddle  and  riding  mankind  to 
death,  and  overriding  all  independence  of  purely 
academic  philosophy. 

Still,  all  such  complete  chasm  between  two  things, 
chasm  once  thought  so  self-evident  is,  with  all 
the  more  intelligent  and  well  informed,  fast  becom- 
ing obsolete;  and  all  such  as  a  priori  intuition  of 
space  and  time,  or  whatever  else  independent  of  the 
senses  and  sensual  experience,  and  even  in  advance 
thereof,  becoming  at  least  questionable  if  not  ridic- 
ulous. 

And  now  as  to  the  immensity  of  mind  of  Im- 


Original  Intuition 


263 


manuel  Kant  who  could  conceive  the  absurd  propo- 
sition in  question,  —  well,  immensity,  indeed,  of 
mind  of  a  man  who  had  not  discernment  enough  to 
know  that  but  for  an  outlying  world  absolute,  he 
could  not  possibly  ever  have  known  of  the  existence 
of  another  human  being  than  himself !  nor  discern- 
ment enough,  again,  to  know  that  but  for  the  possi- 
bility of  our  knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute, 
he  could  not  possibly  have  known  even  of  his  own 
existence!     Immensity  of  mind,  I  should  say! 

I  have  said  Kant's  discovery  of  the  primacy  and 
transcendency  of  the  concept  what  is  next  door  to 
the  primacy  and  transcendency  of  consciousness. 
Yes,  and  I  must  still  believe  that  only  that  Kant 
was  overwhelmingly  impressed  and  assured  of  the 
latter,  foremost  of  all  childish  inanities,  might  he 
never  have  set  out  on  his  crusade  of  impeachment 
of  the  validity  of  the  primary  consciousness;  of 
denial  of  all  objective  truth  absolute,  even  that  of 
his  own  existence;  and  of  the  apotheosis  of  the  un- 
derstanding, the  reason,  and  the  chimerical  a  pripri 
intuition,  all  at  the  expense  of  insult  to  the  dignity 
and  validity  of  the  senses  and  their  deliverances  of 
an  external  world  absolute  and  of  our  perception 
of  it. 

However,  let  that  pass. 

What  is  of  immediate  moment  here  is  that  the 
only  intuition  of  any  standing  in  court  is  sim- 
ply original  intuition,  which  is  nothing  of  Kant's  a 
priori,  and  is  faculty  a  fisherman  as  it  were  fishing 
down  to  the  bottom  of  the  pond  but  fishing  up  noth- 
ing of  the  bottom  of  the  pond  itself,  nothing  of 


264 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


the  fundamentals  underlying  life,  mind,  and  con- 
sciousness; while  the  senses,  "the  poor  despised 
and  rejected  of  men,"  which  yet  may  become,  even 
in  the  view  of  philosophers  themselves,  "the  head  of 
the  corner,"  alone  are  faculty  a  fisherman  fishing 
down  to  include  that  bottom,  and  bringing  to  the 
surface  to  our  realization  and  appreciation  the  very 
bottom  of  the  pond  itself,  the  very  fundamentals 
underlying  life,  mind,  and  consciousness. 


With  consciousness  a  development  and  an  after- 
math, we  have  the  only  situation  that  effectually  dis- 
poses of  the  problem  of  evil,  the  time  immemorial 
scandal  alike  of  the  universe  and  of  theological  meta- 
physic. 


It  is  simply  idiotic  to  keep  on  insisting  on  the  pri- 
macy and  transcendency  of  the  consciousness  or 
conscious  mind  when  it  stands  right  in  the  way  of  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  — the  evil  there  is  in  the 
world  outside  what  man  himself  is  responsible  for; 
and  when,  with  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  but 
an  aftermath  and  a  development,  there  would  not 
even  be  the  problem.  "What  fools  these  mortals  be," 
says  Shakespeare.    And  sure  enough,  what  fools! 


Our  life  and  mind  to  any  fancied  cosmic  or  infinite 
life  and  mind  are  as  eddy  to  the  stream,  and  not  as 
lesser  stream  to  larger,  little  stream  to  greater,  as 
has  always  been  the  view  taken  not  only  by  theology, 
but  by  academic  philosophy  as  well.  And  yet  are  not 
light  and  heat  and  chemical  force,  etc.,  as  the  scien- 
tist's forms  of  energy  to  any  fancied  energy  as  out- 
side or  apart  as  it  were  from  its  forms,  much  as  eddy 
to  stream  rather  than  as  lesser  stream  to  larger?  And 
what  scientist  would  think  of  energy's  any  forms  as 
affording  a  clue  to  energy  itself  as  outside  or  apart, 
as  it  were,  from  all  its  forms?  And  why  more  should 
our  life  and  mind  and  the  lives  of  all  existences  be 
supposed  to  supply  the  least  clue  to  any  fancied  life 
and  mental  outside  or  apart  from,  as  it  were,  these  in- 
finitely diversified  manifest  forms  of  it? 

No,  our  life  and  mind  to  any  fancied  cosmic  or  in- 
finite life  and  mental  are  not  as  lesser  stream  to  larger 
merely,  but  as  eddy  of  the  stream  to  the  stream, 
which  involves  a  vastly,  if  not  infinitely,  greater  dif- 
ference. 


XX 

Summary  in  Brief  and  in  Part  of  Conclusions  in 
Philosophy  and  Criticism  Arrived  At 

And  here  at  an  end  —  for  the  most  part,  —  our 
Critique  of  Pure  Kant,  so  far  as  Kant's  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason  is  concerned,  except  for  a  sum- 
mary, in  brief  and  in  part,  of  the  conclusions  in 
philosophy    and    criticism    arrived    at,    which    are 

these :  — 

(i)  That  metaphysical  philosophy  has  hith- 
erto been  a  failure  and  the  disgust  of  all  intelligent 
mankind,  outside  philosophers  themselves,  (a)  be- 
cause the  latter  have  scouted  the  notion  that  physics 
could  afford  any  clue  to  the  solution  of  problems 
in  metaphysics  —  which  might  be  excusable  a  hun- 
dred and  more  years  ago  when  physics  was  of  little 
account,  or  in  its  infancy,  but  which  in  these  days 
of  modern  science  is  simply  idiotic;  and  again  (b) 
because  they,  the  philosophers,  have  set  out  with 
assumptions  rather  than  only  with  most  absolute 
knowledge,  only  with  which  had  they,  as  philoso- 
phers, any  business  to  set  out,  —  and  Kant  himself 
was  no  exception : 

(2)  That  what  is  of  most  absolute  knowledge 
are  the  three  great  facts,  great  primary  facts  of 
consciousness,  namely,  fact  of  awareness  of  one's 


268 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


own  existence,  fact  of  external  perception,  and  fact 
of  recognition  of  other  minds  and  their  experience, 
minds  other  than  each  its  own  mind  and  its  experi- 
ence, facts  with  which,  still,  as  simply  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, and  at  the  same  time,  as  working  factors 
in  the  solution  of  mind-world  problems,  has  not 
ever  yet  one  metaphysician  set  out  in  the  whole  his- 
tory of  metaphysical  philosophy,  —  Kant  himself 
failing  to  with  all  the  rest : 

(3)  That  the  primary  consciousness  or  con- 
scious mind  is  no  positively  constructive  falsifier, 
and  is  at  the  worst  but  a  negatively  constructive 
such  —  is  no  positively  constructive  falsifier  and 
well-nigh  downright  liar,  as  Kant  would,  as  would 
also  every  genuine  idealist,  have  us  understand  that 

it  is: 

(4)  That  we  may  have,  and  do  have,  most 
absolute  knowledge  of  objective  truth  absolute,  not 
a  little  of  it  at  least,  nevertheless  Kant's  scorn  of  the 
possibility  of  any  such  knowledge,  and  scorn,  by 
implication,  of  any  knowledge  of  his  own  existence 

even: 

(5)  That  whether  there  is,  or  is  not,  an  ex- 
ternal world  absolute,  and  whether  we  do,  or  do 
not  perceive  it,  something  of  very  it  itself,  is  crucial 
of  the  truth,  or  falsity,  in  its  essential  and  vital  part, 
of  Kant's  whole  transcendental  aesthetic,  and  of  his 
whole  metaphysic,  in  fact ;  so  that,  as  were  proven 
an  external  world  absolute,  and  our  perception  of 
very  it  itself,  must  be  undermined,  uprooted,  and 
exploded  that  whole  transcendental  aesthetic,  that 
whole  metaphysic : 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      269 

(6)  That,  in  very  truth,  there  is  most  abso- 
lutely certain  an  external  world  absolute,  Kant's 
wavering,  bewilderment,  self-contradiction  and  ut- 
ter inability  and  failure  to  demonstrate  its  exist- 
ence, notwithstanding. 

(7)  That  in  very  truth  again,  we  do,  in  ex- 
ternal perception,  perceive  that  external  world  ab- 
solute, perceive  very  it  itself,  —  Kant's  most  strenu- 
ous flat  denial  that  we  do,  and  mountainous  effort  to 
establish  the  contrary,  nevertheless: 

(8)  That  even  what  only  in  external  percep- 
tion we  perceive  is  that  external  world  absolute, 
save  only  what,  besides,  as  illusion  we  perceive 
from  not  perceiving  it  exhaustively  mechanically; 
which  is  to  say,  that  nothing  of  Kant's  phenomena 
do  we  perceive,  and  even  that  none  such  are  there 
to  perceive,  however,  still,  that  it  was  his  long 
drawn-out  agony  of  contention  that  such  there  are, 
and  that  we  perceive  them,  and  perceive  nothing 
else;  and  however,  still,  too,  that  only  as  there  are 
such,  and  we  perceive  them,  and  nothing  else,  is  not 
his  whole  metaphysic  but  the  "baseless  fabric  of  a 
vision";  is  to  say  this,  and  to  say  again,  that  the 
mind,  in  external  perception,  does  not  perceive  posi- 
tively constructively,  but  only  negatively  construc- 
tively, constructively  as  it  were ;  all  of  which  is  say- 
ing, in  short,  that,  in  external  perception,  the  mind 
functions  as  a  cognitive  organ  or  faculty  simply, 
and  not  as  a  constructive  one  in  the  more  proper 
and  orthodox  sense,  at  all,  —  yet  that  not  only 
Kant  assumed,  but  the  whole  academic  world  as- 
sumes and  declares  to  the  contrary,  and  that  exter- 


270  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

nal  perception  is  positively  constructive  perception : 
(9)     That  that  external  world  absolute  of  our 
external  perception  is  one  of  the  Primordial  Mental, 
what  is  the  mental,  yet  that  nothing  of  mind  or 
consciousness  or  of  the  offspring  thereof;  what  is 
the   mental   and   Itself   the    forever   and    forever 
changeless,  as  is  Its  activity  the  forever  and  forever 
changeful,  and  out  of  which  — the  latter  — mmd 
and  consciousness  are  evolved;   yes,  what  is  the 
mental  and  the  Primordial  Mental,  and  even  the 
very  foundations  of  the  universe  —  yea,  very  the 
Soul  of  the  universe;  —  still,  yet  that  the  only  men- 
tal either  at  the  foundations  of  the  universe,  or  else- 
where, or  at  any  time,  of  Kant's  recognition  is  the 
mental  as  mind,  consciousness,  or  their  offspring: 

(10)  That  the  most  primary  movement  of  that 
Primordial  Mental,  which  is  to  say  of  the  Absolute 
Reality,  of  which  we  have  any  hint,  is  that  of  cen- 
trifugal and  centripetal,  and  in  virtue  of  which,  the 
movement,  itself,  worlds  revolve  about  suns  and 
suns  about  suns ;  and  in  virtue  again  of  the  impact, 
in  the  return  stroke  of  the  centripetal  of  that  Real- 
ity on  Itself,  and  impact  of  the  mechanical  of  that 
Reality,  as  exciting  cause,  on  the  wnmechanical  of 
It,  as  predisposing  cause,  life,  mind  and  conscious- 
ness result,  —  these  being  much  the  triune  spec- 
trum, as  one  might  say,  of  the  Primordial  Mental 
and  Absolute  Reality  as  are  red,  green,  and  blue, 
the  triune  spectrum  of  white  light : 

(11)  That  the  consciousness  or  conscious 
mind  as  being  thus,  with  the  rest,  the  outcome  of 
an  event,  the  event  of  the  impact  of  the  Absolute 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      2yi 

Reality  on  Itself,  is  a  development,  and  as  a  de- 
velopment, then  but  an  aftermath  and  nothing 
aboriginal  and  primary  as  was  Kant's  assumption 
that  it  is,  and  as  is  the  whole  academic  world's  echo 
of  that  assumption  that  it  is: 

(12)    That  the  consciousness  or  conscious  mind 
is  thus  but  a  development  and  an  aftermath,  is  even 
most  absolutely  demonstrable,  as  absolutely  so  as 
is  any  proposition  in  Euclid;  —  this,  yet  that  not 
only  Kant,  but  every  academician  the  world  over 
must  be  understood  to  join  in  a  wild  chorus  of  in- 
credulity, and  shout  of  the  absurdity  of  such  a 
proposition;  and  following,  is  the  demonstration: 
—  Modern  science  informs  us  that  visual  light  is 
due  to  the  impact  of  ether  vibrations  on  eye  and 
brain.     Vibrations  are  something  mechanical.     So 
that  visual  light  is  due  to  the  impact  of  something 
mechanical  on  something.     But  science,  again,  in- 
forms us  that  to  a  change,  itself  something  me- 
chanical, of  the  wave  lengths  and  of  the  frequency 
of  their  impact,  themselves  (the  wave-lengths  and 
frequency  of  impact)   also  something  mechanical, 
is  due  a  change  of  consciousness,  that  is  to  say,  of 
its  content,  from  a  consciousness,  say  of  red,  to  a 
consciousness  of  blue,  green  or  other  color.     But 
now,  if  to  a  change  of  the  mechanical  making  the 
impact  is  due  a  change  of  consciousness,  that  is,  of 
its  content,  then,   prima  facie,  to  the  mechanical 
minus  the  change,  that  is,  to  the  mechanical  in  statu 
quo,  is  due  content  of  consciousness  at  all,  and  due 
consciousness  itself  at  all,  since  we  know  the  latter 
only  as  with  content  as  we  know  reflection  in  a 


272  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

mirror  only  as  with  objects  before  it  for  reflection^ 
But  now  again,  consciousness  due  to  the  impact  of 
something  mechanical  on  something  is  consciousness 
preceded,  oi  course,  by  that  something  making  the 
impact  a^d  on  which  the  impact  is  made,  and  which 
as^receding,  is  itself  the  thing  of  Pr^^^^ ^ 
transcendency,  and  not  consciousness    hat  is  such 
which  itself  then  obtains  only  as  a  development  ^nd 
as  only  a  development  then  only  as  an  aftermath -- 
a  devebpment  and  an  aftermath  of  that  rnaking  the 
impact  and  on  which  the  impact  is  ^ade;  only  a 
development  and  an  aftermath  and  nothmg  aborigi- 
nal   and    primary, -as    was    the    proposition    to 
demonstrate:  this  the  proposition  and  demonstra- 
tion and  which  the  following  incontestable     ac  s 
only  go  to  confirm,  namely,  fact  that  it  is  in 

perfect  consistence  with  the  universe  an  evolution, 
which  it  is  not  with  the  universe  a  snap  creation, 
but  fatally  inimical  to  it;  fact  again,  that  between 
the   consciousness   or   conscious   mind    our   own, 
which  we  know  something  about,  itself  only  com- 
petent as  author  or  origin  of  the  mechanical  physi- 
Sl  and  utterly  impotent  as  author  or  origm  of  the 
Zing  physical,  and  the  any  fancied  consciousnes 
or  cLcious  mind,  infinite  or  otherwise  which  we 
know  nothing  about,  itself  competent  as  author  or 
S  of  such  living  physical,  there  is  absolutely  no 
logical  connection,  none  whatever,  «f^«f '^^^  "°7 ' 
and  if  none,  then  some  other  mental,  if  the  mental 
at  all    than  as  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  is 
uch  author  or  origin  of  that  Ij-i-iV^y-'^^'j'^^ 
only  possible  other  mental  as  it  is  that  void  of  con- 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      273 

sciousness  or  conscious  mind,  it  must  be  that,  then, 
that  is  the  author  or  origin  not  only  of  the  living 
physical  but  also  of  the  principles  of  the  mechanical 
physical  which,  themselves  the  mental  as  conscious 
mind  not  being  the  author  or  origin  of  and  only 
availing  itself  of  combinations  of  in  its  authorship 
of  anything  mechanical,  it  must  be  the  mental  void 
of  consciousness  or  conscious  mind  that  is,  and 
which,  as  it  is,  must  logically  and  historically  antici- 
pate the  mental  as  conscious  mind,  the  latter  itself, 
thus  proving  to  be  but  an  aftermath  and  a  develop- 
ment; fact,  still  again  that  the  mental  as  con- 
scious mind,  our  own,  the  only  such  we  know  any- 
thing about,  is,  primarily,  utterly  incapable  of  con- 
sciousness unassisted  from  without ;  while  such  men- 
tal as  must  the  Absolute  and  Final  Reality  be, — must 
for  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  understand  that  any- 
thing else  than  the  mental  should  be  author  or 
origin  of  the  mental,  and  most  assuredly  conscious- 
ness is  what  is  mental  —  is  capable  of  conscious- 
ness unassisted  from  without,  or  there  would  never 
be  any  consciousness  in  the  universe,  which  we 
know  there  is,  even  very  our  own  being  in  attesta- 
tion thereof;  is  capable  unassisted  from  without  as 
there  can  be  nothing  outside  the  Absolute  and  Final 
Reality  to  afford  that  outside  assistance  as  every- 
body will  allow,  —  which  is  to  say  that  yet  that  the 
primordial  mental  as  the  Absolute  Reality  is  capa- 
ble of  consciousness  unassisted  from  without,  it 
still  is  so,  as  it  would  seem,  only  in  the  event  of  its 
being  acted  on,  and  acted  on  from  within,  and  by 
itself  on  itself  —  acted  on  by  itself  for  there  is  noth- 


274  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

ing  else  to  act  on  it  —  and  as  is  so  only  in  that 
event,  it  is,  then,  only  in  the  event  of  an  event  that 
conscious  mind  obtains  and  as  obtaining,  obtains, 
too,  but  as  an  aftermath  and  a  development,  and 
nothing  aboriginal  and  primary ;  and  (4)  fact  even 
still  once  more  and  finally,  —  and  this  is  a  clincher 
—  that  the  proposition  and  demonstration  renders 
readily  solvable  the  problem  of  evil  in  the  world, 
which  never  has  been  solvable  and  never  will  be  to 
all  eternity,  with  consciousness  or  conscious  mind 
understood  as  something  aboriginal  and  primal. 

(13)  That  consciousness  is  absolutely  demon- 
strable as  nothing  aboriginal  and  primary,  is  quite 
enough  of  itself  and  alone,  let  go  all  other  abundant 
proof,  to  render  utterly  impossible  and  absurd  the 
whole  Kantian  metaphysic,  a  metaphysic  which  ac- 
cords pre-eminence  to  the  concept  —  or  a  priori 
intuition  assuming  whatever  form  in  the  abstract 
or  as  being  thought,  you  will  —  over  idea  in  the 
concrete  and  as  unbeing  thought :  quite  enough, 
since  the  former  involves  consciousness  which  itself 
being  nothing  aboriginal  and  primary,  the  concept 
or  a  priori  intuition  assuming  whatever  form  you 
will  but  involving  it,  can  by  no  possibility,  be  any- 
thing such: 

(14)  That  consciousness  may  obtain  as  often 
as  ever  there  is  impact  of  the  Absolute  Reality  on 
Itself,  —  or  it  may  not;  —  only,  as  the  former  is 
the  case,  then  it  obtains  cosmically,  and  our  con- 
sciousness is  one  with  that  of  the  cosmos  or  uni- 
verse, our  brain  as  brain,  merely  functioning 
neither  as  the  origin  of  our  consciousness,  nor  even 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      275 

of  its  content,  at  ally  but  only  as  determining  its  con- 
tent such  as  it  is;  or  yet,  as  still  the  former  should 
not  be  the  case,  and  the  latter  should  be,  then  our 
brain  as  brain  functions  as  the  spring  both  of  our 
consciousness  itself,  as  also  of  its  content  at  all, 
and  of  its  content  altogether,  altogether,  that  is, 
both  of  its  content  at  all  and  of  its  content  such  as 
that  is,  —  the  former  though,  and  that  conscious- 
ness obtains  as  often  as  there  is  that  impact,  be  it 
said,  being,  perhaps,  the  more  likely: 

(15)  That  the  mind  itself,  in  external  percep- 
tion, is  no  more  directly  acted  on,  in  the  return 
stroke  of  the  centripetal,  by  the  external  world  ab- 
solute or  external  objects  absolute  then  obtaining, 
which  it  cognosces,  than  is  a  mirror  by  the  objects, 
which  that  cognosces  as  it  were,  as  it  reflects  them, 
only  the  physical  substratum,  the  brain  namely,  be- 
ing that  directly  acted  on  by  that  world  or  those 
objects;  which  being  so,  Kant's  "phenomena"  for 
this,  still  another,  reason,  are  necessarily  only  the 
veriest  fiction: 

(16)  That  space  and  time  are  primarily  noth- 
ing of  the  human  mind's  conception,  nothing  of  a 
priori  intuition,  nothing  of  forms  of  perception,  as 
Kant  would  have  it ;  but  things,  from  the  first,  exter- 
nal to  the  mind  and  absolute;  and  wherefore  that 
they  are,  are  we  ourselves  in  space  and  time,  and 
not  space  and  time  primarily  only  in  us,  as  he  would 
fain  make  us  believe : 

(17)  That,  in  fact,  what  there  is  experience 
of  in  the  sensuous  experience  of  space  (and  so  of 
time),  a  notion,  concept,  idea  or  a  priori  intuition  of 


276 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


is  no  sensuous  experience  of  at  all ;  and  so,  of  course, 
prima  facie,  can,  by  no  possibility,  be  a  contribu- 
tion to  —  Kant,  yet,  shouting  at  the  top  of  his  voice 
that  it  is  such  contribution ;  and  the  validity  yet, 
of  his  whole  metaphysic,  touching  space  and  time, 
and,  indeed,  of  his  whole  metaphysic  altogether, 
contingent  on  its  being  such,  nevertheless. 

(18)  That  what  are  properly  categoricals  are 
only  what  are  in  effect,  genera  entertained  as  such, 
by  the  understanding,  the  basis  of  the  species  of 
which  is  thing  absolute,  and  matter  of  sensuous 
experience  and  perception  as  much  as  are  space  and 
time  — this  still,  yet  for  all  Kant's  attempt  at  the 
absolute  divorce  of  everything  of  the  nature  of  a 
categorical  from  the  sensuous  and  the  absolute  of 
that  sensuous,  of  which  there  is  experience  and 
perception. 

(19)  That  with  the  consciousness  or  con- 
scious mind  but  a  development  and  an  aftermath, 
it  must  be  the  un-being  thought,  or  unbeing- 
thought  thought,  that  is  at  the  very  foundations  of 
the  universe,  and  not  the  being-thought  thought 
that  is,  as  was  the  acclaim  of  Kant,  as  it  is,  too,  at 
this  hour,  of  the  entire  academic  world,  that  entire 
world  philosophical  or  otherwise. 

(20)  That  all  conviction  whether  of  truth,  or  of 
right,  has  both  its  exciting  cause  and  its  source  in 
the  sensuous  experience  of  the  physical  and  of  the 
mechanical  of  the  physical,  so  intimate,  correlated, 
atid  inseparable  are  matter  and  mind,  the  so-called 
physical  and  the  mechanical  of  that  physical,  and 
the  so-called  spirtual ;  —  this,  still  that  must  be  un- 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      277 

derstood  to  stand  aghast,  and  with  unspeakable  dis- 
gust at  so  startling  a  proposition,  not  only  Kant, 
but  the  whole  academic  hierarchy  of  worshippers 
at  the  shrine  of  Kantian  metaphysic. 

(21)  And  finally,  that  as  was  sought  to  ex- 
plain how  things  in  external  perception  are  as  they 
appear,  and  not  how  they  are  not  as  they  appear, 
as  how  they  are  not  Kant  sought  to  explain,  it  has 
been  with  the  result,  as  hinted  early  in  this  treatise, 
that  the  plain-man,  in  the  simplicity  of  interpreta- 
tion of  his  external  perception  is  vindicated,  and 
the  primary  consciousness  proven  no  liar,  —  liar  or 
stupendous  falsifier  at  least,  as  Kant  and  the  whole 
academic  world  of  his  following  would  have  it  that 
it  is;  while  the  academic  philosopher  himself  in  his 
cumbersome,  labored,  far-fetched,  stilted  and 
pedantic  effort  to  explain  such  perception  is  shown 
to  make  himself  simply  ridiculous. 

These,  in  brief  and  in  part,  the  principal  con- 
clusions arrived  at.  Nor  are  we  to  be  terrified 
that,  in  the  light  of  them,  the  universe  should  ap- 
pear to  be  primarily,  much  a  machine,  a  machine 
acting  intelligently,  with  intelligent  result,  but  void 
of  intelligence;  the  fundamentals  of  it  being  unbe- 
ing-thought  thoughts,  and  these  in  the  concrete  of 
the  Primordial  Mental,  and  all  in  a  certain  combina- 
tion itself  unbeing-thought  thought,  and  the  whole 
driven  by  a  blind  power,  precisely  as  is  the  case 
with  any  machine,  and  say  a  pin  machine.  In  the 
latter,  every  piece  and  part  of  which  itself  is  an  un- 
being-thought thought,  each  in  the  concrete, 
the    concrete    of    iron    or    steel,    and    all    in    a 


278 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


certain  combination  itself  unbeing-thought 
thought,  the  whole  driven  (usually)  by  a  blind 
power  of  water,  electricity,  or  some  other,  with  the 
result  —  as  the  machine  draws  the  wire,  cuts  it  off 
of  the  right  length,  tapers  it,  points  it  and  heads  it 
and  much  more  —  of  the  pin  machine  acting  in- 
telligently with  intelligent  outcome,  but  without 
the  least  intelligence,  whatever.  The  only  differ- 
ence between  it  and  the  universe  is  that  the  former 
acts,  primarily,  only  mechanically  intelligently, 
without  intelligence,  while  the  latter  acts  not  only 
mechanically  intelligently  but,  also,  livingly  intel- 
ligently, without  intelligence.  Meanwhile,  the  only 
difference,  again,  between  the  universe  itself  and 
the  human  being  is  that,  while  the  former  acts, 
primarily,  both  mechanically  and  livingly  intelli- 
gently but  without  intelligence,  the  latter  does  it 
with  intelligence  superadded,  though  only  within  a 
very  limited  and  comparatively  narrow  range,  and 
immeasurably  at  the  expense  of  power,  it  would 
seem,  for  authorship  or  origin  over  a  wider  field  and 
without  intelligence. 

And  now,  finally  what,  in  the  light  of  it  all,  is 
to  be  said  of  Kant?  Why,  nothing  less  of  him  as 
a  philosopher  than  that  he  was  the  greatest 
romancer,  whether  in  philosophy  or  out  of  it,  that 
ever  lived ;  that  for  assumption,  pure  raw  rank  as- 
sumption, for  sky-rocketing,  contradiction,  enigma, 
jugglery,  puerility,  and  grotesque  absurdity,  he  was 
certainly  past  grand-master  of  all  of  his  guild, 
though  others,  Hegel  for  example,  may  follow  him 
a  close  second. 


Summary  of  Conclusions  Arrived  At      279 

And  then  to  be  said  of  his  philosophy  itself 
that  it  is  of  the  cart  before  the  horse  variety  in  re- 
spect of  about  everything  philosophically  funda- 
mental; and  the  horse,  too,  not  even  then  allowed 
to  push  before  him  the  cart,  but,  instead,  the  cart 
forced  to  drag  after  itself  the  horse!  In  a  word, 
realization  is  made  to  wait  on  conception  instead 
of  the  reverse,  and  conception  to  wait  on  realiza- 
tion. For,  as  that  philosophy  would  have  it,  the 
outlying  world  absolute  gives  us  only  the  "matter" 
—  and  even  that  only  remotely  —  and  not  the 
form,  when,  in  fact,  it,  and  it  alone,  for  the  most 
part  at  least,  gives  us  both.  For,  as  that  philosophy 
would  have  it,  both  the  perception  of  that  world, 
and  the  external  world  of  our  perception  itself,  are 
at  the  mercy  of  the  conscious  mind,  when  in  very 
truth  it  is  the  conscious  mind  that,  primarily,  is  al- 
together at  the  mercy  of  the  outlying  world  abso- 
lute, at  least  as  to  whether  the  mind  is  even  con- 
scious at  all,  or  perceives  or  knows  anything  at  alj. 
For,  as  that  philosophy  would  have  it,  mind  con- 
ceives before  it  perceives,  conceptually  knows  be- 
fore it  sensuously  experiences,  that  is,  knows  as 
conceptually  knowing  before  it  knows  as  perceptu- 
ally knowing.  For,  as  that  philosophy  would  have 
it,  sensuous  experience,  realization,  perception  get 
its  character  from  the  knowing  as  conceptually 
knowing  mind,  yet  that  that  mind  primarily  does 
not  even  exist  for  centuries  and  ages  after  the 
sensuous  experience  and  external  perception  first 
has  its  existence ;  gets  its  character  from  the  know- 
ing as  conceptually  knowing  mind,  which  Kant  said 


28o  Critique  of  Pure  Kant 

it  did,  which  if  true,  there  might  be  some  reason  in 
expecting,  as  he  expected,  and  grounded  his  whole 
metaphysic-in  its  being  true,  that  in  knowing  the 
knowing  mind  we  might  know  of,  yes  and  even 
have  granted  as  falling  to  us,  finally,  such  a  thing 
as  sensuous  experience. 

And  so  on  to  the  end  of  the  endless  chapter  of 
the  cart-before-the-horse  metaphysic. 

And,  then,  finally,  over  all  it  is  to  be  said  of 
that  philosophy,  that,  if  the  exploitation  of  the  im- 
possible, such  as  is  Kant's  Critique  of  the  Pure 
Reason,  is  found  to  end  in  scepticism,  if  by  that 
you  mean  scepticism  as  to  the  living  truth,  then  no 
wonder;  or  if  by  it  you  mean  scepticism  as  to  the 
Being  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  then  in- 
deed is  there  wonder,  but  only  wonder  that  it 
should  so  end. 


The  human  Reason  is  altogether  and  absolutely 
impotent  to  reason  back  from  the  plant  to  its  begin- 
ning in  the  seed  —  only  for  our  observation  of  the 
sensible  fact,  in  sensuous  experience,  could  we  ever 
know  anything  of  it.  And  yet  that  same  human 
Reason  is  altogether  competent  to  reason  back  from 
itself  to  its  beginning,  and  its  beginning  in  con- 
scious mind  the  conscious  mind  attaching  to  Supreme 
Power!  —  this  the  attitude  and  claim  of  Kant;  but 
could  anything  be  more  utterly  and  ridiculously  shal- 
low? But  it  at  least  affords  us  another  of  the  many 
like  measures  of  the  immensity  of  mind  of  Inimanuel 
Kant  as  logician  and  philosopher. 


The  difference  between  a  created  universe  and  an 
evoluted  one  is  the  difference  between  the  hen  laying 
the  egg,  and  the  egg  laying  the  hen.  As  to  what  or 
who  in  the  latter  case  laid  the  egg,  we  are  tempted 
to  say  nothing  laid  it,  and  that  it  was  eternal  from  the 
beginning  —  or,  rather  eternal  from  no  beginning; 
but  that  would  be  to  assume  to  know  something  in  the 
matter  which  we  cannot  possibly  in  any  reason  pre- 
tend to.  Rather,  then,  shall  we  not  say  that  that  is 
to  answer  how  anything  came  to  be,  that  that  is  the 
absolutely  inscrutable,  that  that  is  the  "face  which  no 
man  shall  see  and  live?" —  rather  shall  we  not  say 
this,  and  rest  the  matter  right  there? 


"A   house  divided  against  itself  shall  not  stand.'* 

Scripture. 


Part  II 

THE  CRITIQUE 
OF  THE  PRACTICAL  REASON 


And  the  Reason  divided  against  Itself  as  Kant,  in 
his  discrimination  of  the  Theoretical  or  Pure  Reason 
and  the  Practical  Reason,  divided  It  against  Itself, 
shall  not  stand  —  stand.  Itself  as  of  any  authority. 
Its  deliverances  as  of  any  validity. 


In  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  subjectivity  is  not 
allowed  to  be  any  guarantee  of  objectivity  absolute.  In 
the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason,  just  the  contrary 
is  insisted  on  and  that  subjectivity  is  guarantee  of  ob- 
jectivity absolute:  and  that  it  is,  is  the  very  soul  of  that 
Critique.  Oh!  consistency,  thy  name  is  not  Immanuel 
Kant ! 


XXI 

Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason 

But  now,  as  a  moment  ago,  I  said  that  then  and 
there,  for  the  most  part,  an  end  of  our  Critique  of 
Pure  Kant,  so  far  as  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
son, taken  by  itself,  is  concerned,  so,  now  I  say, 
here  at  an  end  that  Critique  altogether. 

But  yet  a  word,  and  only  a  word,  as  to  his 
Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason;  only  a  word,  for 
when  you  have  heard  the  opinion  of  the  Judge  on 
the  Bench,  what  the  counsel  for,  or  against  the  ac- 
cused has  to  say  is  of  little  account.  And  Kant  in 
his  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  was  a  Judge  on  the 
Bench.  He  was  then  under  no  bias,  no  conscious 
bias  at  least,  to  discover  one  particular  thing,  or 
another,  as  the  truth,  but  to  discover  the  truth  sim- 
ply, whatever  that  might  be.  His  attitude,  too, 
was  the  scientific  one,  that  of  the  man  of  modern 
science  who,  on  entering  his  laboratory,  is  indiffer- 
ent as  to  whether  oxygen  unites  with  carbon  to 
form  water,  or  with  hydrogen  to  form  it,  he  only 
eager  to  know  which  it  is. 

But  Kant  in  his  Critique  of  the  Practical  Rea- 
son is  no  longer  the  judge  on  the  bench,  but  the 
advocate  at  the  bar.  He  has  now  demeaned  him- 
self to  the  level  of  a  vastly  lower  role  in  the  drama 


286 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


of  his  enacting.  The  accused,  namely,  the  Being 
of  God,  as  also  freedom  and  immortality  of  the 
human  soul,  —  as  also  the  latter,  since  depending, 
as  they  are  generally  understood  to,  on  the  former, 
are,  particeps  criminis,  in  a  way,  with  the  Being 
of  God  Himself,  the  principal  offender,  —  charged, 
we  are  to  understand,  with  the  crime  of  being  veri- 
table realities,  have,  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
son, just  been  acquitted  of  the  grave  offense,  as, 
*'in  the  opinion  of  the  Court"  (Kant  himself),  the 
evidence  was  "insufficient  to  convict."  But  now, 
again,  these  criminal  dignitaries  are  up  for  trial, 
and,  this  time,  with  Kant  the  leading  counsel  for  the 
prosecution,  in  the  attempt  to  prove  them  guilty, 
guilty  of  being  veritable  truths,  actual  realities  in- 
deed. The  accused,  whom  or  which  Kant  as  judge 
found,  at  the  first  trial,  innocent,  found  the  evi- 
dence "insufficient  to  convict,"  he  is  suddenly,  as 
prosecutor,  flush  with  evidence  to  prove  guilty. 
And  of  course^  to  prove  guilty;  for,  like  every 
other  advocate,  however  disposed  to  be  fair,  he  is 
bound,  under  the  stress  of  the  exigencies  of  the  role 
he  is  enacting,  to  attach  significance  to  some  facts  or 
circumstances  which,  before,  with  him  as  judge 
had  little,  or  none;  to  realize  less  in  others  which, 
before,  seemed  to  him  to  have  much;  and,  maybe, 
even  to  overlook  altogether  still  others  which  pos- 
sibly hitherto  he  had  given  special  attention  to; 
bound,  in  a  word,  so  to  juggle  with  the  facts,  and 
even  juggle  with  his  own  faculties  that,  to  his  mind, 
guilty  "without  reasonable  doubt"  was  the  only 
"verdict"  that  could  consistently  be  "returned." 


Critique  of  The  Practical  Reason         287 

In  other  words,  Kant  now,  in  the  Critique  of  the 
Practical  Reason,  has  it  in  mind,  not  to  discover 
what  is  the  truth,  but  to  prove  what  it  is  already  a 
foregone  conclusion  in  his  own  mind,  and  what  it 
is  his  own,  and  the  pleasure  of  all  mankind,  to  think 
is  the  truth,  is  the  truth.  It  is  not  in  that  God,  im- 
mortality and  the  soul  are  not  truths  or  realities  that 
lies  Kant's  mental  apostacy  and  demoralization  for 
the  moment,  but  in  that  he  iirst  assumes  them  such, 
and  then  —  as  is  ever  the  temper  of  the  strenuous 
advocate  —  has  it  in  mind  headlong  in  any  event 
to  demonstrate  them  such;  headlong  in  any  event 
to  break  and  bend  facts  and  considerations  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  predestined  conclusion  that  truths 
and  realities  they  are.  It  is  simply  impossible  that 
a  mind,  under  the  stress  of  an  ardent  advocate's 
leaning,  should  not  color  its  line  of  thought  itself 
with  that  leaning.  Not  in  our  civil  and  criminal 
courts  would,  for  an  instant,  be  taken  the  opinion 
of  judge,  or  of  jury,  under  one  hundredth,  no,  not 
under  one  thousandth  the  bias  of  Kant  in  the  course 
of  his  argument  —  argument  if  it  may  be  called, 
to  call  it  something  —  for  God,  immortality  and  the 
soul.  I  say  a  judge  or  a  jury  even  under  one  ten 
thousandth  the  prepossession  of  opinion  of  Kant 
in  the  elaboration  of  his  Critique  of  the  Practical 
Reason,  would  be  disbarred  of  all  function  in  the 
trial. 

And  yet,  still  that  Kant  was  under  such  tre^ 
mendous  stress  to  drive  his  argument  to  the  goal 
of  his  own  foreordination,  the  whole  religious 
world,  spite  of  the  reactionary  conclusions  of  his 


288 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  but,  because  he,  in  the 
Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  pats  on  the  back, 
doctrine  of  its  most  cherished  and  ardent  belief, 
"takes  stock"  to  the  limit  in  his  argument  in  the  lat- 
ter Critique  as  were  his  the  very  "pink  of  perfec- 
tion" of  mental  attitude  in  the  conduct  of  it;  and 
as  must  not  the  argument  itself  be  in  the  least  im- 
paired by  the  viciousness  of  that  attitude.  And  so 
would  seem  besides,  even  about  the  whole  academic 
world,  to  do  much  the  same  thing;  and  even  to  be, 
as  I  before  said,  prostrate  before  Kant  as  before  a 
very  god,  and  almost  as  before  very  God;  mean- 
time, its  only  excuse  for  it  all,  being  that  it  knows 
no  better!    And  the  pity  'tis  it  knows  no  better! 

Now,  the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  is, 
in  brief,  to  the  effect  of  a  contention  that,  because 
our  practical  or  moral  experience  requires  us,  as 
would  seem,  to  postulate  such  as  the  Being  of  God 
an  outstanding  entity  and  absolute  reality,  there- 
fore is  there  such;  —  the  same  reasoning  —  rea- 
soning !  —  as  it  is  thought  to  be,  applying  to  the 
doctrines  of  freedom,  the  soul  and  immortality! 

But  now,  could  you  imagine  a  line  of  argument 
more  utterly  shallow,  more  thoroughly  sophistical? 
Why  it  is  like  contending  that,  because  our  sensu- 
ous and  perceptual  experience  requires  us,  as  might 
it  seem,  to  postulate  such  as  a  varicolored  sunset 
sky,  as  being  an  outstanding  entity  and  absolute 
reality,  entity  and  reality  independent  of  eye  and 
brain  therefore  is  there,  forsooth,  such  sky  an  out- 
standing entity,  and  absolute  reality,  —  precisely, 
however,  what  we  know  there  is  not;  precisely  what 


Critique  of  The  Practical  Reason         289 

every  scientist  the  world  over  assures  us  there  is 
not,  that  color,  we  being  told,  depending  wholly  on 
our  eyes  and  brain  only  for  which  would  it  exist; 
and  which  precisely,  (that  outstanding  independ- 
ent reality)  that  there  is  not,  is  absolutely  demon- 
strative that,  because  our  sensuous  or  perceptual 
experience  requires  us,  as  it  might  seem,  to  postu- 
late a  varicolored  sunset  sky  an  outstanding  inde- 
pendent entity  or  absolute  reality,  it  is  no  evidence 
in  the  least  whatever,  much  less  proof  of  such  vari- 
colored sky  an  outstanding  independent  entity  and 
absolute  reality.  And  so  by  a  parity  of  reasoning 
is  it,  of  course,  similarly  absolutely  demonstrative 
that  because  our  practical  or  moral  experience  re- 
quires us,  as  it  might  seem,  to  postulate  such  as  a 
Being  of  God,  freedom  and  immortality,  it  is  not 
the  least  evidence  whatever,  much  less  proof,  of 
anything  such  outstanding  and  absolute  realities, 
realities  independent  of  our  thinking  or  thought. 

And  yet,  I  say,  as  runs  the  logic  of  the  Critique 
of  the  Practical  Reason,  it  is  evidence,  and  most 
abundant  and  conclusive  evidence  thereof;  which 
only  shows  up  at  a  stroke,  most  luminously  and  ex- 
haustively, the  utter  rottenness  of  the  logic,  logic  as 
it  pretends  to  be,  at  the  bottom  of  that  Critique. 
And,  still,  it  is  that  of  Kant,  that  of  him  of  colos- 
sal and  Copernican  intellect,  as  it  is  said!  Colos- 
sal! and  Copernican!  But,  oh.  Shade  of  Coperni- 
cus, forgive  us  for  ever  once  mention,  in  the  same 
breath,  of  yours  with  the  name  of  Immanuel  Kant ! 

But  enough  and  enough.  Why  say  more? 
Why  follow  Kant  further  into  the  wilderness  ?    And 


290 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


to  return  to  my  earlier  inquiry  —  Why  waste  time 
on  the  specious  pleading  of  an  advocate,  as  it  might 
be  on  either  side,  when  you  have  the  judgment  of 
the  Judge  on  the  Bench  ?  —  Why,  when  you,  in  the 
Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  have  "the  opinion  of 
the  Court"  in  the  matter,  even  Kant  himself  the 
Court?     No  reason  why;  and  we  will  waste  none 
further  on  it.    We  have  even  scripture  itself  for  it 
that  a  house  divided  against  itself  shall  not  stand. 
And  so  it  is  to  be  said  of  the  Reason,  that  it,  that 
that,    divided  against   Itself  as   Kant   in  his  two 
Critiques  of  the  Pure  Reason  and  of  the  Practical 
Reason  has  divided  it,  shall  not  stand;  stand  as 
having  any  authority,  stand  as  commanding  to  the 
full  the  respect  and  confidence  of  mankind.     And 
in  the  light  of  this  division  of  Kant's  of  the  Rea- 
son against  Itself,   it  cannot  be  said  of  his  two 
Critiques,  as  someone  has  remarked  of  the  earlier, 
that   it   is   the   "glorification  of   the   Reason";   as 
rather,  is  it  that  the  two  are  very  the  damnation  of 
the  Reason. 

But  now,  as  I,  a  while  ago,  was  done  with  Im- 
manuel  Kant  so  far  as  his  Critique  of  the  Pure  Rea- 
son is  concerned,  so  now,  again,  am  I  done  with 
him  so  far  as  his  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason 
is  concerned ;  and  done  with  him,  indeed,  altogether 
as,  as  surely  as  the  sun  rises  on  the  morrow,  will  all 
mankind  sometime  in  the  future  have  done  with 
him  as  a  metaphysician,  and  done  with  him  forever 
and  forever. 


Appendix  A 

It  was  said  in  the  preface  to  this  work  that  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  Kant's  transcendental  aesthetic 
does  not  hinge  primarily  on  the  possibility  of  knowl- 
edge independent  of  experience;  but  I  may  add  here 
that  it  does  not  even  hinge  secondarily  on  it;  since 
even  were  there  that  possibility,  still  such  knowledge 
might  not  include  that  afforded  in  sensuous  experi- 
ence. That  it  must  is  entirely  a  non  sequitur  if 
there  ever  was  one.  It  is  but  academic  dogmatic 
assumption  that  affects  to  bridge  the  abyss  between 
the  premiss  and  the  any  such  conclusion. 

So  that  it  has  not  been  that  I  was  to  be  under- 
stood as  making  the  contention  that  there  are  no 
"classes  of  ideas,"  no  "forms"  in  the  "human  Rea- 
son" which  do  not  come  through  experience  — 
which  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  anyone  could  main- 
tain—  but  that  it  is  not  through  any  such  as  first 
in  the  human  Reason  that  "experience  is  acquired," 
as  Kant  sought  to  establish  is  the  case.  For  what 
is  the  transcendental  aesthetic?  Why,  it  is  not 
simply  that  there  are  "classes  of  ideas,  or  forms"  in 
the  Reason  affording  knowledge  independent  of  ex- 
perience, but  it  is,  besides,  that  among  them  are 
those  first  in  the  Reason  through  which,  later,  "ex- 
perience is  acquired."  So  that  as  there  might  be 
those  affording  knowledge  independent  of  experi- 


292 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


ence,  and  still  not  those  through  which  experi- 
ence is  acquired,  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  trans- 
cendental aesthetic  does  not  turn  on  there  being  the 
former  but  does  turn  on  there  being  at  least  the 
latter. 

And  as  to  there  being  the  latter,  you  might  as 
well  talk  about  a  leaf  deriving  "form"  or  structure 
and  function  from  a  flower  —  almost  the  exact  re- 
verse is  the  fact  —  as  to  talk  about  the  senses  or 
sensuous  experience  deriving  anything  of  "form," 
or  whatsoever  from  the  intellect  or  Reason.  But, 
then,  Kant  was  no  evolutionist,  but  a  snap-creation- 
ist. He  knew  nothing  practically,  of  the  order  of 
evolution.  His  whole  theory  of  mind,  is  quite  the 
reverse  of  it;  and  indeed  as  violent  an  outrage  on 
that  order  as  it  is  possible  to  conceive. 

But  even  for  the  moment  to  pass  that,  and  to 
keep  to  his  own  ground,  there  yet  is  absolutely  no 
logical  connection  between  the  human  intellect  or 
Reason  having  some  "ideas  or  forms"  and  its  hav- 
ing all  such,  or  having  any  such  as  some  faculty 
Kant  might  think,  or  anybody  might  think,  distinct 
and  alien  to  the  intellect  or  Reason,  as  Kant  as- 
sumed for  the  senses  might  have  —  no  logical  con- 
nection whatever. 

And  was  it,  then,  that  he  had  a  fancied  aborig- 
inal Reason  in  his  mind,  and  in  his  mind  as  at  the 
foundation  of  the  universe  and  author  of  every- 
thing mental  outside  Itself  —  Itself  without  senses 
and  sensuous  experience,  of  course  —  and  so  au- 
thor of  any  "idea  or  form"  met  with  in  the  human 
mind,  and  in  the  senses  through  which  "idea  or 


Critique  of  The  Practical  Reason         293 

form  sensuous  experience  is  acquired"?  Did  he 
have  that,  or  even  have  now  one  and  now  the  other 
in  view,  but  flit  with  such  lightning  change  from 
one  to  the  other  that  you  never  know  when  he  has 
one  in  mind  and  when  the  other?  Or  even  did  he 
have  both  simultaneously  in  view  as  were  to  have 
one  in  mind  was  to  have  the  other  as  well,  —  such 
his  utter  confusion  as  to  the  distinction  between  the 
two?  It  would  almost  seem  the  last  was  the  case, 
and  that  he  was  under  the  impression,  as  are  most 
of  his  echoes  and  idolators  after  him,  that  author- 
ship of  whatsoever  by  one  is  at  once  authorship  of 
it  by  the  other  and  both,  and  because  of  identity  of 
nature  of  both;  quite  overlooking  that  identity  of 
nature  is  not  identity  of  entities  having  that  nature, 
which  itself  quite  debars  one  necessarily  having  an 
experience  because  the  other  has  it. 

But  then,  anyway,  what  did  he,  or  do  we,  know 
about  an  infinite  or  aboriginal  Reason?  Nothing, 
absolutely  nothing.  If  there  is  a  finite  or  condi- 
tioned Reason,  and  which  is  ours,  then  an  infinite 
or  unconditioned  Reason  has  not  the  ghost  of  a  fact 
or  rational  consideration  in  warrant  of  its  existence. 
More  than  this,  such  is  positively  inconceivable, 
still  that  the  whole  academic  world  never  doubts 
the  fact  of  it.  It  is  positively  inconceivable  that,  as 
ours  is  a  finite  or  conditioned  mental  assuming  the 
form  of  the  Reason,  that  fancied  infinite,  uncondi- 
tioned or  absolute  mental  should  obtain  in  the 
assumed  same  form  and  be  anything  the  Reason  at 
all.  It  is  positively  inconceivable,  to  any  intensive 
thinking,  that  the  relation  of  infinite  to  finite,  of  the 


294 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


unconditioned  to  the  conditioned  is  the  mere  me- 
chanical and  quantitative  one  such  as  larger  stream 
to  lesser,  as  has  always  been  assumed,  and  not 
rather  such  as  stream  to  eddy  of  the  stream.  The 
former  is  thinkofable;  oh,  yes,  as  is  thinkofable 
that  two  and  two  is  five,  but  not  thinkable  as  is  that 
two  and  two  is  four.  And  I  say  again,  it  is  abso- 
lutely unthinkable  that  infinite  shrunken  to  finite 
should  not  suflfer  a  jolt  in  the  transition  that  con- 
stitutionally must  radically  altar  it  as  well  as  cir- 
cumscribe it;  so  that  if  the  form  of  the  mental  to 
which  the  fancied  infinite  aboriginal  is  altered  is 
that  of  the  conscious  mind  or  Reason  such  as  is  our 
own,  then  the  former  itself  thus  reduced  and  trans- 
formed must  be  of  quite  another  order  than  that  of 
the  human  Reason,  nevertheless  wholly  incompre- 
hensible to  us  what  definitively  that  form  or  order 
is.  A  thousand  volumes  or  gallons,  more  or  less, 
of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  shrunken  to  the  compass 
of  a  pint  of  water,  evidently  are  not  still,  as  water, 
themselves  in  their  original  integrity  or  condition 
at  all,  yet  that  is  utterly  hidden  from  us  in  what  con- 
dition precisely  they  are.  And  although  the  cases 
are  not  altogether  parallel,  the  latter  is  at  least  sug- 
gestive; and  the  revolution  undergone  by  the  any 
mental  in  its  first  estate  of  infinite  and  aboriginal, 
must,  in  a  drop  from  that  to  the  mental  in  the  form 
of  the  finite  or  human  Reason,  be  nothing  less  as 
great  and  inevitable  as  in  the  above  and  former 
case;  and  the  any  inference  of  what  that  fancied 
infinite  aboriginal  was  (or  is)  from  what  is  the 
human  conscious  mind  or  Reason  is  as  absolutely  im- 


Critique  of  The  Practical  Reason         295 

possible  as  any  inference  as  to  what  oxygen  and 
hydrogen  are  in  their  original  integrity  from  what 
they  are  as  they  appear  as  water.  Nor  is  it  any 
more  against  that  aboriginal  mental  obscure  form's 
obtaining  that  it  is  inappreciable  by  us  what  defi- 
nitely it  is,  than  it  is  against  oxygen  and  hydrogen 
as  objective  realities,  that  the  forms  they  assume  as 
they  appear  as  water  are  beyond  our  divining  what 
precisely  they  are. 

So,  that  there  is  an  actual  infinite  Reason  to 
which  ours  is  finite  is  about  as  irrational  and  un- 
warranted a  proposition  as  well  could  be,  notwith- 
standing the  whole  academic  world  has  shouted  it 
from  time  immemorial. 

The  only  conclusion  left  then  is  that  it  is  the  Rea- 
son cooped  up  in  our  own  brains  that  is  author  or  ori- 
gin of  "ideas  or  forms"  through  which  experience 
is  acquired,  or  else  that  they  have  no  spring  in  the 
Reason  at  all. 

But  I  will  add  that  even  were  the  difference  be- 
tween infinite  or  aboriginal  mental  and  finite  or 
human  mental  merely  the  mechanical  or  quantitative 
one  of  larger  stream  to  lesser,  even  then  the  latter 
would  be  so  robbed  of  power  of  accomplishment 
that  just  what  it  is  robbed  of  might  be  very  that 
power  to  afford  "ideas  or  forms"  through  which 
experience  is  acquired.  And  there  is  no  manner 
of  means  of  knowing,  no  data  for  the  inference, 
that  it  is  not  so.  So  that  viewed  any  way  you  will, 
altogether  without  the  least  warrant  whatever  is 
any  proposition  looking  to  "idea  or  form  through 
which  experience  is  acquired,"  obtaining  first  in  the 


jl-:i.T:j-_'*:Lta.Jt 


296 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


Reason  —  altogether  without  it  even  on  Kant's  own 
ground. 

But  now  to  shift  from  Kant's  own  ground  to 
that  already  hinted,  and  only  which  is  consistent 
with  the  vast  increase  of  our  knowledge  which  has 
come  to  us  since  Kant's  day,  —  to  shift  to  that,  and 
what  then?  Why,  we  get  rid  of  all  this  awkward 
and  cumbersome  freight,  of  academic  distinctions 
dogmatic  and  childish  between  finite  and  infinite, 
between  fancied  aboriginal  conscious  mind,  or  Rea- 
son, and  human  conscious  mind,  or  Reason,  the 
former  of  which  we  know  absolutely  nothing  about, 
not  even  that  it  obtains,  and  have  to  deal  only  with 
that  conscious  mind  or  Reason  within  our  own 
brains  which  we  know  does  obtain  and  which  we 
may  and  do  know  something  about.  And  that, 
the  latter,  we  know  from  experience  and  observa- 
tion to  be,  to  all  appearance,  but  an  aftermath  and 
a  development,  what  is  a  flowering  of  the  mental 
and  not  either,  so  to  speak,  the  whole  plant,  leaf  and 
all,  obtaining  before  the  leaf  otherwise  arrives,  and 
even  from  which  the  leaf,  once  it  otherwise  arrives, 
is  derived,  nor  that  which  is  itself  either  derived  from 
the  leaf,  or  even  from  the  whole  plant,  but  derived, 
that  itself,  the  Reason,  from  what  both  the  leaf  and 
whole  plant  are,  namely,  the  somewhat  utterly  in- 
scrutable in  the  seed.  That  is,  we  know  it  to  be 
what  is  a  flowering  of  the  mental,  and  not  either 
the  whole  mind  the  senses  and  all  obtaining  as  it 
were,  before  the  senses  otherwise  arrive,  and  even 
from  which  these  take  origin,  nor  that  which  itself  is 
either  derived  from  the  senses,  or  even  from  the 


Critique  of  The  Practical  Reason         297 

whole  mind  but  derived  that  itself,  the  Reason,  our 
Reason,  from  what  both  the  senses  and  whole  mmd 
are,   namely,   that  somewhat  infinitely  obscure  to 
us  in  the  mental  in  its  first  estate.    And  this,  what 
is  the  appearance,  we  have  every  fact  and  rational 
consideration   for  believing   is  the   real   situation. 
That  is,  again,  what  is  the  actual  situation  is  not 
that  the  senses  got  their  "idea  or  form"  from  the 
Reason,  and  even  before,  too,  the  Reason  has  an 
actual  existence,  nor  yet  that  the  Reason  itself  gets 
its  own  "idea  or  form"  from  the  senses  exactly  — 
though  this  is  nearer  being  true  than  is  the  reverse 
—  no,  nor  even  that  the  mind  as  a  whole  (which 
of  course  includes  the  Reason)  affords  the  "idea  or 
form"  in  either  case,  but  that  that  which  determmes 
such  in  either  is  a  somewhat  to  us  in  any  articulate 
definiteness  altogether  beyond  our  divining  in  the 
mental  in  its  earlier  and  first  estate ;  the  same  as  is 
what  in  the  seed  is  the  spring  of  leaf,  flower,  and 
plant  altogether,  or  what  in  the  germ-cell  is  the 
source  of  the  full-fledged  chicken,  utterly  beyond 
our  realizing.     And  that  earlier  and  first  estate  of 
the  mental,  as  I  have  argued  in  the  text  of  this 
treatise,  we  can  no  better  term  than  as  the  Pri- 
mordial Mental  and  what,  as  we  have  said,  answers 
to  Soul,  and  very  Soul  of  the  universe,  and  what, 
primarily,  unconscious  and  knowing  nothing,  still 
does  everything  without  consciousness  of  its  doing 
anything.     And  that  it  is,  the  Primordial  Mental 
—  of  which  the  seed  and  the  germ-cell  are  ana- 
logues, —  what  indeed  is  very  the  Soul  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  of  which  we  can  only  say  with  any  as- 


298 


Critique  of  Pure  Kant 


surance  and  intelligence  that  It  IS,  while  we  must 
believe  at  least,  that  it  IS  from  everlasting  to  ever- 
lasting, which  is  that  in  which  the  manifest  universe 
potentially  obtains  in  a  form  absolutely  inscrutable  to 
us,  as  is  the  plant  in  the  seed,  the  chick  in  the  germ- 
cell,  and  wherein  is  the  origin,  and  not  the  Reason 
wherein  is  the  origin,  of  the  any  "idea  or  form 
through  which  experience  is  acquired,"  as  it  is,  also, 
the  origin  of  all  classes  of  ideas,  or  forms  through 
which  all  "experience"  transcendental  or  sensuous 
"is  acquired." 


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